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Future War Question 1
By Charlie
Based on the previous post, We’ll take a look at (in general) the ways generic enemy conventional militaries might respond to an attack by the US. The purpose of this is to examine how enemy “conventional” militaries may adapt and respond based off of the contemporary operating environment. The reason I chose to post on this is the increased attention that COIN has received in Army training and doctrine. [full disclosure] I believe this new emphasis on COIN is well deserved, but many in the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marines believe that we need to focus on preparations for more conventional future threats. A question to examine from the side of the anti-COIN-centric planners is: will conventional threats continue to organize and fight the way they always have, despite recent battlefield developments?
The first question that will be addressed will be: Will nation-state adversaries plan to fight the US based off of OIF I tactics?
From Wikipedia, here’s how Saddam’s military responded to the Coalition assault in OIF I:
The Iraqi army, armed mainly with Soviet-built equipment, was overall ill-equipped in comparison to the U.S. and UK forces. Attacks on U.S. supply routes by Fedayeen militiamen were repulsed. The Iraqis' artillery proved largely ineffective, and they were unable to mobilize their air force to attempt a defense. The Iraqi T-72 tanks, the heaviest armored vehicles in the Iraqi Army, were both outdated and ill-maintained, and when they were mobilized they were rapidly destroyed, thanks in part to U.S. and UK air supremacy. The U.S. Air Force, Marine Corps, Naval Aviation, and British Royal Air Force operated with impunity throughout the country, pinpointing heavily defended resistance targets and destroying them before ground troops arrived.
While many third world armies are equipped with Soviet-era weapons, the equipment maintenance status and crew training and proficiency often contribute to the “real” threat that these systems pose. Simply having a system like a 2S2 or a SA-18 does not necessarily mean it will be technically and tactically employed on the battlefield. Looking at the poor performance of the Iraqi military, the use of conventional, or traditional Warsaw-pact tactics against an advancing armored column by a generic threat force may seem futile. Conventional threat artillery and air forces are usually the focus of conventional US tactics, but overwhelming US airpower obliterated the enemy air threat, and ground forces moved with speed that quickly eclipsed enemy artillery plans. So OCA and counter-battery missions for the blue forces are so effective they have worked themselves out of a job. Additionally, large concentrations of enemy troops or equipment become juicy targets for the Blue Forces.
The Iraqi Army suffered from poor morale, even amongst the elite Republican Guard. Entire units disbanded into the crowds upon the approach of invading troops, or actually sought out U.S. and UK forces out to surrender. In one case, a force of roughly 20-30 Iraqis attempted to surrender to a two-man vehicle repair and recovery team, invoking similar instances of Iraqis surrendering to news crews during the Persian Gulf War.
Morale among potential red forces certainly plays an issue in any future conflict. However, we cannot accurately plan for such “self demobilizations” in the future. Additionally, if command and control mechanism among tactical units breaks quickly, it strengthens the logical argument of pro-COIN advocates. Planning against future potential enemies requires the assumption that units will retain some level of tactical C2.
Worse, the Iraqi Army had incompetent leadership - reports state that Qusay Hussein, charged with the defense of Baghdad, dramatically shifted the positions of the two main divisions protecting Baghdad several times in the days before the arrival of U.S. forces, and as a result the units within were both confused and further demoralized when U.S. Marine and British forces attacked.
Poor tactical execution of C2 ops, and frequently shifting orders and plans plays into the hands of Blue Force planners. Threat conventional units may not be able to practice effective command and control, depending on the situation. Confusion and poor morale provides an opportunity for Blue Force operations to exploit gaps in red plans. If conventional planners attempt to assign perfect C2 to threat actors, they may be giving too much credit to the Red Forces.
U.S. and UK units had orders to move to and seize objective target-points rather than seek engagements with Iraqi units. This resulted in most regular Iraqi military units emerging from the war fully intact and without ever having been engaged by U.S. forces, especially in southern Iraq. It is assumed that most units disintegrated to either join the growing Iraqi insurgency or returned to their homes.
This is a prime example of poor C2 among threat forces: rear units that were bypassed by the Blue main effort could have executed counterattacks or rearguard actions, but poor C2 structures led to complete breakdowns in command and control. This was exacerbated by the use of conscripts –common in many third-world militaries. Although it may be preferable for Red planners to hope for durable C2 during a full Blue assault, it may not be possible to effectively plan for and organize a counter attack with a conscript army with vulnerable C2 nodes.
According to the declassified Pentagon report, "The largest contributing factor to the complete defeat of Iraq's military forces was the continued interference by Saddam." The report, designed to help U.S. officials understand in hindsight how Saddam and his military commanders prepared for and fought the invasion, paints a picture of an Iraqi government blind to the threat it faced, hampered by Saddam's inept military leadership and deceived by its own propaganda and inability to believe the United States would invade a sovereign country without provocation. According to the BBC, the report portrays Saddam Hussein as "chronically out of touch with reality - preoccupied with the prevention of domestic unrest and with the threat posed by Iran.”
Intervention by the Leader (again, we are assuming a generic opponent) is a fact that planners must factor in to their scenarios. There is an assumption of giving the Red Forces the planning and operational capacity of the Blue Forces, which ignores that cultural and political realities of the enemy. Poor top-level leadership, operational-level incompetence, and poor execution of Red Plans all contribute to the chaotic situations that arise in tactical engagements.
So, to summarize: Will nation-state adversaries plan to fight the US based off of OIF I tactics? Would a smart but realistic OPFOR organize, defend, and counter a Blur invasion in a method similar to Saddam?
Maneuver: Due to the inherent problems in equipment, facets or the Cold War, such as tanks and artillery pieces, seem to be of less value to the Red Forces. Negating Red armored and mechanized tactics produces a limited range of tactical options for the opposing force, which may force a switch for smart red planners in the future. Red Maneuver tactics must now react to pervasive Blue Air supremacy and fast, agile, networked, and deadly Blue ground forces. Relying on the strategy that Saddam used, relying on rings of conscripts and elite troops to guard the capitol was not an effective strategy for Saddam. A Red Force adopting similar tactics would likely meet the same fate.
Firepower: Red airpower is simply not effective against Blue forces, unless it could be hidden in hardened facilities and used as a compliment to a combined arms counterattack. Artillery in the traditional sense –brigade artillery groups massing fires, is equally doomed due to the signatures it produces in a conventional fight. The moment an enemy artillery group is identified, it will be targeted. Firepower, however, remains an essential war fighting function. Its proper use in an adapted battlefield environment may lend an advantage to Red forces, but it must be conserved as a fighting asset.
C2: Effective Red Command and Control will always be difficult to effectively war game against. Red Force C2 will always be influenced by a galaxy of factors that Blue will never fully understand. Effective Red C2 is hampered by leader experience on all levels, especially at the mid-level where an effective NCO corps could expedite orders and plans. Training, effectiveness, and discipline must also be factored in to the C2 discussion –even if clear and concise orders are received by a unit, can that unit execute them? Can units that were bypassed by the Blue main effort effectively organize a counter attack? The failure of Red forces to field durable and survivable C2 structures seems to be a continuing vulnerability.
What we are left with is a plain picture that organizing and training a generic enemy force based off of the Iraqi model is a prescription for failure, but that conclusion seems fairly self-evident. Discussion of this topic in this context adds value to the practice of COIN-centric training, because the rapid and decisive defeat of an enemy force translates directly into a phase IV operation. But what if future armies abandon these tactics and try something new? The question that logically follows is: if the old tactics don’t work, what will? Will enemy conventional armies fight conventionally in the future?
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Comments
Excellent comment Marcus. No wonder the Romans were so damned good...
I thought I saw recently that the Chinese were standing up two more armor divisions. It may well be that they have no intent of going toe to toe with the US conventionally and are bringing these on line for use against (less than peer) competitors like Taiwan. As someone else noted, if we own space and the skies, then Armor Divisions are primarily "juicy targets" for stand-off systems. Palm groves filled with burned out T-72s, BMPs and HETs (one per worthless dug-in hide position) were an awesome sight. But the Chinese have shown a desire to eliminate our space advantage which indicates an intention to match us conventionally. The Iranians would likely adopt an OIF 1-4 approach with an attempt to defeat our maneuver forces in the mountainous terrain S and W of Tehran followed by an unconventional counter-strike. National pride and politics will probably compel at least a showing of a conventional defense by most nation-states.
After reviewing what has happened in Iraq and to a lesser extent Somalia, I doubt a regional power like Iran would ever attempt a flat out fight against US or UK forces. For all the reasons mentioned by Marcus.
What would happen facing North Korea is a different story. While supplied with older technology, there is no reason to believe its forces suffer from low moral. The impact of low food supplies might mitigate their desire to fight, however.
I truly doubt we will ever fight the Chinese in the manner in which we planned to battle the Warsaw Pact. We would be crazy to land on the Chinese mainland with the current size of our army.
Even Taiwan would not present that type of war. I'm not sure if we would even have the time to land large numbers of ground forces before such a conflict ended one way or another.
I also cannot see the Chinese being aggressive along their border. There is no positive take away from such a move. Why destroy their export economy in order to snap up a smaller or less capable neighbor?
As long as we can keep the enemy in front of us, we're going to win, hands down. Our capacity of focused destruction is presently unmatched, even if it is delivered at the hands of a 22 yr old lieutenant in a 58 year old bomber. As long as you can keep the bomber above the battlefield vice driven off or downed, the outcome will never be in doubt. Right now that is enough to win the battles, but will that be enough to win the war? The answer to this question will be in the assumptions you make. Tactics, doctrine, will, and technical expertise all play a part in the outcome. I'm sure the War Colleges debate this every semester.
The two things to look for in an planning your battles are Capability and Intent. China's big concern has been and probably is still Russia. But, while their intent may not have changed, their capabilities have. AQI's intent towards us has not changed in the last 3 years, but their capability has. Iran's intent toward us have not changed, but has their capabilities? Does this picture change with the introduction of nukes?
Pakistan, the Serbia of the 21st century.
America's military must plan to engage formidable adversaries, not incompetent ones. We must be ready to face any threat, on any battlefield.
Most importantly, we must be prepared to fight the 21st Century, urban fight where maneuver and employment of combined arms becomes difficult, if not impossible.
How would we defend Los Angeles from foreign attack, or defeat an enemy in the streets of Hong Kong?
The next war will be nothing like anything we have ever seen and to base our preparedness on Bozos like Saddam Huessain is suicidal.
Please read "Crack in the Foundation" by H.R. McMaster: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/mcmaster_foundation.pdf
The biggest problem with this discussion, as I read it, is that it assumes that the US is the invading force. If that is the casee, then yes, absolutely, we can expect the enemy to do exactly what we saw in the conclusion of OIF, strip off uniforms, disperse, and form the basis of an insurgency. I think if we roll into Iran, we will see those same tactics. If we charge north of the DMZ, we can expect the NODAKs to do the same thing. Hell, even China (if for some reason we were dumb enough to assault the mainland) would probably adopt a very similiar strategy.
But all of these things assume the same thing that we always critique, an assumption that the next war will be like this one. That we will have the early initiative, that we will be taking the fight into the enemy's home, and that they will be defending themselves in the best way possible. Unfortunately, this is not likely for the simple fact that our wars are rarely consistently the same.
I personally do not think we will ever go to war with China. I agree with early comments that it would be a far greater blow to their economics to pick that kind of fight than they could really afford. However, it is not easy to predict what motivates another to start a war. Often there are issues that have nothing to do with us at all, yet we only assess their likelihood to start the war based on how it would impact our relations with them. Very often, we see our opponents are surprised by our interests after they've already initiated the attack.
So with that in mind, China could very well attak Taiwan or attempt to seize islands in the South China Sea or hell, finally decide to shut up that nut job in Pyongyang and just seize the country for themselves. Rarely have we accurately predicted the next war. At any rate, if China is the next fight, it will be far different from any we have seen previously.
And while I completely agree with the statement that "air power does not win wars" I think this would be a good example of "land power does not win wars" also. A fight with China will lean heavily on air and naval power with little, if any, land support invovled. And in both these areas, China is getting very advanced technology and is significantly improving their training as well.
I applaud the Army's adoption of greater COIN strategy and their advances in that area. I believe it is very important for the Air Force and the Navy to learn how to best support that fight via fire support and ISR. However, I think transitioning the entire US military to a COIN-centric doctrine would be a huge mistake. There will be stand-up fights again. There will be invasions of other countries against our allies that will not involve insurgency tactics at all. Which means we will need to be prepared to fight any fight we come across, including those that involve big dollar, high technology weapons systems.
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It all boils down to training.
The "Red" doctrine was and is sound. In fact, the old Soviet model and its derivatives are not all that much different than our own doctrine. Overwatching obstacles with fires, conducting reconnaissance, and integration of fires and other effects are all shared doctinal concepts. I could go on for hours, but the bottom line is that our doctrine was never all that different than the Soviets. Hell, most Americans never understood their own doctrine, let alone that of the enemy's, so it was easy to create misperceptions.
I think the other problem with the posted argument is the over-reliance on air power. Air power alone did not defeat the Germans, the North Koreans, the Chinese, the Vietnamese, the Iraqis, the Somalis, the Serbs, the Taliban, or anyone else for that matter. Air supremacy is nice to have, but it does not win wars in and of itself. It is just one piece of the combined arms fight. Used properly it can be important; used improperly it is a waste of time (for the record I lump attack aviation or "CCA" in with close air support "CAS").
I served with an "OPFOR" unit for several years, and in my experience the American military can be defeated in a "HIC" environment. Even with all the technological advantages it can and will lose to a better trained enemy.
The good thing for us is that we have the best trained people in the world and we haven't been forced to learn this lesson on a real battlefield.
Any technological advantage can be mitigated. That is fact.
At the end of the day it is training that is decisive. More intricate and expensive technical gizmos will give you advantages, but at a certain point they create diminishing returns. Men that are disciplined in the fundamentals, and trained on them well will be victorious.
Marcus