Over at Tom Rick’s Best Defense there is an interesting discussion regarding “what the Army has learned from the wars of 9-11?” I have posted a very long comment to his original blog post; I would recommend you read the blog and the comments and then come back and read my comments which are posted here at OP-FOR.
Tom,
Your question “what has the Army learned over the last ten years of war?” is very perceptive.
Since I first read the question yesterday I have been giving it a lot of thought. I read through some of the comments today and found some great insights and others that merely repeated oft heard commentary.
Brian Linn in his book Echo of Battle identified the three cultures within the Army; one of which is the Guardians. This culture guards what they believe are the historic ethos of the nation. Today the Guardians are the dominant culture in the Army; as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan wind down, they are determined to ensure they restore the Army they are comfortable with, the Army that focuses on winning the grand wars and to avoid fighting wars of stability. They are the culture that plays up the future threat of China and Iraq, and seek to define the need for the Army within the traditional boundaries understood since the end of World War II. But in order to dominate the culture of the Army they will have to work hand in hand with the Manager culture. The Managers are the ones who adhere to the rigid proprieties of the system—in some ways these two sub-cultures complement each other. The last sub culture with the Army is that of the Heroic. These are the ones who understand how to fight wars, where it be grand wars or insurgencies. They will be losers and will find it hard to deal with the bullshit of the Guardians and Managers.
I mentioned Linn for one reason; because few in the Army understand it roles and responsibilities. One of your commentators stated, “The failure in the use of analytics to make effective core decisions in how the US Army leads, plans, and executes its military operations and its Title X operations (train & equip) ultimately is a failure of basic leadership.[,]” highlighted one of the greatest failure of those in the Army, they Army does not plan or execute Operations. When I speak of the Army—of course I am referring to HQDA and the Institutional Army. Rather they support Joint Operations by providing trained, ready, and equipped forces to the Joint Commander. (Let me also be a little snarky—I am tired of seeing it written as Title X, whenever I do see it written this way it means the individual has never picked up a copy of Title 10.) But the author of that comment highlighted a fundamental problem with the Army over the last ten years—it has not adjusted it processes to support the war. Most of the Army’s uniformed Senior leaders do not understand what Title 10 means or how it effects the Army. Just like the commentator many believe they have a say in Operational matters, unless a Joint Task Force Commander their only role is to support.
Some of the failures of Army processes:
- Procurement; why did the Army continue to procure Up-Armored HMMWV when it was evident in 2004 that they were death traps when hit by an IEDs, that they were overweight, top heavy, and underpowered because of all the additional weight. It took Secretary Gates to push the Army and USMC out of their comfort zone in order to procure the MRAP. He literally had to circumvent the overly bureaucratic service procurement processes.
- Promotions; the Army has not adjusted it promotion guidelines to fast track those who have demonstrated ability to execute and fight the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
- The Army failed to cull the deadwood. One of the great things George Marshall did at the beginning of World War II was to cull the deadwood within the officer corps.
- While the Army instituted Operational Needs Statements (ONS) early in the conflicts, it allowed the system to become “Toys for Boys” where every Battalion Commander, when influenced by contractors, got what he or she considered to be the latest greatest toy. The end result was the Army bought a lot of kit that ultimately turned out to be crap.
- The Army Combat Uniform. Enough said.
- Rather than flattening command levels, the Army maintained the status quo and allowed the Headquarters to become too large. (Army HQs 1000+; Corps 800+; Division 700+; Brigade 200+). The larger the Headquarters makes harder it becomes to get the important information to the leaders.
- Rotating General Officer forward through positions so they can get the coveted right sleeve patch.
In short, as much as possible the Army has maintained the “Status Quo Ante Bellum.”
Now we see the Guardians and Managers throwing around the buzzwords of a bureaucracy seeking to recreate the Army they grew up in:
- Realigning Division to Corps, and Brigades to Divisions; we have suddenly determine that a Brigade Commander must be on the same post as a two star division commander in order to be properly supervised.
- Realigning Combat Aviation Brigades with Corps and Divisions—remember the whole point of modularity was to make Brigade self-contained elements that could deploy with any type of Headquarters.
- Realigning Fires Brigades with Division Headquarters.
- While it has been articulated yet look for us to align Expeditionary Sustainment Commands with Corps, and Sustainment Brigades with Divisions.
- There is concern within the Senior Leadership we have a whole generation who doesn’t know how to operate in garrison. True they do have to learn something about how to maintain and account for their kit, how to conduct their own training. But I have a startling thought for the Senior leaders, most of our junior leaders are pretty smart and will figure it out. An ass chewing from the Brigade Commander for shoddy maintenance or a Report of Survey or whatever we are calling it today will get a leaders attention on accounting for property. Sure they will need some mentoring. What I am afraid is the code word for how to operate in garrison means unnecessary meeting and formations; CSM deciding the rocks need painting white etc. All the bullshit the Army is famous.
- The Sergeant Major of the Army talking about overweight soldiers, standards, getting rid of the bad apples I can see it now the soldier who has served four, five, or six tours in either Iraq or Afghanistan is going to be thrown out because he is overweight but can pass his PT test! There is no question there are bad apples we need to get rid of, but the Army being the Army we will mange to throw the baby out with the bath water.
- Can starching uniforms be far behind—walking around the Pentagon I am amazed at the number who have their ACUs starched!
- The Army as a Profession—while a needed discussion I worry is about getting rid of those who don’t fit our Senior leader mold of what a “professional is or should be.”
- The Army says it needs to keep mid-grade leaders for expansibility—but based on the latest O6 board results, not so much. There was a 34% selection rate—including a number of former battalion commanders who had 2 or more 1 block OERs. This is a direct result of a number of factors—grade plate review, MTO&E changes, etc which when institute the second and third order effect were not considered or were ignored by the Colonels who developed the plans. (Remember a hog don’t slaughter itself!) Of course if the Army choose to get cull the herd of Colonels and Lieutenant Colonels who have no promotion potential and who are essentially robbing oxygen until they hit their mandatory retirement date.
The Guardian-Managers are going to make the rules and will make life hard for those who rightly belong to the Heroic sub-culture.
One of the points you touched on was why the Army can’t seem to develop Strategic leaders. Very simply it does not tolerate intellectuals. Yes there have been a few in recent years; I will name the ones I think fit that mold during my time in the Army (1976-2009): Bernard Rogers, Shy Meyer, John Galvin, Colin Powell, Max Thurman, Donn Starry, Eric Shinseki, David Petraeus, Gary Luck, Martin Dempsey and Dan Bolger. Rogers, Meyer, Galvin, Thurman, and Starry were a product of an era where being smart was not necessarily a sin. Powell because of his assignments developed into a Strategic thinker. The others developed their ability because of education, assignments, and mentorship. Because of their mentors they able to overcome the prejudice against smart people.
In recent years the Army created a functional area “Strategic Plans and Policy.” Many of those in this functional area have come be believe they are “Strategists.” While smart few of them are Strategists. (In fact the career field is misnamed it should be Operations, Plans, and Policy; with some being selected based on their performance to be a select core of Strategists.) The Army seems to believe that if you recreate the education experience of David Petraeus you will create the next generation of strategists. Unfortunately before someone can be a Strategist they must first be a creative thinker.
Most officers entering the Army are not creative thinkers. Either they are graduates of academically deficient institutions or they major in a discipline that was the path of least resistance. In short by and large the Officer Corps is intellectually deficient. Someone who has the potential to be a strategist must first be intellectually curious, a creative thinker, and willing to take on the status quo. Lastly the Army’s educational system does not encourage either creative thinking or intellectually curiosity. As they use to say at Command and General Staff College, “it is only reading if you read it.”
Back to your original question will the Army learn anything from the last ten years. Probably not. . .certainly the Center for Military History is not interested in what has happened in the last years. The Combat Studies Institute at Leavenworth is studying some areas of what has happened in the last ten years. But if we really want to know what the Army has learned or how it has changed it is going to be the work of someone outside the Army.
Townie,
Good read – looks like you unloaded a number of posts into one response to Tom Ricks. Off the top:
1. Yes, the Pentomic Army is the model for the Modular Force.
2. Starched ACU has already returned. Getting rid of MOLLE is likely next.
I am wondering if the model of the British and German Imperial War staffs is not the answer. 4 years in the Regiment, followed by 40 years as a Red-tabber to remove Managers and Guardians from the field. We’d see an occasional Battle of Isandlwana, but ultimately the Heroes would triumph.
Dave O:
I tend to disagree with you on the Pentomic Army; the Battle Groups were to always operate as part of a Division; the Modular BCT is suppose to be able to to operate independently.
I realize that starched ACU are here; concur; what would replace MOLLE with and why would we replace it. If we go back to LBE that would be a step backwards.
The Imperial General Staff–might be a good idea; but there has to be a very definite selection process.
MOLLE allows soldiers to arrange their kit according to their need, which defeats uniformity.
I disagree that the Modular BCT is capable of independence. It should interface seamlessly with any type of HQ, and with the non-maneuver WFA to make up for its lack of organic assets. That’s why it’s not independent. The Pentomic Army wasn’t expected to exist beyond its on-board stocks of ammo and fuel, with a division HQ at partial effectiveness due to constant movement/nuclear attacks.
The beauty of MOLLE is it designed to drive CSM bat shit.
I think the three categories identified here are ovely broad. Fitting everyone in a 500-700K organization into just one of these three rounds off so many sharp edges as to distort the selections.It also leaves out what I think is the real split–special forces versus conventional. Both have elements of all three types, but each is oriented by inclination and experience in vastly different directions. And it leaves out the guys who can work with the other services easily (but that would probably be about six guys total in the whole army–there are likely fewer in the other services).That’s the other talent we really need to develop, and have yet to do–maybe tight money will force it, but my experience at HQDA in 92-95 says money never gets THAT tight.
That said, an army needs a lot more than just “heroes.” An army must be an organization that can last indefinitely–way beyond the time horizons of anyone in it–so it must develop policies and procedures that let it exist for all time. That takes a lot of smart managers. In my experience (1973-2000), too few people in troop units (or who see themselves as troop unit guys–”heroics”?–want to work in the institutional army and make it work better than it does. And that means that the unqualified/already in place/whatever guys end up doing that kind of vital work. Now that people can (I assume still) serve past 30, maybe we can get those smart field guys to come work in the building and make for some real change.
At the same time, your point about how most officers are not creative thinkers is well-taken. I miss some of those I served with as a lieutenant and captain–those folks who were what we used to call “draft-induced” officers who joined because they had to and found out they liked it. (Of course, the dolt coefficient, particularly until the 1974-5 SERBs and RIFs occurred, was pretty high).We also used to have a few elite college guys around, too, leftovers from the days before ROTC lost its academic status at thosekinds of colleges. Maybe now that some of the Ivies are contemplating letting ROTC back will help, though that will take many years.
The current times remind me of the two great resets we had in my 27 years–getting over Viet Nam, which we did by focusing exclusively on Europe and the Warsaw Pact; and shrinking after the first Gulf War, when the Army shed about a third of its LTCs and colonels (I had just been selected for 05–above the zone, I might add– and my boss got his SERB notice about the same time; I replaced another SERB’d guy on the Army staff). So perhaps your point about 06 selection is similar–it is time to get rid of some guys–of course, as in any selection process, the just and unjust will be lumped together. I sense the smart combat arms junior officers self-selected themselves out over the past 10 years–no opportunity to have a family, which is something we old Cold Warriors could at least do–take them to Europe for years, too.
Frankly, the post-war Army offers little except stability to its officers and families, which is what the post-Gulf War army did (as did the post-WWI and WWII armies). We don’t train for stability–we improvise it, and we never get it right, not at first. Now is one of those times when we will transition to stability, and we will likely screw up the first few years until we settle down.
And then if we’re lucky, we’ll get a better war.
Mike,
Great comments. You are correct, broad categories are unfair. In fact I would argue that the service is made up of individuals who posses some of all the three cultures mentioned. The point that Linn was making in his book, and the point I was making is that aspects of a particular culture tend to dominate the life of the military and that it is a wax and wane which occurs over generations.
You are also correct about the line between conventional and special forces. While I have a great deal of admiration for the SF I wonder if we would be better off if they were their own service. Particularly in tough budget times, what the services have to pay to equip those assets can pay for alot of soldiers or kit for conventional forces.
Mike, not all of the folks in “troop” units are the heroic culture; quite a few are the guardians and the managers. Again spot on the divide between the operational army and the institutional army is wide. I know for me, my first assignment after the basic course was Fort Leonard Wood–a TRADOC assisgnment–and throughout my career that was seen by my branch guy as being an albatross around my neck. As long as TRADOC or HQDA or Joint Staff is seen as something to avoid and you can still go to the top nothing will change.
You mentioned the vision thing. I think by and large most CSA and leaders in the Army want to leave their mark and they don’t think about what the Army should be in twenty or thirty years. My observation about the Army is it is parnoid and as such are hamfisted when it comes to easily telling the political class why we need an Army. The USMC, who is the best PR firm in America, will send their Commandant to the Hill–he will take powerpoint slide with three or four bullets and then have discussion with the HASC or SASC. THe Army on the other hand will send the CSA up there with 27 horse holders each carrying 2 or 3, 4 inch binders, and the Chief himself will have a fifty slide powerpoint presentation. Rather than discussing with the HASC or SASC it will be a race to get through all the slides. Unfortunately the slides with their complex graphics and unintelligible Army speak will leave the committees dazed, confused, and less informed than when it all started.
Your contrast between USMC/USA briefing style reminded me of my first week at “Mother I” when we were briefed on the different services to help us decide which one we wanted to join.
First up was the USAF presentation by a young Captain. He excitedly explained how the Air Force was the wave of the future with the best technology and best post-service career opportunities in the newly emerging IT field.
Second came a USN Lt. Cmdr., sounding amazingly like Mr. Howell from Gilligan’s Island, and explaining that joining the Navy could allow you to serve as an “Officer and a Gentleman”, and cruise the globe to exotic ports of call.
Third came the Army. A Major stood behind the lecturn and began a dry recitation of bullet points from overhead slides (pre-powerpoint). “You should choose Army option for – next slide – good pay, good training, good family benefits – next slide – leadership opportunities, graduate school…..etc.”
The final presenation was by the indomitable Col. William “Bill” Dabney. Instead of the stairs, he bounded up on the stage in JM Hall, refused the microphone and podium and boomed “If you haven’t already chosen the Marine Corps, we don’t want you!” He then jumped down from the stage and returned to his seat.
Which presentation do you think was most effective?
Colonel Dabney was a trip and a half!
A couple of other thoughts: some of the really big issues over the next few years will relove around people vs. machines. In aviation, for instance, I can see the end of the Apache and similar aircraft as more and more low-cost drones–greater loiter time, no pilots to recover, etc–taking over not just surveillance but actually delivering ordnance–close air support will likely be all-drone at some point. That’s probably a good thing, but I bet aviators won’t like being turned into troop carriers and medevac pilots–the internal fight over resource allocation will be a huge deal.
The other big fight is over how much electronics, variously defined, will dominate the battlefield. Drones are just one example, but I bet the amount of resources we will devote to networking and intelligence collection and dissemination will become extraordinarily high. This will also reduce the need for people, in part to pay for it and in part because individual soldiers and units will become more lethal.
These two fights will cause a problem when we next have to occupy someone else’s country–I don’t think that’;s ever really going to go away–and i wonder where the proverbial boots on the ground will come from. In a way, we’re going to become more like the Navy and Air Force–more expensive platforms with far more capability, but less flexibility. Drones make lousy TCPs, for example. Or maybe better ones will.
I predict the internal fights over who loses people to fund machines will drive us batty over the next few years, and we really won’t care as much about painting rocks and MOLLE–we’ll be too busy cleaning up after gored oxen.
Mike,
Great points. I think the question of manned v. unmanned is spot on and is going to create a huge change in the culture of the USAF. The one areas where you will not see human pilots replaced will be in aircraft that transport personnel.
The services, and in partiuclar the Army, are preparing to sacrifice people in order to buy hi tech weapons. The reduction in personnel within the services and I think there is a reasonable chance we will see the Army shrink below 400K in the next ten years in order to pay for increasingly expensive weapons systems. A smaller military will result in a culture even more isolated from the society as a whole. Will the end results they begin to feel they are somehow better than society as a whole. Huntington and Mokoas could have fun with this question.