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Musings on the USAF
By Townie 76
John and I have been having a private email conversation for several months regarding the state of Air Force leadership. Let me say upfront that I have a great deal of respect for individual members of the United States Air Force. In fact, my only Brother Rat to make General Officer, is in the Air Force, and believe it or not is not a rated Pilot.
I have been around Air Force Officers my whole life, and in fact, in a tacit admission, started in Air Force ROTC and would have remain if I could have been a Pilot.
The Air Force Officers of 50 years ago were quite different than those today. I think of my Dad’ Law Partner, William C. Plott, who was graduate of the University of Oklahoma and then went and graduated from West Point! While he started in the Army Air Corps flying bombers in World War II, at different points in his career he was a fighter pilot and transport pilot. He went to law school and then taught law at West Point. Why do I mention his career, as his is very similar to those who were pioneers in the USAF—they were Army Officers first and then Pilots. They understood the ethos of leadership, they were in leadership positions early in their career, they understood the Army as they shared a common language.
But the zoom zoom fighter boys of the modern Air Force quickly replaced the culture of the early Air Force. War was an abstract to them as they saw it from 30,000 feet. I can remember COL Bill Plott telling me, that when he was an Air Controller in Vietnam that the Army and Marines would ask him to direct either USMC or USN close air in before calling on the Air Force. He understood their reason, for the USAF often did not deliver the ordnance on target because they came in high and fast, whereas the Navy and Marine pilots would come in low and slow if that what it took. The Air Force has always looked down on the grunt, look down on the CAS mission, and has always believed that with enough planes and bombs they could win the war. T. R. Fernenbacher said it best, and I paraphrase, you can fly over it, you can bomb it, you can strafe it, but if you want to hold it soldiers must stand on the ground.
Recently the Secretary of Defense decapitated the Senior Air Force Civilian and Military leaders, of course I speak figuratively, as they resigned or retired over the loss of control of nuclear weapons. But it also reflected a frustration of the Senior Civilian leadership with the Air Force in that they were arrogant in their distain for the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.
To understand the Air Force one must understand that you count only if you are a Pilot. At one time the bomber boys ran the Air Force, but in recent years the top of the heap were the Pilots. You know the ones, leather flight jackets, sunglasses, looking like something out of Top Gun. They have swagger, they have style, they are arrogant. They also know of nothing of leadership. A 2nd or 1st Lieutenant flyboy knows nothings of leading men and women. He has only one concern his airplane. He is not expected to lead until he is Captain when he may be a flight commander, but then he is only leading one other a pilot. Real Command in the Air Force does not come until one Commands a Squadron, and for a Fighter Pilot there are few enlisted to lead, just pilots. For an Air Force Officer Wing Command is there first integrated Command, when they must lead both the ground support and the Pilots.
So how does the Air Force lead—very poorly. Except for the Special Operations Troops, the Transporters, and Warthog Drivers, they have no understanding or empthy for the ground troops, but more importantly they do not know how to lead. They are poorly versed in anything but flying airplanes, they have very little Strategic understanding nor any concept of developing good Strategic and Operational Plans and orders. As General Officers they often find themselves in key billets at Joint Commands without the background or tools necessary to perform their missions.
I do not say these things lightly, for I am tarnishing the reputation of brothers in arms, however my experience over the last four years has led me to conclude that the Air Force is a service badly in need of leadership and without understanding that they play a role in supporting the National Security Strategy of the United States. My wife is constantly upset with my comments when I see an Advertisement or Story glorifying the United States Air Force—my comment is usually F%^$$##@ the Air Force. I come to this from my experience with the Air Force in Iraq and in dealing with CENTAF in the CENTCOM AOR.
When I first arrived in Iraq I worked for an Air Force Major General. He was a fighter pilot, an Air Force Academy Graduate, and the most arrogant self-serving individual I have ever known. He was in charge of Strategic Plan and Policy for MNFI. He pretended to be a warrior—strutting around in Starched BDUs, Pilots Glasses, 9mm Rose Wood Handles slung low on one leg and on the other a large Arkansas Toothpick like knife. He led by intimidation and fear. He regularly berated officers for making recommendations and proposing Strategic Options, which he did not agree. I personally witness him berate and belittle an Army Colonel Promotable whose only sin was trying to inform him how ground operations should be conducted in a counter-insurgency environment.
More recently I spent the better part of week defending the Army’s use of Air Force personnel because the CENTAF Commander believed that the Army had changed their mission and that what they were doing was not important. Regardless of the facts that these teams looking for excess and equipment which could be retrograded to the United States worth millions of dollars, the CENTAF Commander required USARCENT to spend countless hours worrying about a rather trival matter. It boiled down to the understanding of TACON meant. In the end we won they day but not without a lot of heartache.
The Air Force Senior Leaders—most recently articulated by Major General Charles Dunlap—the fighting JAG—that they see no glory in what we are doing in Iraq and Afghanistan—that they want to be the fly boys of their gloried and sullied past. They have established policies, where the Air Force spend 4 month rotations in support in Iraq and Afghanistan. The tours of duty are short compared to the bone crushing tours of the Army and the USMC. The Navy, who could argue that serving in land combat operations, is far from their core mission, in contrast to the Air Force has routinely served at least six month and many have served one year tours in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Navy (they refer to themselves at times as the Narmy,) led by then CNO Mike Mullens, and now CJCS Mullens clearly understood that when the nation calls real warrior serve where their nation acts.
The United States Air Force has good men and women serving. They are patriots who have chosen to serve their nation. Unfortunately for those men and women they have joined a service who leadership has failed the nation and who is more interested in how many airplanes they have than supporting the National Security interest of the nation.
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Comments
the fact that the chief and secaf were relieved at the same time speaks volumes about the current air force culture. they have some serious issues that need to be worked out.
I agree 100%!
I've served in 3 of 4 branches of the Mil (not the Navy) and I've seen what Leadership is and what it isn't.
The Air Force isn't.
I am sorry but I do not agree at all. The Air Force has its problems like everyone else. Yes having our bosses canned was embarassing and no we do not see as much action as the infantry. That is not our job. I would much rather field a first class air force than a second rate army, which is what the author seems to be advocating when he insists on placing Airmen into "green" billets.
Who can remember the last time our soldiers were strafed by enemy aircraft?
BSR... as a fellow zoomie, I hear what you're saying. But I must concur with the Colonel here. The Air Force is hopelessly lost right now. It's bad to the point that I'm thinking the Army Air Corps isn't such a bad idea...
I'd also point out that this isn't some anti-Air Force screed. The author clearly laments the fact that he's denigrating his fellow service members, but comes armed with very specific examples and plausible causes/solutions.
That makes the post worthy of a head turn or two.
All of this makes me second guess enlisting in the USAF right now. I would like to make the military my career. I just took my ASVAB and am going for my physical in 3 weeks. I have high hopes of qualifying for the pt test for Pararescue. What other options do I have, should I let this blog make me think twice. I'm 23 and I've been wanting this for a long time now...
Jeff,
I am going to steal a phrase here from the Bible.
Let not your heart be troubled. When you look at the military, remember that it is an institution, just like anything else. There are good points and there are bad points to everything you will do in life.
The fact that 2 people were fired should not cause you to second guess your decision to enlist, because the odds are that you will probably be able to count on both hands the number of times you will come into close, sustained contact with flag officers.
The vast majority of the people you will meet will be professional beyond reproach, and would put to shame 99% of the general public.
A couple of points to ponder.
1) The Navy calls it self the Narmy because it has plenty to keep it busy and yet is still being screwed over sending people to do missions that it should not be doing. (IA's in both Iraq and Afghanistan). ILO missions are another issue-but it is coming at a high price.
Make the Army bigger.
The USAF is sending guys for IA's too-having people do missions they are not trained for.
Make the Army bigger.
Four month rotations are only for unit rotations I believe. I say good on the USAF-the Army deploys for too long.
Make the Army bigger.
The reason the USAF went to hell is because its culture of aviation was destroyed when it tried to become a family friendly employer because it woke up one morning and found itself 23% female.
The other services are getting there............
Regardless, IA's just suck and the Navy leaders who agreed to them are not worthy of praise. They should be scorned for selling out their Sailors. I could do a whole post on this because a lot of guys are getting screwed by that program.
Make the Army bigger.
Blue suit ranger,
It's been a really, really long time since we've been strafed. One way to read it is the AF mission is way, way too risk averse. The Army duck hunters don't even get to shoot at enemy aircraft.
If our air superiority is so overwhelming there isn't even a chance that we'd fight air to air combat, it may be a safe bet to scale back a tad. :)
One problem is that the Air Force has a bias for promoting from the Air Force Academy. That institution has historically turned the nation's best and brightest young people into hard-core, self-serving liars and cheats. Harsh words. But I saw it myself. About 20 years ago I was a class leader for a class at pilot training. I was a captain who earned a slot after about 4 years on duty. My whole class was recently graduated from the Academy. I was shocked at what I saw. The back stabbing. The cheating. The lying. On an institutional scale and practiced as an art form. I never saw a more homogeneously defective group for leadership. It was then that I started to put 2 and 2 together. A lot of what I had seen the previous 4 years, and after, became clear. The organization has a steady drip of poison into itself. The result is that the organization's highest posts are filled with people who understand the mission to be one of getting themselves promoted at all costs. And the promotion boards are comprised of people just like them. The feedback loop of poison just keeps feeding itself. What is the fix? I have no idea. But the guys in my class from 20 years ago are now promoting each other to general. Would I recommend a young man join the USAF today. Yes, with reservation. Would I recommend him to seek appointment to the academy, under no circumstance.
As we say in the fighter world, "fight's on!"
I am an Air Force officer. But not a zoomie. Though I have spent most of my career in their company. The notable exception being last year when I spent the summer (and then some) with the 1st CAV in Baghdad. And seemed to me, there were a helluva lot of blue suiters (some of us in Army ACUs, many more in ABUs) walking around MND-B headquarters on Liberty. Not to mention the overwhelming number on Camp Victory with MNF/C-I.
Part of this is as Skippy-san said, AF guys doing Army jobs. And that's never a good thing. Not for anyone involved. Others were there because they were filling joint jobs. Or in my case, and that of many others, we were filling roles specifically designed to help integrate air power with the ground commander's operations.
As noted, the 4-month rotation is only for the squadrons as they deploy as a unit. All other airmen deploy for six month or one year tours, depending on the specific job. Most intel guys and JTACs are doing 1:1 dwells. In other words, we're home for six months and then back in Iraq or Afghanistan for six months. Its killing our folks and they are taking the option to walk whenever presented. So, helping the Army is not helping out the Air Force in the slightest.
For this reason alone, don't expect the Air Force to start extending their rotations to 15 months. Even the USMC was smart enough to keep rotations to 7 months, extending only when a bonus was offered. I never understood the Army griping about doing 15 months and then getting pissed off that the Air Force didn't follow suit. If you thought 15 months was a bad idea, why should the Air Force follow you down that hole? Only that misery loves company, which is not really a good excuse for managing people.
A flight commander in a fighter squadron usually commands about 10 other pilots. A flight "lead" in the air commands about four other aircraft. Two different types of command. Usually within the squadron, most officers are put in charge of one element or another, so they get some leadership experience even if its just three other officers. Some get put in charge of the life support folks (enlisted) and others get placed in charge of the intel shop (some enlisted folks). For a while, the AF acknolwedged our lack of leadership opportunities and put the maintence squadrons under command of the fighter squadron. So now the squadron commander was in charge of hundreds of enlisted troops. Bad idea. We have since corrected but again, that puts pilots in charge of fewer enlisted for most of their career.
However, you regularly see pilots in charge of flights and squadrons throughout the wing. So they will get exprience as senior captains, majors, and light colonels leading other officers and enlisted troops. (This is why non-rated officers typically refer to pilot wings as "universal management badges.")
So now we got Army guys complaining that Air Force officers don't lead enough enlisted troops and you get Air Force guys complaining that pilots are put in command when they don't deserve it. There is a good medium which is to promote more non-rated officers to leadership positions and let the fliers just fly. (I don't think you're going to get much complaint from anyone.)
"Lets stop doing air superiority since we're so good at it" makes since in this war. But contrary to the current popular belief, this is not the war to end all wars. There will be more wars in the future and some of them will be conventional. So maybe we should keep practicing this thing just in case we face a military that's not flying Vietnam era fighters and rolls over at the first sign of trouble. Just a thought...
Lastly, I'd still like to know what everyone thinks the Air Force should be doing? MNF-I still has yet to identify any requirement from the Air Force than to be able to provide CAS in a certain timeline. Since we are meeting that timeline, what are we not doing that the Air Force needs to undergo a cultural shift so desperately?
The only argument I've heard has been on the UAV issue. But since I've addressed the fallacy of that previously on OPFOR, I'm sure you don't need me to hit it again.
Well put BK. While I respect some of the sentiments of the original poster, I think it ought to be noted that the wonderful "old" Air Force of which you spoke was also responsible for giving pilots a gun-less fighter with cruddy missiles to fight a war with. Without your "zoom zoom fighter boys", there would be no F-16, F-15, and yes, even the A-10 was a product of the "Fighter Mafia".
Air threats have not diminished, and while chances of a conflict with another peer power may be somewhat exaggerated, modern fighter aircraft are still finding their way to any moron dictator wannabe with a few bucks handy.
These officials didn't so much "disdain" the current missions as refuse to consider them to the exclusion of future threats.
What Skippy said.
I will go even one further. I don't think the Army needs to grow, I just think they need to figure out how to manage their manpower. Hell, an IA assignment in the Navy is now offered as a regular duty assignment. But I don't understand how it helps the country if we are taking folks from ships, deploying ships no less, and sending them as IAs. When I was on active duty we never had our boats fully manned and now we are taking people from ships/carriers/squadrons/submarines and sending them out as IAs? Why the fuck do we have a reserve force, only about 5800 or so of which are mobilized at any given time if this is such an important mission?
Sorry for the tangent...
Blue Suit Ranger,
The last time the Army and the Marines were strafed was 2003. By our own US Air Force. It won't get much more personal than that.
The issue isn't the casual disregard for American lives on the battlefield, it is the USAF's culture of command. The USAF doesn't allow for the team-player concept. I've seen this on the battlefield (real and simulated), the school-house, doctrine & systems development, and in the acquisition arenas. The USAF is singular, and a rogue.
The time has passed for our USAF to rejoin the fold peacefully. Now it's up to Gen. Schwartz and another SecAF to repair the institution.
The last paragraph is my two cents...
BK, except for the following paragraph you missed the point.
"A flight commander in a fighter squadron usually commands about 10 other pilots. A flight "lead" in the air commands about four other aircraft. Two different types of command. Usually within the squadron, most officers are put in charge of one element or another, so they get some leadership experience even if its just three other officers. Some get put in charge of the life support folks (enlisted) and others get placed in charge of the intel shop (some enlisted folks). For a while, the AF acknolwedged our lack of leadership opportunities and put the maintence squadrons under command of the fighter squadron. So now the squadron commander was in charge of hundreds of enlisted troops. Bad idea. We have since corrected but again, that puts pilots in charge of fewer enlisted for most of their career."
The reality is that the USAF does an absolute crappy job training leaders, period, dot. The Army starts training Lts to be leaders on day one. The Af in never really trains their officers to be leaders. Several appoointed over me (O-3 through O-6) didn't have a freaking clue how to lead someone how to open a door.
At one point the AF did a pretty good job training their NCOs but evidence recently indicates they too have become more concerned with their own ass as opposed to leading their groupd and getting the job done. These days (I spent last week on a flight line at a southern AFB) all one hears are excuses why something cannot be done.
The AF is broke through and through. The good news is the new CSAF was one of the best, true leaders I ever served under. One hopes that he remembers the path that got him to this point.
Well, the same is definitely not said of Air Force Special Ops, of which the new CSAF comes from.
Rest assured, things will change in the Air Force...for the better. And it's about damn time.
CTII Raven, in my defense, you will note that a lot of what I wrote was in response to other comments before mine. However, with regards to the actual post itself, you're probably right. I don't get the point.
The Air Force is not the Army. And its not the USMC. So leadership is going to be different. It will not look the same in many cases. The JTAC community uses a leadership style very similiar to that of the Army. And it works for them. But that's also the culture they are in. The rest of the Air Force does not necessarily require that kind of leadership. And to say that leadership is the same across the spectrum is to ignore one of the most important tennets of leadership, which is to tailor it to those you intend to lead.
Having said that, I would highly recommend the book "Officers in Flight Suits" by Sherwood. It does an excellent job of explaining how the USAF culture so quickly diverged from our roots in the Army Air Force. And it helps to explain why we became so technically oriented, rewarding those with technical skills over other attributes.
But I don't think the Air Force is quite as separate as some would make it out to be. I currently sit in a class of 20 officers. Four of us are Air Force. There are 1 or 2 conventional Army types. Three foreigners. One Navy SEAL and the rest are all SF. Listening to the SF guys talk about "I can't believe that guy got promoted" or what assignments need to be filled, the other blue-suiters and I look at each other and say, "same problems, different acronyms."
As noted previously, I have spent most of my career in fighter squadrons. The leadership I found there was very good in my opinion. When I have been outside the fighter world (which is to say more precisely in the non-flying world), I would agree that leadership is less evident than management. And that's not to say that non-rated officers are less capable than rated officers, in many cases I think its specifically because its rated officers who were not deemed worthy enough of commanding flying squadrons and either lacked the leadership skills necessary or chose to take out their frustrations on their subordinates.
My first wing commander was an excellent leader. Cared about his people, went out of his way to make sure we were ready to wage war (in the Air Force way), and that we understood our mission. His successor was a highly decorated combat veteran, a graduate of the USAF Weapons School, and highly respected "stick." But he cared more about flying than he did about being Wing King and he made no secret about it. (Oddly, he graduated from a Southern military academy and you would have thought he would have had the best idea on "leadership" from an Army/USMC perspective. Still, he did give me my first ass-chewing and it was a good one.)
The point being, leadership styles vary throughout the force. It is nonexistant in some but how they get promoted may not be that different from the Army (who only just recently started using Patraeus as their touchstone.) People get promoted because they are in the right place at the right time or because they know the right people. Again, having been with the Division in Iraq and sitting here with Army guys now, it doesn't sound that much different in either service.
You don't like Mosely, that's fine. I think the guy was far more interested in being a leader at the tactical level than at the Service level. But I've heard him speak, I've been charged by him to accomplish certain missions and I found him to be a pretty impressive leader at that level. I think his Vice, Corely, would probably have been better at that level (and they've since moved him to ACC) but that doesn't matter.
My real concern is that Schwartz was selected simply because he shared Gates's view on the war. I don't know the guy personally, and I don't intent to sully his honor with the notion of being a sycophant, but politics is politics and my concern is that's how Gates chose him. If he's not, great, I look forward to having him as our new CSAF. And I agree, that pilots from crew aircraft (AMC/Rescue/SOF) tend to be better "team players" than what we traditionally put forward but I wouldn't expect the new CSAF to be able to change the culture overnight. It will take time for him to get his style of generals into key positions.
Lastly, I think its important to acknowledge the Air Force doctrine of "centralized control, decentralized execution." This significantly reduces the tactical flexibility of most commanders, especially compared to the manner in which Battalions and Brigades are currently fighting the war. But it is a necessary doctrine given limited resources, expansive domain, and a need to manage disparate assets in the best way possible. Unfortunately, I too agree that this doctrine bleeds over too much into the tactical execution realm as well (which is specifically counter to the doctrine as written). But that's no different from Brigade commander's watch Pred porn of their guys kicking in doors. You miss the days of being in tactical control and you're not quite ready to give it up yet.
The Air Force is different. We have our flaws. But I would not say it is broken through and through.
Warfront with Jihadistan: Air Force surge
Military leaders and historians will be studying the success of the surge in Iraq for decades to come, but it is already becoming clear that the United States Air Force played a crucial role that has gone almost unnoticed. On the rare occasion that the Leftmedia has actually reported on the surge, credit for progress has almost always been given to the “Anbar Awakening,” or the 20-percent increase in boots on the ground. While these are certainly important factors, the Air Force deserves some credit too.
New research by the Pentagon shows that during the period after the surge began, air strikes against insurgents increased by 400 percent, and the amount of munitions released increased by more than 1,000 percent. The Air Force also began targeting groups as small as three insurgents with precision munitions, and in most cases air strikes were putting overwhelming force on targets anywhere in Iraq within seven minutes. Of course, air support doesn’t happen in a vacuum—it was the increased human intelligence (HUMINT) that Army and Marine surge units were able to provide that allowed the Air Force to devastate the insurgency. The Air Force’s role in the surge shows that it is overly simplistic to explain U.S. success in Iraq as merely the result of increased troop levels. All of the military branches had a large part to play.
More important, however, the Air Force’s success proves the importance of overwhelming force when fighting a deadly insurgency. By constantly pummeling al-Qa’ida in Iraq with devastating firepower wherever their forces were found, the U.S. military denied terrorists the opportunity to plan or regroup. It’s a lesson we hope the military and the American people will remember as their focus increasingly shifts from Iraq to Afghanistan, where another surge might be needed.
PatriotPost.US
Friday, July 25, 2008 9:42 AM
The AF is indeed broken through and through. Fish rot from the head down. And from my perspective (I flew fighters, strategic recce, and was a Guard ALO attached to special ops, heavy mech, and infantry) the "AF" is a case study on how a huge organization can be severely diminished by only a small group of incapable, politically driven leaders. Yes, there were and are great flight leads and squadron commanders. But the qualities that make them great also make them uncompetitive at 0-6 and above. So the rats who do get promoted sit on the next promotion board. And where is their focus? On things such as uniform changes. Example.....the first I saw of this was when I was a 1 LT and the new CINC TAC (that dates me) came to my wing and promised front aspect AIM-9's. The very next time we saw him he had good news for us.........leather flight jackets. But no AIM 9L's. And so it went for the next 10 years. Hoping to see some military leadership in my lifetime, I joined a unit attached to the Army. A very sad commentary indeed. It is cultural. It is systemic. And changing it will be resisted on every golf course at every fighter base and at every faculty meeting at the Academy.
The flying part of the Air Force does a crappy job of training leaders for all the reasons noted in the original post.
But the ground part - AFOSI, Security Police, other Special Ops guys, and other non-rated officers - are bringing up some fantastic leaders. Unfortunately damn few of these officers get promoted past 0-6 and even when they do they are not the ones really running the AF. That goes to the guys with the wings, no matter how ill-suited they are to the job.
I retired from the AF in 97'. As an NCO. I worked the flightline for over 20 years as a weapons loader. The big change came in the Gen. Meril McPeak years, when he and his flock began to change the AF from a traditional war fighting force with the likes of Gen. Curtis Lamay, Hap Arnold and others to a family friendly collage fraternity.
When we were told not to refer to a cockpit as a cockpit but as a flight deck or a command center(?? A joy stick is now a control stick etc.) or Barracks as a dormatory and a mess hall as a "dining facility" we knew there were some storm clouds ahead.
Then the crowning blow came when we were integrated into the fighter squadrons and now were commanded by pilots. A LT.Col. pilot was now in command of 200 mechanics! Like he did not have enough to worry about.
The others are right, the rot starts at the head. Until the officer corps starts holding those responsible for major screw ups nothing will change and will only get worse.
When there was a Stratigic Air Command there were no screw ups like we are having now.
There was an old saying we had in SAC, " To error is human, to forgive is devine, neither of which is SAC's policy!"!!
Guys, I think you all are missing a lot. The firing of the Chief and Secretary were blaimed on the "loose nukes", but that was just the latest convenient excuse. There has been a "they're out to get us", "damn you all" TOP DOWN paranoid attitude from the USAF portion of the E-ring since the Thunderbird procurement scandle in 2005. See http://is.gd/17RX .
That was an ugly stinky immoral mess and nobody got fired or resigned under a cloud. There were some things before that, but the bad paranioa started there. I spent 8 years walking the hallways of the Pentagon and I know how the staff feels this stuff. The best Action Officer becomes a pigeon-toed putz with his/her other-service AOs because nobody cleaned up your stink.
And the paranioa emerged again as the "Oh, flying drones is such a hard job and we can't train and our people work too hard" cry baby crap from USAF people sleeping with their own wives every night out in Colorado. (Jeeez.. get some 14-year old kids to do it for $8 an hour)
And so on. What you are seeing is a self-reinforcing loop of paranioa. The heat engine, silent and deadly, keeping it going was the evil Thunderbirds contract.
As far as the rest of the service, I have had many "joint" jobs and I can only echo what BK Said above " Listening to the SF guys talk about ... the other blue-suiters and I look at each other and say, "same problems, different acronyms."
And, beyond all that, the military is STILL better managed (DESPITE the Congress) than any of the civilian companies I've ever been invloved with.
You can sure tell who the pilots are in making comments trying to defend the totally lack of leadership exhibited in the Air Force, any casual observer can see the system is indeed broke though and through.
I served in the Marine Corps before coming to the Air Force where I retired as aircraft maintenance SNCO. I saw us start down the tubes when they did away with the old school AGS units and slid us under the fighter squadron commander. While most of these men were “nice guys” I only met one in twenty-one years that I would consider a leader. The great majority were AFA grads who were more interested in polishing the apple to get the next promotion than doing what was right and making the tough calls. The same goes for the herds of maintenance officers. During my career I tried to figure out what their real function was. None of them new a damn thing about the aircraft we maintained, most just took up space. Additionally no one ever seemed held responsible for screw-ups, this how guys like Generals, New, Goldfein and Mosely workedther way up the ladder until the recent hosue cleaning.
Fundamentally I feel a big part of problem has been the devout worship at the alter of the pilot and the doing away with warrant officers. Flying an aircraft is not rocket science but a technical process, why in gods name does everyone have to have a commission to fly? This whole system is ludicrous, if the Air Force would bring back warrants to fly and be in charge of units like maintenance you could set up a program that would develop senior leaders. Let those who want to be in charge due the staff tours and get developed for the future while everyone else can develop their skills in their respective specialties. Warrants would allow us to keep all the cockpit seats filled epically the back and would give qualified SNCO’s an opportunity to serve in a different capacity instead of descending to the level of kissing ass for Senior and Chief. This I know will never happen so the AF will twist in the wind rotting to the core with commissioned pilots flying drones, Generals covering each others ass and highly qualified SNCO’s saying screw and retiring to civilian companies,
Hey BK, MOGS here - good to see you again - I'm heading to Iraq BTW in the not too distant future...
I've always held that there are two main types of leadership in the Air Force:
there's traditional, hierarchical military leadership - (officers-NCOs-junior enlisted) - we've covered the ground where that applies already,
and the more famous Air Force instance, that's being critiqued ad nauseam here and in several other places...I call first peer leadership or the "first among equals" - mostly what we typically think of when we think of flying units.
The two are NOT interchangeable, they do overlap quite a bit, but I also think they have their best time and place.
The trick in the Air Force really is in training leaders how to recognize when to apply one over the other, and to be skilled in both.
And oh by the way, a few more things:
On peer leadership: - the thing to understand about this is the aviation world is based primarily around experience, ability, and credibility. This is pretty essential, as in a flying unit it is really not uncommon for a Capt to lead a multi-ship flight where at least one wingman or crewdog outranks him, and all are or just about his peers. That requires some different skills than the typical officer and NCO roles the Army and USMC know and love so much. The peer leadership model is appropriate in its context.
Take it outside of that, and that's where the clash comes into play. How do we really fix this one - I don't know, other than to recognize that some people should never leave the flying world, ever. :)
Now, as far as USAFA - I am a Zoomie, and I'm non-rated, and I'm a little tired of hearing the same-old same-old about how USAFA grads suck in the field. I've been doing this long enough now that I can say there is no one perfect commissioning source, and pound for pound, the Zoo produces no greater per capita share of losers than any of the other means.
Here's how I think though, that USAFA contributes to the "universal management badge" issue: for most of it's history, USAFA was a pilot factory (and still is in terms of raw numbers) - the style of leadership emphasized there is the peer model? Why? Why is BCT (Beast) not BMT? - Because the cadre is training new cadets who are going to be their neighbors, their team mates, their school class mates for the next 1-3 years. We are trained by, and are training our PEERS, not airmen.
- the above is background, now here's where I think USAFA actually fails: lack of consistency, and also, nothing there is ever really attempted long enough as a policy for anyone to really see whether or not it would actually work before a new commandant comes in and changes everything again. The USAFA training structure, the officers and NCOs who work there, can never seem to make up their mind about their roles - are they there to no-kidding shepherd and lead the cadets like they were airmen (what tends to happen in my opinion), or are they there to facilitate the CADETS in learning to lead themselves? I think the former is what happens for several reasons, 1) lack of experience in this type of setting on the parts of the Air Officers Commanding and their MTL sidekicks and 2) unclear or poor direction from on high 3) the fact that the cadets are 18-21/22 year olds who are generally of the same maturity level as similarly aged airmen living in the dorms on base.
In my time there, the closest things to true, cadet-run programs were the Jump course and the Cadet Honor Guard (and some similar programs) - the best AOCs were the ones who let the cadets lead and only stepped in to avert disaster, to mentor, or when circumstances forced them to (discipline, etc), otherwise, the officers and NCOs at USAFA were TOO DAMNED IN THE WEEDS, including things like the administration of the Honor Code in my opinion too.
Past USAFA, here's a few other things to consider:
The Air Force is extremely officer-heavy, and this isn't a function of the pilot force as much as you would think - there's only what, 12,000 or so rated guys in the ENTIRE force? The officer-enlisted ratio, overall is something like 1 to 4. Simply put, we're rank heavy, and we end up with hundreds of butterbars and 1Lt running around looking for something to "lead" that often turns out to be project management or program management. You and I all know that's not the same as "leadership."
Hell, bring back the warrant officers and the E-4 through E-8 specialists. Make Officer and NCO actually mean something outside of a "better paid" technical expert.
Speaking of, there's two long-standing trends that hurt the Air Force in the leadership department: I think aircrew have a nasty tendency to micromanage - reason being that the pilot in command/dude in the single seat, is in near total control of his environment, has information presented to him (more or less) how he wants, when he wants, how he wants, and the plane responds the same.
The problem comes up when they forget that they can't completely control human beings. Thus, the impression they usually give off is that they don't trust the enlisted.
On the opposite end of the spectrum, I've seen aviators who feel intimidated by dealing with enlisted tend to give the SNCOs full leeway to do whatever...you know what, that can backfire too - as much as we bag on the OFFICERS as the problem in the Air Force, we also have a "Cult of the SNCO" especially the E-9, where they're seen as infallible.
This is in an organization where in some career fields, enlisted won't get any significant supervisory and leadership experience until they make E-7 or E-8. That's too frickin' late in the game in my book.
Rightfully so, we hold officers accountable for the performance of an organization, even a military service. However, if we're going to discuss a flawed leadership culture in ANY service, look to the NCOs and SNCOs too.
What does the Navy do differently with its pilots that it doesn't have these kinds of problems?
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Townie76,
Thank you for the perspective. Most of the retired USAF officers I work with are pretty good people - several were A-10 pilots and loved it. They also never made it beyond major.
It goes back to 'like begets like.' Until the USAF changes its promotion system and the personnel sitting on the board, the cultural bias against leadership will continue. Should McPeak return in a civilian policy mode, it may even get worse.
My two cents...