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Re: Reserves
By Charlie
I’m a National Guardsman. I’m a citizen soldier, part of an organization that traces its lineage to the Minutemen. Those Revolutionaries had civilian careers, just like we do today –and just like today those careers were abandoned when the country called them to arms.
Nowadays, the term “Minutemen” needs to be re-evaluated. I’ve been “mobilized” [a term that invokes a sense of “mobility” or movement.] for nine months now,, and I was stuck at a mob-station (MOBSTAT in Army lingo) for 3+ months starting July, 06. We trainied for months for a deployment, working on individual, small collective, and large collective tasks. The conventional wisdom goes: the Guard isn’t composed of “full-time” soldiers, so they need an extensive mob process to bring them “up to speed” for a deployment. With this extensive process, the Guard units obviously require intense oversight to ensure they are up to Army standards, so a Training Support Brigade/Battalion (TSB) should be put in charge of them, and Observer/Controller/Trainers (OC/Ts) should be pervasive, giving out valuable expertise to neophyte Guardsmen deploying. There’s the current party line.
Now here’s why the entire process of calling up and readying a unit for deployment is counter-productive and is probably leading to a decrease in retention of valuable combat-trained Guard soldiers, NCOs, and officers:
Since 9/11/2001, the National Guard has shouldered a historically amazing combat load. The Guard/Reserves have been hovering between 40-50 percent of all forces deployed across the globe. Elements of my unit have been deployed several times, to Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans, Cuba, and elsewhere to support the Global War on Terror. Because of the heavy op-tempo of Guard units, the men my unit deployed with easily had 50% of its personnel holding “veteran” status. This meant that in every rifle squad, at least 3 or four enlisted men had a prior deployment, many proudly wearing their Combat Infantryman’s Badge. Most NCOs had prior deployment experience, and some platoon sergeants cut their teeth in Afghanistan as staff sergeants with active-duty units. Officer leadership at the platoon and company, and battalion level had similar experience.
This (very) experienced battalion, with colors flying replete with combat banners from the Revolutionary War, Civil War, WWI, WWII, and the current GWOT arrived at MOBSTAT and was promptly told to sit down, shut up, and get “trained” by the TSB.
Here’s what ended up happening: an attitude of “check the box” emerged, where our MOB tasks were “certified” by the TSB, and our unit “went through the motions” of the “official” training, while training itself in our spare time. Here’s an example of what I mean: we were required to attend basic first aid training. That meant that the platoon was sitting on wet bleachers at 0700, getting a block of instruction from a PFC. The youngster, bless his heart, had obviously never been to ITC, and was literally reading the instructions off a butcher-block, telling us how to apply a tourniquet. The combat medics who had weathered OEF round II had to sit in attendance as well, and gave practical instruction when the private concluded his block of instruction.
We encountered similar problems, having 88M truck drivers instructing us on room clearing techniques, when our platoons were packed with 11Bs who had cleared rooms abroad in hostile environment.
Now, I want to clarify that I’ve hold no personal animus toward anyone at the TSB. The commanders and soldiers in the TSB were professionals. Rather, their mission (I believe) is misdirected. The TSB spent the majority of its time trying to instruct us, rather than trying to step back and evaluate us and give us good AAR bullet points. The thing is, once the TSB realized we were “squared away,” there was a long period of awkwardness between the two units. They realized that doctrinally, we were locked on. Therefore, the only real criticism (their job- to tell us we’re f’d up) came down to TTPs (tactics, techniques, and procedures) rather than doctrine. So the responsibly conducted AARs became “well we did it this way in fort swampy, and I think you guys should do this my way.”
Well, as any military guy knows, we’ll suck an egg if you tell us to: just don’t tell us how. That was the problem that emerged: telling us how to suck the egg. Streamlining the MOB process gives units more “boots on the ground” time when mobilized –what really counts.
I think the Guard has realized this problem, and is now moving to fix it. Faster Please!
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Comments
Never been in the Guard (yet) but I have to admit it's the same way on the active side of the fence. The so-called leadership courses (like the newly renamed "warrior course" (PLDC) actually think they have something to teach a bunch of NCOs who've just come off a sixteen month Iraq tour.
Okay, SSG Foxhole, I'll let you "teach" me how to march and call cadence; haven't done it since basic. But if you think you have something new under the sun to show me about how to clear a compound or run a TCP, you've got another thing coming.
Sounds like the usual SNAFU....the whole approach is based on mobilizing a unit from cold iron, instead of taking an experienced unit and giving it an update on the latest tactics and conditions.
Mike M.
I agree with you that it is of high importance to keep the guard up to speed on the lastest tactics and the conditions.
Being deployed in OIF3 as a 88M, I know that the tactics are always changing , this is like playing a football game against a team that alway throws you a different play on offense. The biggest grip that I and my fellow Pards had was to sit there in a class and have a guy who has not even been in Combat give us text book instruction. You know the book is a good guide but our enemy doesn't read the same book. Experianced instructors are the best to teach untested troops/units that have not seen the elephant in battle.
Sorry my spell check did,t work?
oh well look who's back....
I like how LG Blum, chief of the National Guard Bureau (NGB), helped with fixing NG rotations. While the individual Soldier no longer has the 2 year deployment limit, the unit is only mobilized for 12 months. If Mother Army wants the unit to spend 3 months at mob station, and 2 months at demob, well, then that leaves 7 months overseas.
The Air Force doens't make the Air Guard go through the hoops the Army imposes on the Army Guard. It's time for the Army to start trusting the Guard.
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Charlie, as a guardsman that has also deployed, I whole-heartedly agree with your assessment of the process. My deployment was for OIF-1, so we didn't have the high degree of combat veterans that my current unit has (we had like 30% desert storm vets though), and even then, the MOB process was very much about checking the box and not geared toward our actual mission or threat. The most valuable training we did was in our "off" time, doing our initial planning and rehersals for the actual mission.
My unit has the joy of having a TSBN already assigned, due to our current transformation, and luckily, they are all Iraq combat vets with experience in our MTOE, which makes a huge difference. Even with that being said, there is a lot of tension between us trying to train the way will fight vs. how we will be evaluated.
The only saving grace, is that above battle drill, nobody really knows what their exact mission will be. During my first deployment I can't count the number of times I heard "are we MOS qualified to do that" or "you can't do that, you haven't been to the school." Sorry folks, but we are the Guard and we adapt. There isn't a well defined or updated training task for a lot of what a unit has to do in country. Thw Guard isn't perfect and have a lot of room for imporvement, but flexibility is our strength. charm out.