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"Progress is occurring amidst the violence"
By Lt Col P
I've been having a great email discussion with my good friend and fellow Marine historian, LtCol Kurt Wheeler, about the progress in Al Anbar province. Much if this has gone--- surprise, surprise-- unreported. And when he told me that he had just written an article for Marine Corps Gazette on the subject, I asked if he would like to do a Q&A for OPFOR. Here it is.
Q: A frequent battle cry from milbloggers has been that the main-stream media doesn't always report the successes and advances from Iraq and Afghanistan-in fact, that's the reason why there are milblogs. You've written an article for Marine Corps Gazette on some specific successes in Al-Anbar province; at the risk of stealing its thunder, can you share the gist of it with us?
A: The subtitle is "Progress is occurring amidst the violence." Obviously the violence is being reported, as we continue to suffer casualties from IEDs, SAF and IDF. There are two problems with the violence-only reporting: 1) Almost none of the steady progress being achieved in the development of Iraqi security forces, enhancement of the security of communities, improvement of local government or setting conditions for economic growth is being reported. (The argument I always here is that "news" is reporting the exceptional not the routine. By that standard, isn't a new police station far more newsworthy than the ubiquitous 120 mm mortar shell?) And, 2) Some equate the continued violence with a lack of progress.
Specifically:
The numbers of Iraqi police have grown dramatically during the past year (from less than 2000 to 9000 by the end of this rotation). Iraqi Army units in this AO have not grown in numbers, but they have fought, stood their ground, become much more effective and have taken over significant amounts of battle space. Overall, Marines and soldiers in this AO are doing the couterinsurgency basics extremely well. They are getting out, patrolling on foot in neighborhoods, making connections with locals. These connections are increasingly leading to intel and tips which are making us much more effective.
The second piece is that you can't measure our success by the number of attacks received because our increased activity, "taking the fight to the enemy," has as much to do with the level of violence as does enemy will/actions. We could reduce attacks on our forces by staying on the FOBs, but that's not how you win a COIN fight. Many commanders are describing the insurgents as fighting desperately to hold onto areas and neighborhoods that they once controlled without question.
Q: What has been the underlying cause of the success? Did we uncover some sort of operational Rosetta Stone all of a sudden? Or is it the result of years of hard work and sacrifice?
A: I MEF (Fwd) has built on all the hard work and sacrifice of the previous rotations. The whole point has been that NOTHING is quick about a counter-insurgency. If we have had a failure, it is that we have not clearly communicated that this is a long, steady process. I MEF had the wisdom to exploit some key opportunities which came their way. Previously, many Al Anbar leaders had a "marriage of convenience" with Al Qaeda and other extremist elements based on their mutual desire to drive us from Iraq. The terrorists went too far when they began to force religious values on the Anbaris and then killed some sheiks who disagreed with them. Traditional leaders finally recognized that they had more to gain by working with us than with AQI. I MEF should be credited with quickly seizing this opportunity when it arose. Once young men had the nod from their Sheiks, IP recruiting went through the roof. Transition teams of all types (police, military, border, etc) are also working incredibly hard and incredibly closely with their counterparts and tapping into the local/cultural awareness of the Iraqi forces to roll up bad guys in record numbers.
Q: You've been to every clime and place in Al-Anbar, as it were. Give us a thumbnail sketch of the situation from your point of view; which cities or towns are in the best shape, and which are in the worst shape? And what do the troops think?
A: I have been privileged to interview more than 300 Marines, soldiers and sailors all across the AO and I see a real trend in the perspectives they have shared. #1, nearly all see steady (sometimes dramatic) progress. Everyone says the key word is patience. You don't win a counterinsurgency in 3 years. This will take time. Standing up an army and a police force in the middle of a war is an impossible task, but our transition teams are doing the impossible every day. The center of gravity here is the Iraqi people and young corporal squad leaders are winning the grudging respect and trust of the people in their AO everyday via their courage, temperance and determination to do the right thing.
I full run down of the AO would take too long and cut into the 5 hours of sleep I'll get tonight, but in brief; Al Qaim is great, Ramadi is being transformed before our eyes. It's still very tough in places, but infinitely better than a year ago. Fallujah is holding steady even while Iraqis are taking on much more responsibility for their own security their. Refugees are streaming by the thousands from Baghdad INTO Fallujah. (Could we even have imagined that Fallujah would be a DESTINATION for refugees two years ago?!) Haditha may have been the most violent place in Iraq 5 months ago and has been turned around due to combined coalition/police ops there. We are actively involved in separating the insurgents from the populace they try to hide amongst in Rawah, Anah, Rutbah and other areas where we have had little presence until recently. That being said, ANYPLACE in Al Anbar can be deadly at any given moment. That is the nature of this fight.
[ASIDE: One thing I have to mention in the hope that someone out there can help to fix it is the situation with detention facilities in Iraq. This is absolutely the number one frustration among leaders here. Insurgents who are captured are vetted through a western-style legal process where detailed packages of evidence and statements have to be carefully compiled to get them to the next detention facility. Those who make it from local to regional to the theater detention facility are almost certainly bad to the bone. However, due to lack of space and other considerations well above my pay grade, shocking percentages are being released after just a few weeks or months. Not only do they return to attack our troops, but they go directly after the Iraqi sources who risked their lives to help us catch the bad guy in the first place. Commanders compare it to emptying the German or Japanese POW camps every six months during WWII. NOTHING is causing more anguish on the battlefield today than this issue. Commanders are begging, "Please build more facilities!" The most common phrase used in describing current practices: "MADNESS."]
The troops have incredible morale everywhere I go. It's hard work, but in the end, they are doing what they joined the Marine Corps to do. In fact, it's ironic, the harder the job they are given, the more that is asked of them and the tougher their conditions, the more motivated they seem to be. The Marines in support roles on FOBs may be struggling more than the forward troops in some cases. They can't always see how their job DOES support the fight in the big picture. They are incredibly motivated to "get outside the wire" and contribute directly and will volunteer for any mission which will allow that. I MEF (Fwd) achieved 161% of its goal for first term reenlistments for this FY... what does that tell you about what the Marines think?
Q: When will your full Gazette article come out?
A: I sent drafts to several of the people I interviewed and to some other key Marine leaders to make sure I "got it right." I just made some edits based on their feedback over the weekend. I believe it will be on the Gazette's website in the next couple weeks and I'm hopeful that it will appear in print during the next couple months. I also try to do at least one post a week on http://marinehistorian.blogspot.com
--KW
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Thanks for some good news and thoughful commentary. I nearly un-subscribed from this blog after reading the ridiculous "Patriotic Terrorists" post John linked to (Lt Col P - I hope you'll excuse this on your post -- Hey John - why no comment section on your post? - Please, leave the silly name-calling rhetoric to other, lesser sites like the one you found it on - this one is usually above that kind of behavior). But I come here to get the good news, and I was happy to read Lt Col Wheeler's account of progress being made.
I know it's frustrating that this kind of good news doesn't get much play in the press, and it's a real shame. But bad news has always sold better than good news - it's just a sad fact of the human condition. Just consider this: If you had never been to America and knew of us only from our news, wouldn't you think we're a nation of mostly car-jackers, murderers, theives, and gangsters, based on the reporting of what goes on here every day?