Strategery Archives

The Arctic

By Lt Col P

Came upon this discussion yesterday, by accident almost. Although it unintentionally reveals much about the commenters and their odd notions-- I looked in vain for Skippy-san, perhaps he was using an alias-- it brings up a good point.

An interesting briefing by the Northcom Commander General Victor Renuart has flagged cyber and arctic threats as priorities for the next President. Reportedly, the National Security Council is debating drafting a new strategy document on the Arctic. We have already discussed cyber threats a couple of times, but not the Arctic. Ironically, Russia's behavior in Georgia may have ripple effects of national security thousands of miles away in the Arctic if we really are seeing the resurgence of an aggressive Russian bear. For that matter, one of the near-term security implications of global warming is to make the Arctic more in play for geopolitics. The Arctic mission is also one that would have interesting inter-service rivalry implications, since it would be primarily a Navy and Air Force mission. How important is the Arctic and should an increasing portion of defense resources be directed to it? My own sense is that the bipartisan push for energy security will make the Arctic a higher priority for future Administrations than it has been for decades, and its importance will grow in the decades to come. Given the long lead-times for some weapons purchases, it would be foolish not to make at least some investments in improving our capacity to project power in that region. The priority still should be on other near term concerns, winning the wars that we are in, as Gates puts it, and ensuring our capacity to respond to more urgent challenges, but it is smart strategy to be thinking anew about the Arctic. How big a factor should the Arctic be in US military planning?

At the top of the world we are cheek by jowl with Mother Russia. The end of the Cold War (supposedly) brought the end of the existential threats the old regime presented, the ICBMs, the bombers, the subs. Well, since the new boss in the Kremlin is the same as the old boss, welcome back to a new Cold War in the cold.

All of this has flown below our DEW Line, but it is a frequent topic over at The Torch...

Yes to Georgia, No to Russia

By Lt Col P

They're going at it hammer and tongs in an obscure corner of the Caucasus, but there is much more at stake than the finer points of sovereignty over a dusty patch of not-quite-Europe-not-quite-Asia.

Georgia has steadily advanced along the path to responsible government and stability, and has been a real ally in the war. For years now, US forces have been exercising and training with the Georgians, and have made considerable inroads in helping them emerge from the gross darkness of Soviet rule.

Russia has been steadily sliding back into its old ways, and making everyone nervous in so doing. They've been remarkably unhelpful with Iran.

Time to stand up for an ally, and stand up to the neighborhood bastard.

The Air Force and COIN

By Slab

Small Wars Journal posted an article by Air Force LtCol Buck Elton, "Shortchanging the Joint Doctrine Fight: One Airman's Assessment of the Airman's Assessment". LtCol Elton's excellent article is a counterpoint to an earlier monograph, published in December 2007 by Air University, and written by Air Force Deputy Judge Advocate MajGen Charles Dunlap, entitled Shortchanging the Joint Fight? An Airman's Assessment of FM 3-24 and the Case for Developing Truly Joint COIN Doctrine.

I have not read MajGen Dunlap's article, as I was deployed in Iraq at the time watching the lessons of FM 3-24 put into practice by an Army cavalry troop. I find it interesting that MajGen Dunlap believes the Army and Marine Corps are shortchanging airpower in the COIN fight, as I spent quite a bit of time using rotary and fixed wing aviation in support of Apache Troop's objectives. However, LtCol Elton does a far better job of refuting the General's criticisms than I ever could, so I'll let him do the talking:

Many COIN and Irregular Warfare experts argue population control, legitimacy of the government and isolation of insurgents are key elements of success. Contrary to what General Dunlap suggests, airpower is a critical enabler that is absolutely necessary, but it is by no mean sufficient to defeating insurgencies. While criticizing the commitment of massive numbers of American boots-on-the-ground, he fails to discuss any historical COIN case studies where airpower replaced land power as the dominant military effort. From Malaya, to El Salvador, to the Greek Civil War to Vietnam, to Algeria, insurgencies are rarely, if ever, successfully crushed by an overwhelming foreign military force alone and there has never been an insurgency crushed by the overwhelming application of airpower alone. Ground forces, whether they are host nation security forces or external combat forces assisting the security forces, are necessary but also not sufficient. Of all the discussions about the best way to counter insurgencies, only General Dunlap argues airpower is necessary and sufficient. The harsh reality is that our Joint Force will be called upon to conduct many difficult missions and we must prepare for them together with the resources we have available. Advocating the types of wars the Air Force should fight (no ground troops) by only preparing for the wars they want to fight (airpower centric conflicts with peer competitors), while ignoring the type of fight our enemy wants to fight (al-Qaeda’s global insurgency) and the wars our President orders us to fight (Afghanistan and Iraq), is a terrible mistake. Our nation must be prepared to succeed in conventional, irregular, and hybrid conflicts such as Iraq and Afghanistan. If funding for new equipment and forces is constrained, the Air Force should be willing to consider some risk in capacity (not capability) for Major Combat Operations to increase the capability and capacity to conduct Irregular Warfare and COIN, while convincing our civilian leaders to supply adequate funding for all our threats and requirements. Our services shortchange the joint fight when they organize, train, and equip for only one type of conflict. General Dunlap shortchanges the doctrine development process by discrediting sister service doctrine and military operations to protect service’s budget equities.

H/T to SWJ

Update: Looks like several members of the Small Wars Council don't think quite as highly of LtCol Elton's article.

I am not convinced Buck like Dunlap ever read 3-24. He read passages and filled in with what he wanted it to say. More Hap Arnold airmindedness mess.

I saw LtCol Elton's article as being more in favor of joint mindedness, but perhaps I misread. I must admit that applauding a critique without having read the criticized work itself is less than exemplary scholarship on my part.

I have to say that when I read the line in his conclusion, "The United States Air Force is the most lethal, flexible, overwhelming and feared military force in the world," I snickered a bit.

Future War Question 1

By Charlie

Based on the previous post, We’ll take a look at (in general) the ways generic enemy conventional militaries might respond to an attack by the US. The purpose of this is to examine how enemy “conventional” militaries may adapt and respond based off of the contemporary operating environment. The reason I chose to post on this is the increased attention that COIN has received in Army training and doctrine. [full disclosure] I believe this new emphasis on COIN is well deserved, but many in the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marines believe that we need to focus on preparations for more conventional future threats. A question to examine from the side of the anti-COIN-centric planners is: will conventional threats continue to organize and fight the way they always have, despite recent battlefield developments?

The first question that will be addressed will be: Will nation-state adversaries plan to fight the US based off of OIF I tactics?

Read More »

The Shape of Future War

By Charlie

It is taken as common wisdom that in the future, the US will face a large degree of irregular warfare when dealing with enemy actors, both state and non-state. Analysis of insurgencies, past, present, and potential, has been frequent and in depth –but what about all of those conventional armies that are still out there? While terrorist groups like Al Qaida lack infrastructure, funding, equipment, manpower, and all of the other benefits of an established military, state actors have all of these advantages from the beginning. Theorists often say that the military plans to fight and win the last war, so will nation-state adversaries do the same? Another way to frame this question is: will enemy conventional armies fight conventionally in the future? Will they (and are they able to) fight unconventionally? Is there some way for them to do both, and to maximize the advantages and minimize the disadvantages of each?

These questions are relevant to ask, especially now as the Army swings into full COIN mode. The emphasis on nation-state military threats has decreased, due in part to the fact that our forces have been very adept at striking and disabling conventional military forces, but that assumes that enemy conventional armies will not adapt their tactics or adjust their strategies in the future. How many future enemy armies will fight a war we want them to fight, the way we want them to fight it?

This is a broad topic, so let us attempt to address each of these questions:

Will nation-state adversaries plan to fight the US based off of OIF I tactics?

Will enemy conventional armies fight conventionally in the future?

Will enemy conventional armies (and are they able to) fight unconventionally?

Is there some way for enemy conventional armies to fight conventionally and unconventionally at the same time, and to maximize the advantages and minimize the disadvantages of each?

I will attempt to address each of these in a different post, but I would like to get some comments on the concept first. COIN training is prevalent, but should we be watching threat nation-states and evaluating what the next war may look like?

Pakistani Paramilitaries

By Slab

A recent firefight near Asadabad, Afghanistan was ended when US Air Force F-15Es and a B-1 dropped several 500-lb bombs into Pakistan. Only trouble is, the planes apparently targeted Pakistani paramilitaries, killing 11 of them. Pakistan is upset over the loss.

The incident highlights one of the perils of employing paramilitary forces - the difficulty of distinguishing them from the actual insurgents. My last tour in Iraq saw much of the same, although we were not being engaged by insurgents at the time, so there was little danger of mistakenly killing the Neighborhood Watch guys. However, on more than one occasion I had aircraft working for me report some sort of suspicious activity that looked an awful lot like, say, insurgents placing an IED on a dirt road that we used from time to time. After a watching for a bit, we realized we couldn't identify them as a threat with any reasonable certainty, and eased our proverbial fingers off the triggers. When we stopped out there on patrol the next day, turns out, it was just the local Neighborhood Watch filling sandbags to fortify one of their checkpoints. We left them with a polite suggestion that they might not want to fill sandbags in the middle of a road at night.

On the whole, paramilitary forces are one of the most effective tools in COIN. Although they don't have the training and equipment of regular military forces, their knowledge of the local area and population makes them far more adept at separating the insurgent "fish" from the "sea" of the local populace. Many have pointed to the Awakening Movement in Iraq as a key ingredient to the current success in Al Anbar province, and rightfully so. I have seen the difference between Anbar province of 2006, where the Iraqi Army battalion I supported struggled to maintain control of a 4-5 kilometer stretch of battlespace, and the same area in late 2007 and early 2008. The area was so peaceful that the Iraqi Army shifted the entire brigade to another province and gave responsibility for the area to a battalion. The difference was the rise of the Provincial Security Forces in the area.

The Afghan border presents a real predicament for Coalition forces. I spent some time in Asadabad in 2003, and the base out there is not all that far from the border. Add a Pakistani paramilitary force such as the Frontier Corps in close proximity to a Coalition outpost, and the potential for cross-border incidents such as this one is very high. I have no idea what level of coordination is being done with the Pakistanis, but it is apparent that it is not enough.

How to prevent the continuation of this sort of incident? Well, one way would be to restrict all Coalition fires across the border. But since the enemy regularly operates across the border, and places no such restriction on their fighters, it's pretty easy to see why this is a poor choice, militarily. Better communication with the Frontier Corps seems to be the answer. But how, in a situation like a firefight in the mountains of the Afghan/Pakistani border, do you communicate with the Pakistanis that you are targeting a group of personnel at location X? And how do the Pakistanis, in turn, verify the location of paramilitary forces in the area and communicate whether the targeted individuals are friendly? Or contact the Frontier Corps soldiers and tell them to mark their position in such a way that it is recognizable to Coalition aircraft? All of this in a timely fashion, because the guys in the Coalition combat operations center are very aware that their fellow Soldiers are taking fire on some mountainside and need help. I've been in a COC in that sort of situation in Iraq, and having the ability to rain down high explosive from the sky to help out your brothers is very satisfying, but it can also be incredibly difficult to wait for things like identifying a paramilitary force on patrol in the vicinity.

So, I'm going to come completely out of left field with an idea for solving this sort of problem. Rather than relying on communications with the Pakistani Frontier Corps, ask Pakistan to allow Coalition personnel to train and advise the Frontier Corps in the border regions. This puts Coalition personnel and communications equipment in position to track and communicate the location of Frontier Corps patrols. The benefits to the Pakistanis are better training and equipment for their paramilitary forces, and a reduced likelihood that they will be targeted by Coalition units when operating in the vicinity of Coalition forces. The benefit to the Coalition is a more capable force patrolling the Pakistani side of the border, interdicting the insurgents before they attack our forces on the Afghan side. It will also help to maintain good relations with Pakistan, as we are less likely to mistakenly kill their troops.

Of course, there are many problems with this idea. Where do we get the manpower and equipment? Providing enough advisors for Afghan and Iraqi forces is difficult enough as it is. How to overcome Pakistani objections to foreign troops on their soil, even in an advisory and training capacity? They've 're obviously not interested in having our forces operating in their territory. Of course, I'm not talking actual Coalition combat formations, I'm talking small teams in advisory capacities similar to what we've done in Colombia and the Philippines. I would think that should be a bit easier for them to swallow. It's a pretty tough idea to implement, but one that can bear a lot of fruit in the struggle to secure the border regions and prevent cross-border operations by the insurgents. Not only will it aid in the discrimination of enemy insurgents from friendly paramilitaries, but it will make the Frontier Corps a stronger and more reliable counter-insurgent force. And ultimately, strong indigenous forces are required to win against this cross-border insurgency.

Edited to add: I'm leaving unsaid the possibility that the Air Force did, in fact, successfully target the individuals who attacked Coalition forces that day, and that those individuals might also have been members of the Frontier Corps. That is because I don't intend for this post to be about the reliability of paramilitary forces, which is another problematic issue. Coalition advisors could help to increase their reliability in terms of loyalty to the government of Pakistan, but ultimately it is up to the Pakistani military to take necessary steps to ensure the Frontier Corps in the Northwestern Frontier Province is not working against us.

Update: I was unable to find the complete footage of the strike earlier, but Defense Tech provided it. From the raw footage, it looks pretty clear that the guys who ate the high explosives were asking for it. Even UAS footage doesn't necessarily tell all, but I'm pretty confident at this point that if those guys were Frontier Corps, they were bad apples. Even if the UAS lost track of the original group of fighters and hit FC troops, the close proximity would indicate at least a degree of complicity on their part. So, tough luck boys, but when you mess with the bull you get the horns.

Obstacle Emplacement in the COIN Fight

By Charlie

North of the Green Zone, in Iraq, the Army’s new COIN doctrine is being put to the test as a wall is being erected in the southern third of Sadr City. The construction of this barrier is an odd mix of new and classical approaches to combat, engineering, and counterinsurgency. Here is a recent report from the New York Times on the progress:

This is the war over the wall. It is a daily battle of attrition waged over the large concrete barrier that the Americans have been building across Sadr City in the hope of establishing a safe zone in the southern tier of the Shiite enclave.

The Americans began building the wall a month ago, working east to west. The work started at night but soon extended into the day as American commanders sought to speed up the construction….Supporters of Moktada al-Sadr, the anti-American cleric, denounced the wall as a nefarious effort to divide the city. Militia fighters with rocket-propelled grenades, machine guns and small arms have been trying to halt its construction. …Those efforts have failed, and the barrier is now 80 percent complete.

Interestingly, the idea of putting up barriers to restrict your enemy’s movement is a conventional one. The emplacement of obstacles has been contemplated by Army engineers since the Fulda gap planning (which may have recently stopped). The (old) Army FM 3-0 defines this as Countermobility, which:

.. denies mobility to enemy forces. It limits the maneuver of enemy forces and enhances the effectiveness of fires. Countermobility missions include obstacle building and smoke generation.

However, the placement, circumstances, and purpose of this wall in the southern third of Sadr city are directly inline with the new Army doctrine. Clever obstacle emplacement by maneuver commanders and combat engineers has been commonplace in Iraq for a while. Marines and soldiers quickly realized that Anti Coalition Forces were uncomfortable engaging them outside of certain distances, and employed obstacles such as barriers and wire to increase standoff distances. The relentless emplacement of this massive barrier is meant to do several things: increase standoff distance for Mahdi Army mortars targeting the Green Zone, disrupt movement of Special Group members and their supply lines, and increase the ability of Iraqi and Coalition forces to project power into the sprawling slum. This plan sounds good, because it is right out of the book:

FM 3-24: Military Aspects of Terrain for Counterinsurgency

B-4. At the tactical level, Soldiers and Marines consider different details of the military aspects of terrain
to describe the operational environment.

Obstacles. In addition to terrain obstacles, obstacles in a COIN environment include anything
that hinders insurgent freedom of operation or counterinsurgent operations. Traffic control
points, electronic security systems, and guard plans are examples of obstacles to insurgents.

By utilizing effective obstacle emplacement in a complex urban environment, Coalition and Iraqi forces are slowly and methodically demonstrating a fusion of countermobility and counterinsurgency.

Does Germany need a national security strategy?

By Charlie

Apparently this type of thing is hotly debated in Deutschland, and in Europe as a whole. It seems obvious to me that a nation state would want to set up some type of national command authority, as well as spell out the circumstances for deploying their military, in order to give themselves and their people a framework on how the country will respond to events as the occur in the real world.
Weekly Standard:

For far too long, in other words, German political leaders shied away from communicating a comprehensive strategic framework that defines the country’s national interests and addresses responses to the various threats. The conservative strategy paper defines Germany’s national interests in terms of five issue areas: (1) the fight against terrorism; (2) nuclear proliferation; (3) energy and pipeline security; (4) climate change; and (5) the prevention of conflicts.

My question: is this a blip on the radar, or are more countries going to start taking responsibility for themselves as they face real threats in the world? With declining military and defense spending throughout Europe, this type of move is a break from 50 years of relying on someone else to make defense decisions. We'll have to see how this plays out...

South Korea to become accompanied deployment

By Charlie

With the strains of the Iraq war, and repeated deployments, this seems like a good idea. Just keep the families out of artillery range:

The U.S. government is likely to accept a request by the top American commander in South Korea to extend the length of tours by U.S. troops here and have their families accompany them, a report said Thursday.

South Korea welcomes the extended tours by U.S. forces, while some critics are worried that the family-accompanied program, along with a plan to pause the reduction of U.S. troops, would burden South Korean taxpayers.

The report said U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates will discuss the three-year, family-accompanied tour program for U.S. forces in Korea (USFK) when he visits Seoul in June.

Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is also in support of the plan, which has been pushed ahead by USFK Commander Gen. B. B. Bell, it said.

Currently, most U.S. troops here are required to serve one-year tours without their families. A USFK official said only 10 percent of the 27,000 USFK members are with their families now.

Stability Operations Now Part of Army’s Core Mission

By Charlie

While embracing reality, this move is likely to rankle some of the Army's "old corps." What I mean by that is that there is a sizeable chunk of the Army, especially in the combat arms branches, that think the mission of the infantry is only "to close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver to defeat or capture him, or to repel his assault by fire, close combat, and counterattack." Not included in that is building schools, policing foreign cities, monitoring infrastructure, training local security forces,etc.

WASHINGTON (Army News Service, Feb. 25, 2008) -- Soldiers have been in Iraq keeping the peace, battling insurgents, protecting civilians and helping to rebuild that country for nearly five years. The Army now recognizes that work, called “stability operations,” as part of a Soldier’s core mission and made it so in the new field manual for operations, FM 3-0, which will be released later this week.

The change comes because the U.S. government has identified that failed and failing states are breeding grounds for terrorists and insurgents, said Lt. Col. James H. Boozell, an Army G3 branch chief for the stability operations and irregular warfare division at the Pentagon.

“When local government can’t provide the civil security and civil control necessary for its people, terrorists are allowed to thrive,” he said. “If we stabilize governance, it will provide the level of civil security and control that disallows the growth of terrorism and insurgency.”

What we face is a near-term certainty of the continuation of "irregular warfare" wherever we fight, in the brushfire war after next. It is good that the Army recognizes this, but it will be a continuing challenge to split-train our 4GW forces on 3GW tactics. Face it, the 3GW mindset isn't going away any time soon.

Castro resigns: Fallout?

By Charlie

I figured Castro would govern 'till death, so this is certainly unexpected:

HAVANA - An ailing, 81-year-old Fidel Castro resigned as Cuba's president Tuesday after nearly a half-century in power, saying he will not accept a new term when parliament meets Sunday. ADVERTISEMENT

The end of Castro's rule — the longest in the world for a head of government — frees his 76-year-old brother Raul to implement reforms he has hinted at since taking over as acting president when Fidel Castro fell ill in July 2006. President Bush said he hopes the resignation signals the beginning of a democratic transition.

I'm not the Latin America expert, but I think it is an ideal time to quote Thomas P.M. Barnett:

Don’t expect Cubans to take some passing of the torch to Raul without putting up something of a popular struggle. He won’t last long, and the committee that replaces him will naturally have, as its first order of business, meeting this popular expectation, a demand for political input that skews higher the younger you go.

According to the polls, 76% of Cubans think a more democratic political system would be good, improving their lives.

Also, 84% says a market-driven economy would improve their lives.

And some more:

Raul will rule with committees galore and new names will rise that we've never heard of before.

Then before he croaks (or when), we'll see serious reformers step up, "new era" and all that, and the popular push for direct elections will begin.

None of this happens overnight, but within five years Cuba is unrecognizable. The young will love it and dub it the "second revolution" and the old will be baffled and nostagically pine for the good old days. Old Miami Cubans will be shocked that the Cuba of their youth is not resurrectable, but they won't care given all the freedom to visit back and forth.

Sooner than any can imagine, life in Cuba will ramp up so close to that in Miami, the talk will begin of going all the way toward joining the U.S. Then, depending on the presidential election year, you'll start seeing Cuban statehood as a staple of Florida's electoral quid pro quo (just like sanctions support got you the Cuban vote in the past).

Comforting: Air Force's nuclear focus has dimmed

By Charlie

So says a report, reviewing the incident in August where a Minot AFB-based bomber was loaded up with nukes and flown to Louisiana.

WASHINGTON -- The U.S. military has lost focus on its nuclear-weapons mission and has suffered a sharp decline in nuclear expertise, factors that may have contributed to a mishap last year in which a B-52 bomber unknowingly carried six nuclear warheads across the country, according to two new independent reviews.

Both studies found that levels of nuclear training and alertness at the Air Force slipped after the end of the Cold War. But one of the reports was much more critical, saying accidents far worse than the errant B-52 flight could occur without immediate changes in nuclear procedures.

"The task force and several of the senior [Defense Department] people interviewed believe that the decline in focus has been more pronounced than realized and too extreme to be acceptable," said the report compiled by an outside panel chaired by retired Air Force Gen. Larry D. Welch.

….
Dozens of officers have been either disciplined or relieved of command, but the Welch report's findings raise new questions about whether failures within the Air Force were more systemic than originally believed. The first Air Force investigation into the incident, completed in October, pinned much of the blame on individual officers at Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota.

The war on terror (thankfully) hasn’t given our nuclear arsenal much to do, so this lack of focus is understandable, but not forgivable. It does bring up the question of “what is the mission of the Air Force?” A question that John and I have discussed at length. Here’s what he said on the Air Force’s mission drift:

I think what freaks Air Force types out about small wars talk (and equipping the force with short range slow-movers) is that they fear they'll go back to the days of subservience to the Army (shoot here, fly here). Zoomies are a proud bunch, and they take a certain satisfaction in the fact that they're our first line of defense against heavy hitters like Russia and China.

What the Air Force has here are two diametrically opposed missions: Space, missile, and strategic duties that require satellites, missile silos, and nuke-capable strategic bombers that will be the country’s strategic deterrence force and charged with dealing with the mythical “near peer” – and heavy lift, combat search and rescue, J-TAC, weather, CAS, and technical expertise for the irregular wars we are actually fighting.

Does it make sense then to cleave the organization in half, to allow for each mission to get 100% of the organization’s attention? I know many officers got fired for the Minot incident, but it seems to be a symptom of a larger problem of mission drift, but this is an outsider’s perspective.

Update (John): Interesting VMI fact, Lt.Gen. Daniel Darnell '75 spoke on this incident yesterday.... in front of a Congressional subcommittee.

Army to Shift (slowly) Out of Korea?

By Charlie

Well, troops are needed elsewhere, and it is looking less and less likely that war between the North and the South will breakout at a moment’s notice. Perhaps we really don’t need troops on the DMZ that are “ready to fight tonight:”

US officers said the headquarters of the Eighth Army, the overall US Army command unit in Seoul, would move to Hawaii by 2012. In addition, the headquarters of the Second Infantry Division, which has only one ground combat brigade instead of the usual three or four, will leave Korea even though its destination has not yet been decided.

About 27,000 US troops are currently posted in Korea. That number will soon decline to 25,000 and keep on dropping gradually, probably to fewer than 20,000. Those troops are needed elsewhere in an Army that is stretched thin by deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan.

Moreover, US officers contend that South Korean forces should take charge of defending their own country from their potential enemy in North Korea. Some assert that the Koreans have long shirked that duty and thus have not prepared themselves to take over the communications, intelligence, and logistics essential to large-scale operations.

For that reason, US officers said, units like the 1st Signal Brigade, which provides strategic and tactical communications; the 501st Military Intelligence Brigade, which gets information for commanders; and the 19th Sustainment Command (Expeditionary), which is the logistic arm of Eighth Army, will remain in Korea after 2012.

This plan isn’t new, it has been in the works since the last South Korean president, Roh Moo-hyun, sought to reach out to the North and take over more of the defense responsibility. The US, with other security matters at hand, apparently had no problem with this request. Now (according to the column) the South is seeking to reach out to us to slow our troop withdrawal plan, which is being rebuffed by a military that is stretched thin, and sees little need for another unaccompanied hardship tour.

This reminds me of the Germany situation, where we dramatically reduce our force projection due to changing policies of a host nation, only to turn around and see them seek to slow the withdrawal. Military bases are an economic stimulator –look at Fayetteville, NC or Sierra Vista, AZ –and the consequences of moving them must be carefully weighed. Critics of US basing overseas seem to be loudly wishing the military to leave, and then getting upset when they do.

Imperialist Westerners Threaten Helpless Backwater Former Colony

By Charlie

It’s OK though, because its France.

France today threatened to take military action against rebels in Chad after the UN security council called on all member-states to support the Chadian government.

President Nicolas Sarkozy said France was ready to launch a military operation in Chad against the rebels if necessary. "If France must do its duty, it will do so," Sarkozy said.

The rebels have accused the former colonial power in Chad of already intervening in the fighting, by using helicopters and tanks to back President Idriss Déby and of causing civilian casualties.

The rebels say French helicopters and tanks, which are part of a 1,400-strong military contingent in Chad, fired on rebels near the airport yesterday. French troops have helped evacuate foreigners from the capital, N'djamena.

Question: will France be roundly condemned for this? Or will other nations now have the political cover they need to step up to the plate and deal with the Crisis in Chad and Sudan? It seems that the “international community” has been just fine with letting the Darfur crisis continue unabated so far.

First Strike Simulation

By John

This creeped me out. It's a fictional depiction of a surprise Soviet first strike against US strategic assets, circa 1979. Looks like they used some of the footage in The Day After.

Apparently what had everyone freaking out back then was the Soviet's newly developed ICBM capabilities, which theoretically could destroy our ultra-hardened force of Minuteman III missiles. Enter the B-1 bomber, the Peacekeeper ICBM, the cruise missile, the Ohio-Class SSBN, and others during the 80s.

Thank you Reagan. While I admit the folks who made the video may have embellished a bit (we could have gotten more missiles and bombers off the ground, methinks), it's pretty obvious that Ronnie understood what it took to keep Ivan out of our collective faces.

US Military Unprepared for Attack on Country?

By Charlie

So sayeth a “report,” which I will discuss and dissect:

WASHINGTON - The U.S. military isn't ready for a catastrophic attack on the country, and National Guard forces don't have the equipment or training they need for the job, according to a report.
Even fewer Army National Guard units are combat-ready today than were nearly a year ago when the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves determined that 88 percent of the units were not prepared for the fight, the panel says in a new report released Thursday.

OK, let me give you some reality here: when a Guard unit becomes “combat ready” it gets sent to combat. Units are either preparing to leave, deployed, or resetting from deployment –that’s it. So unless a unit is preparing to leave, it isn’t going to be classified as combat ready. I get the “88%” that is quoted here, assuming 1/3 of the operational force is prepping to mob, 1/3 is overseas, and 1/3 is just returning and resetting –allowing for headquarters units and other rear-D elements, the 88% makes sense to me. Moving on:

Punaro, a retired Marine Corps major general, had sharp criticism for Northern Command, saying that commanders there have made little progress developing detailed response plans for attacks against the homeland.

"NorthCom has got to get religion in this area," said Punaro. He said the military needs to avoid "pickup game" type responses, such as the much-criticized federal reaction to Hurricane Katrina, and put in place the kind of detailed plans that exist for virtually any international crisis.

Whoa! Throw on the breaks. I was in the Katrina relief operation, and although the federal reaction to the disaster was “much-criticized”, the Guard’s response was nothing short of brilliant. At the end of the deployment, the TAG of Mississippi had to turn away the troops there to help. At the end of the mission, we had enough boots on the ground to successfully execute a follow-on mission to invade Mexico. “Pick-up” game responses are how situations are solved in the real world, because you can’t have a plan to react to every conceivable contingency, it just isn’t possible.

Do we actually want contingency plans for a F-5 Tornado strike on Kansas City followed by an outbreak of Swine Flu with a crowd and riot control element to be specifically codified? How would it even work? We’ve got an F-5 Tornado and a Swine Flu plus rioters in Kansas City –its OPPLAN 31 Bravo 5! Execute! Just like we planned!

No, in reality, the introduction of the Incident Command System is a much more realistic way to handle disasters – a simple, very flexible structure that is universal to civilian and military command structures, and one that can be used in a wide range of disasters or terrorist attacks. Let’s continue with this article:

He also underscored the commission's main finding: the Pentagon must move toward making the National Guard and Reserves an integral part of the U.S. military.

The panel, in its No. 1 recommendation, said the Defense Department must use the nation's citizen soldiers to create an operational force that would be fully trained, equipped and ready to defend the nation, respond to crises and supplement the active duty troops in combat.

Wow, that’s a leap. How is that in any way different to what the Guard is doing now? It has been my experience that the National Guard and Reserves ARE an integral part of the U.S. military. Studies like these continue to confuse me, because they tend to latch on to meta-narratives (Katrina was a disaster) and ignore the current problems that the Guard actually has (lower levels of training, high OPTEMPO, bad work/life balance for civilian careers).

Gaza Roundup

By Charlie

Terror! International Intrigue! War! Read my Gaza roundup below the fold!

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North Korea Calls for Formal End to Korean War

By Charlie

Give peace a chance? I don't buy it:

North Korea has called for a peace treaty formally ending the Korean War to be signed as soon as possible, to ease military tensions with the United States .

The call was made in a commentary published by the Rodong daily, the newspaper of the North's ruling Workers' Party. It said now is the right time for a peace treaty to replace the armistice that has been in place since 1953.

The Korean peninsula is technically still at war since the fighting ended.

North and South Korean leaders held a summit in October that resulted in a call for a meeting of three or four parties to lay groundwork for a formal peace treaty and normalized U.S.-North Korean relations.

But South Korean opponents to the idea argue that any treaty should wait until North Korea completes the full abandonment of its nuclear programs.

Guess which one's communist...

Recall, if you will, that the Korean war was waged by the newly-minted United Nations, not imperialistic unilateral war-mongering America . It is interesting that South Korea is balking on this, given their repeated attempts at “sunshine” policies. The South is probably nervous about the spectacle of having its economy wrecked by absorbing the North’s shattered infrastructure in the event of re-unification (ala West Germany after the Berlin Wall fell). So will the UN be the place where this war ends? I doubt it. Kim Jong Il may be crazy, but a formal end to the Korean war would be followed by a gradual opening of the North Korean economy, which may cause his “hermit kingdom” to realize that their neighbors to the south have it a lot better than they do. Liberalization leads to dictators losing power, and a permanent war footing is a great excuse for an autocrat to hang around for 20+ years of solitary rule –look at Cuba , Syria , Libya , Egypt , etc. So it seems that war is good for Kim Jong Il, and it is unlikely that he will be open to the idea of peace in our time.

But we WANTED to Fight in the Fulda Gap...

By Charlie

This Canadian colonel comments on the SECDEF's remarks on NATO last week, but struck a chord with me in this graf:
Collateral Damage
By George Petrolekas

Many American officers who passed their military adolescence in training to fight in the Fulda Gap - the strategic area in the Cold War era where the Soviets would theoretically invade West Germany - still believe that the U.S. Army is not meant for protracted low-level conflict or nation-building. The Powell doctrine, so favored by many U.S. officers, of applying overwhelmingly superior force followed by rapid withdrawal from the field, was highly successful in America 's first Gulf war but does not apply to the current situations in Afghanistan and Iraq .

The war in Iraq has awakened military soldier-scholars to the fact that America must wage a completely different type of war, fought among the people, generational in scope, where firepower and maneuver must be coupled with the development of civil society and security through close contact with the population.

Petrolekas goes on to chide the SECDEF for his comments about NATO’s reliance on Cold War doctrine and the inability to conduct COIN ops and talk about how great NATO is. What struck me was how true that 1st paragraph rang. Many officers that I have served with, especially the combat arms types, are all about the Powell doctrine and are frustrated with the restricting way the US military chooses to fight its wars. Some majors I have worked with seethe about fighting a “faceless enemy” that does not wear a uniform, others complain about having to waste time on the “other stuff” like IO, PSYOP, Civil Affairs, and coordinating with Host Nation forces, instead of writing a really good “tasks to maneuver units” paragraph in the OPORD. I know that the plural of “anecdote” is not “fact,” but it has been my experience that many leaders in the Army really want to fight another army, not an insurgency. That could be a result –as the colonel above says- of officers who “passed their military adolescence” training to fight the commies in the “big one,” and is leading defense planner to focus on the next “big one,” (China) rather than dealing with what is in front of us now. I always hear from my artillery brethren “you’ll all be sorry you cut the artillery branch when we fight the Chinese/Russians/whoever.”

My take is that the Powell Doctrine is great, when we can use it. The problem is that America rarely gets to choose the conflicts that we engage in. I know Iraq can be debated here as a “war of choice,” but let’s focus on Afghanistan . In 2001, was the Big Army prepared to fight a well-armed terror network and their state-supporters in the middle of Afghanistan in the middle of the winter? Adequately, I suppose, but the Powell doctrine really did not fit into the dynamic of OEF1. So to paraphrase Rumsfeld, you go to war with the doctrine you have. Leaders on the ground made decisions, which became unit SOPs, which were handed off to replacements, which became the "way things were done." FMs have to be re-written occasionally, and organizational knowledge is always better than schoolhouse instruction. We’ll see how the Petraeus doctrine of FM 3-24 (4GW) works out in Iraq, and for all of the Cold Warriors still out there, we’ll keep our older (3GW) regs on the shelf just in case.

Resurgent Russia Running Rampant?

By Charlie

Yes, my skills at alliteration are breathtaking. Moving on, is Russia destined for a comeback?

Putin's provocative actions have become so frequent that they barely generate much attention or protest. Yet these recent news items underscore the challenge a resurgent Russia poses for Bush and his successor:

* Russia 's Navy has test-fired tactical missiles off the coasts of France and Spain , the kind of action not seen since the Cold War. The clear intent was to show Russia is again a military power.

* Putin is offering a bear hug of nationalist solidarity and economic incentives to Serbia . He champions Serbia 's claim to Kosovo, countering the U.S. view that the Serb province deserves independence. Russia has also just bought Serbia 's national oil monopoly and is extending a gas pipeline there.

Putin's aims are no mystery. He wants to revive as much of the old Soviet influence as possible. He's in a much stronger position than in 2001. Unlike then, Russia is flush with oil and gas money, and it has paid off debts to international banks and organizations.

They’ve also been going a little heavy on the crazy by blaming NATO for copyright infringement for making illegal AK47’s:

MOSCOW, January 24 (RIA Novosti) - The new Russian ambassador to NATO has raised the issue of military patent infringement and promised to look into the production of the famous 'Kalashnikov' brand of automatic weapons by NATO countries.

Plus, they’ve given Poland flak over the upcoming missile defense deal with the US , and have released Cold-War-esque statements about “fears” and “wariness” over NATO troop build-ups in Europe . (Huh? Build-up? NATO couldn't get troops to Afghanistan, so they're building up in Europe?? Right...)

One might ask, what the hell is going on in Moscow ? Is Russia struggling to regain its superpower status and return to a bi-polar world? Do they see a militarily weakening and economically shrinking EU, and see a golden opportunity to impose influence over it? Do they fear a hyper-powered US, with technology leaps and bonds above Cold-War era tech, hopping around the world killing terrorists and fear that display of power. Or, do they see a bogged-down America over-committed militarily across the globe and seek to selectively project their power to areas that we have ignored –Africa, Eastern-bloc European countries, and South America ?

Whatever is going on, Russian “help” to petty dictatorships is working out about as well now as it did during the Cold war. Just ask Syria how that new air defense system they bought from Moscow worked out for them. When/if Russia becomes a problem in the future, it will likely be along political, not military lines. That doesn’t mean that the US Army will stop planning to go to war against the Krasnovian motorized rifle regiments any time soon… that would be too much to hope for…

The Doctrine Gap

By Charlie

Over at Abu Muqawama, a comment on the current doctrine that is being taught at CGSC:

I'm a European exchange student in the US Army Command and General Staff College in Leavenworth and it strikes me that the focus of this academic year is still very much, if not entirely, on force-on-force conventional warfare (Fulda gap style). I had expected an immersion in COIN and 4GW related doctrine but I still need to see the first course or excercice [sic] where we have a look in the recent COIN FM. I'm more than a little disappointed with regard to this. Especially since most of my fellow American students have such extensive experience in the COIN/4GWF area. This experience is simply not beeing [sic] used by the school. I would suggest Def Sec Gates to have a hard look at his own institutions before critisizing [sic] others.

In 2005, Army intel officers in the basic course still had to memorize the task/org of Warsaw Pact tank divisions. It took 2 weeks. Think about that.

I Comment on John’s Commenters

By Charlie

That’s right. Do something about it, Weekly Standard! That’s what I thought…

Hi John-
I'm one of those a$$hole battalion commanders mentioned in "The Army's Other Crisis."
Speaking only for myself, from talking to my guys - National Guard cav troopers - it's pretty clear that the main retention issues are that people either are tired of being away from their families and civilian lives or simply want to move on to something else. Being in the Army is, well, hard - it was hard when I was active and it's hard now (Remember the "one weekend a month, two weeks a year" National Guard? None of my guys with under six years does!).
…I'm less convinced that this is a case of a generation of agile, thinkers being repressed by a generation of mindless, nitpicking fossils. As a 20-year LTC, I guess I'm right between those two alleged factions. I don't see it - at least anymore. I mean, when I was a lieutenant, I was certain that only I had the vision, that only I really cared about Soldiers, that my superiors were stodgy, hidebound desk jockies who didn't know anything about the real world. The same was true when I was a captain. About the time I made major, I started to see that perhaps my bosses had concerns that extended a bit farther than the little platoons I led or the companies I commanded.

Sir, I’m with you. Having been through a deployment abroad, I think that officers at the battalion level and below “get it.” Obviously, as officers grow and mature from platoon leaders to company commanders to battalion operations officers to XOs to commanders, they grow and become concerned with things that extend a little farther than the “little platoons and companies.” However, it is also pertinent to note that most O5s and above have not seen counterinsurgency warfare as a company grade officer, and this is especially true in the Reserve Component. This isn’t a knock on colonels, I know a lot of them, but it is a perception among younger officers that must be dealt with –accurate or not. The bottom line for us reservists is that we have to make the best of the situation that we’ve been dealt –imperfect troops, leaders, training –and pair it with our inherent Reserve Component strengths- occupational diversity, civilian skills, creativity, and flexibility. The result of this strange brew has been uniform success in every mission that has been assigned to the Reserve Component, from missions in combat zones to peacekeeping, to support to Noble Eagle and Homeland Security.

The good LTC continues:

That isn't to say there aren't careerist jerks who would shaft their subordinates to get ahead. There are, and they make good people go just like inspirational leaders make people stay. It's just I don't think that's the rule rather than the exception.

Oh, and as for the young officer who was complaining about being chewed out after a patrol for not having his men in their safety glasses - maybe if he did his job and had his guys in their protective gear his battalion commander wouldn't have to. Part of this job is sometimes being a jerk - if you measure success by your popularity, maybe being an Army officer isn't for you. For my part, I'll be the a$$hole squadron commander whose guys can all still see.

Swift and deadly!

Man, I would serve under this officer in a heartbeat. Except that I’m not a huge fan of California’s climate/economic situation. I am sick of hearing about LTs complaining about obvious NCO-Level TTPs being enforced in line units (such as safety glasses and roll-over drills). Those things save lives. The things that can be debated as descent into administrative CYA TTPs, such as reflective safety belts on FOBs, still remain on my lists of reasons to leave the Army ASAP. The bottom line here is that many complaints from junior officers are lingering, and are contributing to the yet-unnoticed mass exodus of mid-level officers and NCOs from the force. These issues are not getting a proper hearing among Army brass, and while the immediate impact cannot be seen, it will soon appear when the Army suddenly finds itself without quality mid-level leadership.

So to conclude, I am with this squadron commander that wrote in to the Weekly Standard, there are no more “weekend warriors,” there are real warriors now. Because of the new threat environment we find ourselves in, there are numerous threats and adversaries that do not easily fit into the current doctrine and training we have received. Change is a part of every organization, but the way that organization manages the change speaks volumes about how the organization will perform in the future.

The Army has a Plan

By Charlie

I’ve knocked the Army in the past for not flagging new units, but it looks like they have a plan in the works to do just that…they just never tell me these things…

Behold! Grow the Army:

In January 2007, the President requested, from Congress, a 74,200 Soldier increase in Army end strength across the Active, Guard and Reserve components. The initiative to “Grow the Army” (GTA) provides additional ground forces to meet strategic demands and mitigate persistent capability shortfalls, and reduce stress on our Soldiers and Families. The types of organizations the Army will grow are Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs), Support Brigades, Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) units. To support these IBCTs and Support Brigades the Army is simultaneously announcing the stationing of approximately 30,000 Soldiers in Combat Support and Combat Service Support units throughout the United States as well as various overseas locations.

In addition to the Grow the Army units, one Maneuver Enhancement Brigade (MEB) will be restationed to Ft Drum, NY and one MEB is planned to be restationed to FT Richardson, AK pending completion of an environmental analysis in accordance the National Environmental Policy Act.

Read More »

Help with Gulf Security or Return of Colonialism?

By Charlie

Now this is interesting:

ABU DHABI, United Arab Emirates - France will set up a permanent military base of up to 500 troops in the United Arab Emirates, the French government announced Tuesday during a visit by President Nicolas Sarkozy.

The military base deal will make France one of the first Western countries other than the United States to have a base in the Persian Gulf region. The presence would give Paris the ability to project its forces into a crucial oil-producing region where many countries are wary of Iran 's rising influence.

The prevailing theory is that as the world’s lone superpower, maintaining world oil supply at market prices is a top national priority for economic, cultural, and political reasons. We have fought multiple wars and smaller conflicts in this region to maintain a reasonable level of stability, and have endured partnerships with shady individuals and countries to keep the oil flowing. There are economic upsides, and lots of other downsides to this. A downside is that precipitous withdrawal from the Persian Gulf would present a security vacuum, which could cause other powers (such as Iran ) to step in and act, gaining a piece of the local security and a cut of the profits. This would be against America ’s best economic and political interests, so we stay. Another downside is that many countries benefit from our security spending in the region, basically getting a free lunch. Take China , which gets a large percentage of its oil from Saudi Arabia , and is having its trade routes protected by the DOD, not the PLA, at American taxpayer expense. China has contributed scant resources to overall security efforts in the Middle East , yet reaps the benefit of stability in its trade.

Now comes France , with plans for a more substantive partnership with the UAE, to include a military base. This allows France to project power into the Middle East , but it could signal some troubling future issues. What if this is just the beginning, and soon China , Germany , India , and other of today’s “great powers” begin to scale up their presence in the Middle East , replete with military force? Could this become a situation akin to the European colonial powers dividing up Africa in the 1700- 1800’s? The image of US and Chinese warships uneasily passing each other in the Straits of Hormuz is difficult to conjure up, but it can’t be a positive future.

On the other hand, perhaps France ’s foray into the UAE is a sign of a positive international development, where Western Nations begin to partner in ensuring regional stability in areas of common interest. After all, Sarkozy did say the deal is "a sign to all that France is participating in the stability of this region of the world,"

The US and the Brits are already heavily deployed in the Persian Gulf :

Outside of Iraq , the United States has about 40,000 U.S. troops on bases across the Gulf — including the U.S. Navy's 5th Fleet headquarters in Bahrain . The British military also has a small presence in the Gulf. The Royal Air Force operates out of Al Udeid, a U.S. air force base in Qatar , and the military is part of the coalition naval task force based in Bahrain .

As we move toward a future that is depending on resources becoming more scarce, and a third world that is becoming more violent and unstable, great power struggle –or cooperation- over the dark areas of the map may be making a comeback, for better or for worse…

Russia to Upgrade AD

By Charlie

After the Israelis blew through the Syrian-deployed, Russian made Air D that ringed the alleged nuke plant a few months back, Russian tech seems to have had some egg on its face. In a frantic attempt to recover their rep, they are rolling out a brand new system that they swear will work:

14/01/2008 10:53 MOSCOW, January 14 (RIA Novosti) - Russia's advanced S-400 air defense missile systems will be initially deployed in central regions of the country, the Air Force commander said on Monday.

The S-400 Triumf (SA-21 Growler) air defense system is expected to form the new cornerstone of Russia's theater air and missile defenses up to 2020 or even 2025.

A regular S-400 battalion comprises at least eight launchers with 32 missiles and a mobile command post, according to various sources.

Related?
Russian Air Force to receive five Su-34 warplanes in 2008

Good Article on Bhutto

By Charlie

I don't usually read the NYT, but they had a pretty good take on Pakistan this week:

It was under Ms. Bhutto’s watch that the Pakistani intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence, first installed the Taliban in Afghanistan. It was also at that time that hundreds of young Islamic militants were recruited from the madrassas to do the agency’s dirty work in Indian Kashmir. It seems that, like some terrorist equivalent of Frankenstein’s monster, the extremists turned on both the person and the state that had helped bring them into being

When I was at VMI, I remember going to see a speech by Bhutto at a nearby Virginia university. I don't quite remember the reason why I went, but I remember the speech centered around the unfairness of Musharaf's takeover, and a commitment to restoring civil liberties in Pakistan. I met her, briefly, after the speech, and she seemed like a politician, not a crusader for human rights.

After spending some time in the third world dealing with corrupt figures, I realize that there is more "gray" in international relations than we like to admit. Sometimes, a figure like Bhutto can be mis-cast as a relentless crusader for freedom, just as Musharaf can be cast as an incompetent militaristic despot. Both figures have good and bad qualities, and their actions need to be viewed in the proper context.

A Peace Accord in our Time?

By Charlie

Somehow, I doubt this:

RAMALLAH, West Bank - President Bush, summing up meetings with both sides in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, said Thursday that a peace accord will require "painful political concessions" by each. Resolving the status of Jerusalem will be hard, he said, and he called for the end of the "occupation" of Arab land by the Israeli military.

Even if a peace of paper is signed here, I feel fairly confident that this conflict will not be solved in my lifetime. Also, I'm unclear as to how Abbas can be seen as a Palestinian power broker when he only controls the West bank. With Gaza now degenerating into a Mogadishu on the Mediteranian, the concept of a Palestinian state under "moderate" leadership seems overcome by events. When Hamas took control of Gaza, they ran out all Fatah members, and even threw some off of buildings. How do you share power after such violence and no reconciliation?

With Gaza pushing at Israel from the South with rocket attacks, Hezbollah-occupied southern Lebanon pushing from the North, and the Iranians hovering in the background, the window for any type of agreement may already be closed.

Ruskies: We'll Target Poland Missile Defense Site

By Charlie

This is so 1982:

WARSAW, Poland (AP) - Polish and Russian officials met Thursday for Senior Polish, Russian officials discuss US missile defense planshigh-level talks on a US plan to build a missile defense base in Poland, which Moscow says would pose a threat to its security.

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Kislyak and Poland's chief missile defense negotiator, Witold Waszczykowski, were discussing a US proposal to place 10 interceptor missiles in Poland as part of a global missile defense shield - a plan Russia has opposed fiercely.

Kislyak was also slated to meet with Poland's top diplomat, Radek Sikorski, during a one-day visit to Warsaw.

Washington says the system, which would also include a radar base in the Czech Republic, is needed to protect the US and Europe from so-called rogue states like Iran.

Russia, however, has argued that an installation so close to its territory would threaten its security, and has warned it could ta