"Some seem to believe that we should negotiate with the terrorists and radicals, as if some ingenious argument will persuade them they have been wrong all along.
"We have heard this foolish delusion before. As Nazi tanks crossed into Poland in 1939, an American senator declared: 'Lord, if I could only have talked to Hitler, all this might have been avoided.' We have an obligation to call this what it is - the false comfort of appeasement, which has been repeatedly discredited by history."
Of course Barry halfWhite is upset-- the truth does hurt.
:: Lars Porsena
May 15, 2008 02:49 PM
Bush is basically right, unless, of course, what we're negotiating is the terms of the terrorist group's surrender. But McCain seems to have switched his position on his one. Apparently in 2006 an interviewer asked him, "Do you think that American diplomats should be operating the way they have in the past, working with the Palestinian government if Hamas is now in charge?"
And McCain said, "They're the government; sooner or later we are going to have to deal with them, one way or another...."
I say "seems to have changed his position" because McCain's language, unlike Bush's, was so ambiguous. McCain could have answered "Yes, we can work with Hamas" or "No, we can't." Instead he used the phrase "deal with, one way or another," which of course can mean anything from "negotiate with" to "militarily annihilate." (Why he's considered a straight-talker is beyond me.)
Recent columns have included information about the Marine Corps during the Civil War, and W.E. Crocken of Roanoke wrote that his "ancestors have a long record with the U.S. Marine Corps, and I thought it appropriate to share some family history with you. In brief, my great-grandfather, James Henry Crocken, served in the Corps for 20 years (1834 54). Following his discharge from his fourth re-enlistment, he was employed by the Virginia Military Institute as a musician (fifer), Ordnance and Quartermaster Sergeant and Manager of the Sutlers Store. He was the fifer at the Battle of New Market" on May 15, 1864.
New Market was the introduction to combat of the 258-man Cadet Corps of Virginia Military Institute. The young gentlemen of the corps acquitted themselves with distinction. They filled part of the line of attack and came under murderous fire from Union artillery. The cadets refused to stop their attack, in spite of suffering about 20 percent casualties: 10 cadets were killed and 47 wounded. The Confederate forces ended a threat to the Shenandoah Valley and Gen. Robert E. Lee's source of food for his Army.
Crocken's account continues: "When VMI reopened after the war, he [great-grandfather James Henry Crocken] established and managed the Sutlers Store at the Institute until July of 1882. He left VMI in July of 1882 to return 17 Dec., 1884, again as Ordnance and QM Sgt. He replaced a Mr. Hook. His salary ... was set at $35 per month. He terminated his affiliation with VMI on 1 August, 1886, when his bid for the Sutler's concession was not accepted."
The story of a life well-spent ends, "Finally, James Henry Crocken raised his family of 10 children in Lexington, Virginia. His son, William Jacob Crocken (my grandfather), graduated from VMI in 1887 -- his diploma hangs on a wall in my office."
:: Comments left behind ::
AMEN. We remember our fallen, as we think of those still overseas. Let us see them home this time next year, safe and sound, and the nation one step closer to victory.
John Stossel's mustache wants you to know: Guns are good!
:: Comments left behind ::
Clap me hands together,
Guns are good. Guns that fire 6.8 are better than 5.65. 7.62 is better than 6.8. SSSSooooo what be your point eggacctly young MASTER Hawkins??? A little pistol in 32 will end a life as soon as a 308 from down range it all be in the perspective we say..what be your tary me boy... what man will speak his best and say the warfare be so. The GENERALS say so and we the soilder DO so. That is the way of it me boys, THAT is the way of it.
AFRICOM halts HQ plan; will phase in staff
(05:42PM)
Remember this plan - to split EUCOM, PACOM, and CENTCOM responsibility for Africa into a new COCOM? It has hit some snags recently, but it seems to be proceeding at pace, despite challenges:
STUTTGART, Germany — The U.S. Africa Command has shelved plans to build a new headquarters on the African continent in favor of placing staff there as needs arise.
The new command already uses 13 Offices of Defense Cooperation at U.S. embassies in African capitals. It plans to open 11 more over the next four years.
The command will also take over the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa, a 2,000-person base in Djibouti on Africa’s east coast.
AFRICOM had planned to select a site on the continent for a headquarters by Oct. 1, when it is to assume control of ongoing U.S. military missions there. The command last summer also favored building about six regional offices throughout the vast, 53-nation continent.
I find it tough to believe that an HQ cannot be established on the continent itself -Africa is a big place, and it does have countries friendly to the US. Until it finds a home:
The command is headquartered at Kelley Barracks in Stuttgart. Much of its personnel and duties are being inherited from the U.S. European Command, headquartered 10 miles to the east at Patch Barracks.
:: Comments left behind ::
Does Germany need a national security strategy?
(02:09AM)
Apparently this type of thing is hotly debated in Deutschland, and in Europe as a whole. It seems obvious to me that a nation state would want to set up some type of national command authority, as well as spell out the circumstances for deploying their military, in order to give themselves and their people a framework on how the country will respond to events as the occur in the real world. Weekly Standard:
For far too long, in other words, German political leaders shied away from communicating a comprehensive strategic framework that defines the country’s national interests and addresses responses to the various threats. The conservative strategy paper defines Germany’s national interests in terms of five issue areas: (1) the fight against terrorism; (2) nuclear proliferation; (3) energy and pipeline security; (4) climate change; and (5) the prevention of conflicts.
My question: is this a blip on the radar, or are more countries going to start taking responsibility for themselves as they face real threats in the world? With declining military and defense spending throughout Europe, this type of move is a break from 50 years of relying on someone else to make defense decisions. We'll have to see how this plays out...
Haha, they included "climate change" and neglected to even consider the possibility of a future war in continental Europe which might affect them? It may not be likely but surely that's the kind of thing there should be plans for.
Are they serious?
Prevention of conflicts is great but you need to have a plan if prevention fails.
Of interest to me is #3: energy and pipeline security. Germany receives a significant amount of oil from Russia (their former chancellor Gerhardt "Screw-the-USA" Schroeder works for Russia's Gazprom. If the Germans are to develop the capability to secure their energy and the gas/oil pipeline, that means they are going to take on Russia. That'll be interesting.
On #1: multiculturalism just may die a bloody death in Germany. They eventually learned to be ruthless in rounding up Baader-Meinhof and the Red Brigade of the month.
The rest of it is pablum. My two cents...
:: DaveO
May 14, 2008 07:27 AM
Thank NATO for this. For ten or more years, led by the U. S., NATO has been telling the Partner countries (10 of which have become Allies) what a good idea having a National Security Strategy is. In many cases the Partners have made wrenching changes, that put some of the Allies to shame. (Albania, deciding they need no fixed-wing aircraft, going to all helo's, for example. There are many others.) Now, some of the Allies who have been lacking are getting the idea.
:: H. S. Normal
May 14, 2008 12:19 PM
"...6) Und, finally, beating zee scheiss out of zee neighborrss, venn zee corrrekt time comess! JA JA!"
No really, I don't think I need to add comedy to this, because it contains its own comedy. CLIMATE CHANGE?? This is what comes of decades of nutty leftist politics slowly gone mainstream, coupled with getting the bulk of your strategic defense provided by others. America, take note!
1) Rely on the US for security
2) Spend defense money on unsustainable social welfare programs
3) Complain about how the US goes about our own national security strategy, by actually confronting threats.
Wasn't it Der Spiegel that showed the average German soldier was woefully out of shape?
:: rbj
May 15, 2008 05:50 AM
Ahh, the cosmic irony of the Germans. Anyone who thinks America could never degenerate into a soft socialist country because of 1)our proud military history, or 2) our hard-fought devotion to freedom, should read a little of German history... History stutters.
:: Ironside
May 16, 2008 06:22 AM
South Korea to become accompanied deployment
(02:04AM)
With the strains of the Iraq war, and repeated deployments, this seems like a good idea. Just keep the families out of artillery range:
The U.S. government is likely to accept a request by the top American commander in South Korea to extend the length of tours by U.S. troops here and have their families accompany them, a report said Thursday.
South Korea welcomes the extended tours by U.S. forces, while some critics are worried that the family-accompanied program, along with a plan to pause the reduction of U.S. troops, would burden South Korean taxpayers.
The report said U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates will discuss the three-year, family-accompanied tour program for U.S. forces in Korea (USFK) when he visits Seoul in June.
Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is also in support of the plan, which has been pushed ahead by USFK Commander Gen. B. B. Bell, it said.
Currently, most U.S. troops here are required to serve one-year tours without their families. A USFK official said only 10 percent of the 27,000 USFK members are with their families now.
:: Comments left behind ::
Since when should the world's best protection be considered a "burden?" God forbid a few more cars hit the local roads and a little more demand be placed on their utility capacity from the extra families in town of those putting their butts on the line for those "taxpayers." How about the burden of a psychopath's military reigning down upon them...and Kim Jong himself dressed in his mechanics suit riding through their streets on his white stallion (like the paintings of him in N. Korea...he really does ride a white stallion, right?).
Maybe I'm not understanding the source of the "burden," but I get sick of hearing others who've been (or are being) shielded by our flag bitch and moan about how we do it wrong, inconvenience them, or some other deficiency. Let's see them grow their own defense and technology to support it...how about THAT burden?!
:: Metallisteve
May 14, 2008 04:51 AM
Who is going to build the infrastructure to support these families? It has been a while since I was stationed in Korea but at the time the infrastructure was barely adequate to support the Military members.
Accompanied tours require schools, housing, increased medical facilities, larger commisaries, PX's etc. GOV Housing would need to be built since I don't recall Korea having an excess of empty housing just waiting for renters. I doubt the ROK government will want to pay for this.
Put me down firmly in the column of supporting the removal of U.S. troops from Korea. We don't have a sufficient justification for being there. There is no reason that ROK can't defend themselves at this point in time. They have a robust economy, quality heavy-manufacturing, and large numbers of young men for military service. If they don't want to defend themselves, they need to live with that decision.
:: Matt
May 14, 2008 06:22 AM
I'll agree with that.
:: Metallisteve
May 14, 2008 06:29 AM
I thought Korea was still a warzone, with only a truce currently stopping the combat.
No place for dependents.
From a person who spend three tours in Korea in the 50s and 60s.
:: Jim
May 14, 2008 09:20 AM
The number of command sponsored slots in Korea are not scheduled to be increased for at least over a decade:
There currently are not the facilities in Korea for increased command sponsored slots and the current relocation and transformation of USFK would have to be completed before more families could come to the peninsula.
Also keep in mind that just over a decade is best case, it could be longer if the South Korean government keeps playing their delay games.
My husband is active duty and we've been an Army family for 15 years. He did a year in Korea on the DMZ in 99-00. In two weeks he's going to Korea again. But this time it's an accompanied tour with the family for 2 years. We have several friends who are going there as well. It is definitely a good thing. With bases closing in Germany the logical replacement is Korea.
::
May 14, 2008 08:43 PM
My husband is active duty and we've been an Army family for 15 years. He did a year in Korea on the DMZ in 99-00. In two weeks he's going to Korea again. But this time it's an accompanied tour with the family for 2 years. We have several friends who are going there as well. It is definitely a good thing. With bases closing in Germany the logical replacement is Korea.
Good to see so many friends in the same room (GI Korea, Amy). I have an even better idea. Let's stand down from any duties in SK.
That way, SK can feel the affects of their stupid sunshine diplomacy, get an Army, and prepare to defend themselves. We only enable their sunshine diplomacy by bearing the cost of their defense for them.
The cost to the taxpayer and the burden on the GI is reduced. The upshot is that we have more resources for the GWOT.
But since no one will listen to my commen sense advice, accompanied deployments are the next best thing.
Buying for the Big War, or the Small One?
(04:55PM)
I've often written about the divide in the military over the focus of our mission: to fight and train for the next "big war" or to prepare to fight the many "small" wars (which we currently find ourselves in.) That is a bigger question than it seems, because the type of war you plan to fight trickles down to the equipment that is purchased by the Pentagon, the training that troops receive, and the strategic focus that force employment entails.
The Marines have given the Osprey (haunted by past technical issues) a good report card from a successful tour in Iraq, and have deemed it the next primary air mover for the Corps. The Osprey is a great example of a "small war" acquisition, because it facilities a very COIN-centric task: moving a rifle platoon a large distance at high (safe) altitude very quickly.
The EFV was developed to do a more "traditional" Marine Corps task: a beach assault under fire. However, that task is very "big war," and may have security repercussions with the proliferation of anti armor weapons and anti ship missiles. Also, it has had massive cost overruns:
The House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform found that major development flaws have pushed up the cost of the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle program by 168 percent per tank and pushed the production deadline back by eight years.
The Defense Department says it will acquire 593 of the amphibious assault vehicles from General Dynamics at a total cost of $13.2 billion, compared with an earlier projection of 1,025 tanks for $8.4 billion, according to a House Oversight Committee report released on Tuesday.
So if you are the Marines (imagine that) what do you buy? Ospreys or EFVs? This is akin to the Army's continuing issues with FCS, and how it is relevant to the COIN fight. One simple question (big or small) drives this entire process.
:: Comments left behind ::
Dear Readers:
The EFV's not a tank. Nor is it an APC or an IFV. It's something different. Nor, I must point out, it is a COIN purchase or a big war purchase. It's an acquisition to support the age-old Marine Corps mission of expeditionary operations from the sea. And we would prefer not to do beach assault under fire. Although we would certainly be able to.
In the same way, the acquisition of the Osprey is part of the greater Marine Corps warfighting capabilities, especially expeditionary operations from the sea. It was not, I say again NOT, acquired for COIN or small wars or big wars.
What then do we Marines buy? Why, we buy that which supports the wide range of general Marine Corps operations-- large, small, and everything in between. We prefer, in all instances, to acquire that most powerful and versatile weapon, a trained and educated thinking fighting man, who can turn his talents from major combat to COIN to raids to noncombatant evacuation operations to, well, you get the picture.
2. The stuff that the DoD buys, however, is tied to its overall strategic outlook, which includes the type of wars we fight now, and will fight in the future.
Your statement about the Marines can easily be translated for the Army:
What then do[es the Army] buy? Why, we buy that which supports the wide range of general [Army] operations-- large, small, and everything in between. We prefer, in all instances, to acquire that most powerful and versatile weapon, a trained and educated thinking fighting man, who can turn his talents from major combat to COIN to raids to noncombatant evacuation operations to, well, you get the picture.
So, yes, that makes sense, but in the larger scheme of things, systems are requested and cut based on the current operational needs, and projected future use, which is what I wanted to point out based off of the COIN/big war debate.
The Osprey replaces the CH46, which was in service when I was in. The EFV is replacing a vehicle that entered service after I got out. That was over 30 years ago.
A nation that would send its sons and daughters to war with equipment that is older than their fathers is in trouble. We're on track to expand the Marines ahead of schedule. It would be nice if they didn't have to walk or swim to get to the fight.
Next, if they would just do something about that abomination they call a rifle... This is what we pay taxes for, not farm subsidies or the other 75% of the budget that is just waste.
:: MarkD
May 13, 2008 06:40 PM
To answer your closing question, the answer is both. The Osprey and EFV are (1) replacements for weapons systems that have outlived their service life and (2) weapon systems whose roles (transport of troops via air and water, respectively) are key components essential to the core USMC mission of expeditionary operations from the sea.
We need to budget, train and equip for the full spectrum of military operations. COIN/small-scale conflicts will be one of our primary concerns for the foreseeable future (not to mention the related new focus on expanding small-scale TSC operations around the globe) but we still have to focus on also being ready for a potential big war. The question shouldn't be choosing one over the other, it should be how can we do both effectively?
:: MJ
May 13, 2008 08:10 PM
You buy for both.
Just because we are embroiled in one type of conflict right now in one part of the world does not relieve us of our responsibilities for the overall defense of the nation.
Just as we discussed training the other day, weapons platforms and capabilities fall in the same category. There are core missions which will atrophy and die if we do not keep procurement up.
I am not saying to neglect the COIN mission (which I would argue was neglected for close on 30 years and is just now regaining prominence) but we need to strike a balance between our current needs and future requirements.
I am about 90% percent sure that newest of the Marine amtracks are over 30 years old. For a change the Marines are getting something NEW and when it has teething problems (which coincidentally both the H-46 and LTVP series had) everybody blows a gasket?
:: Fooman
May 16, 2008 05:57 AM
Outside The Wire: Punk-Slapping the Left
(04:50PM)
A day late but not a dollar short... heard a good interview on the Dennis Miller show yesterday with documentarian JD Johannes on his Outside The Wire series. I've had this on my list for some time but haven't gotten it yet (shamefully). Now I have an even better reason-- JD is trying to beat the execrable Redacted's box office receipts. He told DM he was about fifty percent there. Let's see if we can help a little.
:: Comments left behind ::
Just bought warriors the film-does that count?;)
:: mindy abraham
May 13, 2008 06:15 PM
I can give you a copy of the interview in mp3 if you would like. send me an email.
David.
:: David M
May 13, 2008 06:16 PM
Punk slap or bitch slap?? Beg pardon, I know that if there are any bitches here, they would approve!!!
Gov. Janet Napolitano is again pleading for an extension of the border-security operation that has placed National Guard troops along the border since June 2006.
Known as Operation Jump Start, the mission was designed to bolster the border with thousands of National Guard troops until an equal number of Border Patrol officers could be hired to take their place.
But with Border Patrol staffing still inadequate and a planned virtual fence delayed by technical troubles, Napolitano, a Democrat, warned in a letter to congressional leaders Tuesday that a planned July 15 sunset of the operation would be "irresponsible."
"We respectfully request that Congress extend and fully fund Operation Jump Start at numbers necessary to maintain the hard-won improvements in operational control of the border," Napolitano wrote in a joint letter along with California Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger and New Mexico Gov. Bill Richardson.
I think that the timely use of the Guard to support civil authorities in times of disaster (which some define as the current situation on the border) is perfectly in line with its mission. The question that arises several months (or years) is mission creep. While the Guard is supposed to supplement civil authorities in times of crisis, it is not intended to BE the authority, especially for something like border patrol, clearly a domestic security mission. The Border Patrol should be the force that patrols the border, not the Guard. With all of the priorities that Guard has now, to include training for war overseas, preparing for disaster response missions, and patrolling the border is a mission that could be handed off to civilian law enforcement authorities in light of these other requirements.
:: Comments left behind ::
I do not disagree with your assessment of current force applications, however, the name is National Guard. Or on another front, Coast Guard. But does the Guard have Law Enforcement authority like the Coast Guard?
:: Tom
May 14, 2008 05:46 AM
Op-for said "While the Guard is supposed to supplement civil authorities in times of crisis, it is not intended to BE the authority"
Excuse me.
But the United States military has historically patrolled the country's borders against foreign encroachment since its antiquity. The switch to limited "domestic law enforcement" is a recent phenomenon peculiar to such countries as the United States.
And certain Latin American countries to the south don't share your dishonest assumptions that their borders shouldn't be manned by the military.
Nice try. But your tripe is little more than an attempt to "shape perceptions" rather than "tell it like it is".
"especially for something like border patrol, clearly a domestic security mission"
False.
A bald-faced lie.
Border patrol is - by its very definition - an INTERNATIONAL security mission; one that deals with a foreign counterpart, a counterpart that comes from a foreign territory that is outside the control of your own domestic law enforcement's jurisdiction.
Do Not Pass Go.
Do Not Collect $200
Op-for said: "With all of the priorities that Guard has now, to include training for war overseas, preparing for disaster response missions, and patrolling the border is a mission that could be handed off to civilian law enforcement authorities in light of these other requirements."
Jesus. You are either clueless or dishonest. (probably both).
The Guardsmen are being used as show-pieces in order to politically paint them as FAILURES!
They're like the US Navy and Coast Guard who have to operate under current crippling ROE's under SOUTHCOM, only worse. They don't even get to pursue or arrest (and technically the Navy can't arrest either).
The Latins and the US government are scared stiff of the US military securing the border because it is the one organization that can secure it. Much of it is political. If the Latins try to use provacteur tactics against the military, the US government will either have to side with foreign governments and attack the US military or side with the US Military and blame the provacteurs.
Their answer: point to the Military on the border that they've sabotaged by limiting their time on duty to a matter of weeks and in some cases DAYS!
"We sent them there and it didn't solve the problem" Code: they failed.
You can't even get processed correctly on station, let alone learn the job at hand and become efficient at it - and these jackass governors KNOW IT. They've denied any units with helo and wheeled transport, denied any military equipment electronic/communication/surveillance requests and gear, logistics to support that gear, denied authority to operate (not to mention they're the wrong types of units), put up artificial administrative barriers to prevent them from working seamlessly with the border patrol, not to mention develop long-term contacts.
Think it's funny?
Think again.
In case you're as clueless as I think you are, this is the same thing that will happen in Iraq. The new administration will sabotage, deny supplies and deny authority to CENTCOM, crippling the mission. We won't even be allowed to TALK to the Iraqi security forces without minders and interference from the State Department. When things start going to shit, the politicians will use that AGAINST the Military:
"You Failed (just like we planned) and it's evidence that your mission is hopeless."
Is it becoming clear to you now, or was it clear to you from the get-go.
Op-for: You may not condone this kind of treachery in OIF and OEF, but the fact that you condone it when it suits your purpose is disgusting.
:: Jiminez
May 14, 2008 07:54 AM
Monday, May 12,
2008
Great Article on Distributed Warfare
(04:30PM)
UAVs are getting bigger and better, with the Reaper now carrying the same combat load as the F-16. As remote combat systems mature in theater, who knows what is next?
The airman who fired that missile was 8,000 miles away, here at Creech Air Force Base, home of the 432nd air wing. The 432nd officially "stood up," in the jargon of the Air Force, on May 1, 2007. One year later, two dozen of its drones patrol the skies over Iraq and Afghanistan every hour of every day. And almost all of them are flown by two-man crews sitting in the air-conditioned comfort of a "ground control station" (GCS) in the Nevada desert.
Are remotely-driven Strykers, Bradleys, and Abrams that far off? The thought of a remote-controlled armor division is almost as implausible now as dropping bombs from airplanes must have seemed in 1914. However, the question now is with the success of the very human-intensive tactics of waging COIN neighborhood by neighborhood, will robots take the place of soldiers on the battlefield?
I doubt robots can fill the gap, but the "big war" types may latch on to this technology as the solution to the "next big one," while could better serve as an enabler for our current COIN operations.
:: Comments left behind ::
When does the Dinochrome Brigade form?
:: Fox2!
May 12, 2008 05:43 PM
Fox2-- Great Reference. Did you ever read the one short story about the stranded Bolo that fought to the end and when asked why he didn't give up he said, "For the glory of the regiment." Frakking great reading.
About the drones. Why do they operate them from so far away? Aren't there more ways for the comm system to break down thus losing the drone?
:: Doug (old Army Corporal)
May 13, 2008 05:42 AM
The challenge with "distributed" warfare is it works both ways. It won't take long for an adversary to understand that the best way to stop or disrupt remotely piloted/operated systems will be to target the communications links (remember China and the U.S. have shot down satellites) and possibly easier they will begin to target the control centers/pilots.
With remotely piloted combat vehicles (air-lan-water) and robotic infantry a renewed focus on Just war and ethics of combat will take place. Is it Just to wage war against and adversary if you don't risk your own flesh and blood? Are we reaching the point of answering the question; "What would happen if we held a war and nobody showed up?"
:: Matt
May 13, 2008 06:17 AM
On the topic of remotely piloting drones from CONUS, our point has always been to get between the bad guys and CONUS. What happens when the enemy gets tired of shooting at drones and takes a crack of the control centers? Sending a small commando raid (Or terror cell) to try to eliminate a half dozen pilots in a single control shack (Along with all their equipment, especially in drones in flight at the moment) sounds like the kind of gambit an enemy might be willing to make. Drones might be the double edged sword that gives the enemy the impetus to bring the fight to our shores.
:: Curtis
May 13, 2008 08:03 AM
"Today, the Reaper, which went into service in Afghanistan last September (a year ahead of schedule), can carry nearly the same payload as an F-16 -- typically two 500-pound laser-guided bombs and four Hellfires."
I had no idea that the payload for an F-16 was so totally wimpy. I mean, surely it can carry more than 1,400lbs (since they say the Hellfire is only 100lbs)?
I wonder who fed the journo that line of tripe?
:: SSG Jeff (USAR)
May 13, 2008 09:01 AM
No doubt, the Air Force fed it to them... in order to justify more money.
:: Joel
May 13, 2008 09:44 AM
If you take a look at the F16 Fact Sheet, you will note the following:
Payload: Two 2,000-pound bombs, two AIM-9 and 1,040-gallon external tanks
Armament: One M-61A1 20mm multibarrel cannon with 500 rounds; external stations can carry up to six air-to-air missiles, conventional air-to-air and air-to-surface munitions and electronic countermeasure pods
and the following:
Weight: 19,700 pounds without fuel (8,936 kilograms)
Maximum Takeoff Weight: 37,500 pounds (16,875 kilograms)
Fuel Capacity: 7,000 pounds internal (3,175 kilograms); typical capacity, 12,000 pounds with two external tanks (5443 kilograms)
“ Whenever possible, give a clear, cogent endstate and let people achieve the result, their way..” -- Colonel Eddie S. Ray
Sunday, May 11,
2008
New Indiana Jones Movie
(05:48PM)
So what? The best [new] Indiana Jones plot culminated with the FATE OF ATLANTIS years ago:
I rest my case.
:: Comments left behind ::
My concern: Shia LaBouf (sp? who cares?) as a *sigh* motorcycle-riding bad boy. That's worse than bringing back short-round, now 30-ish and awkward no doubt.
Of course I thought Robert Downey Jr. would make a terrible Iron Man, so obviously I've lost some credibility here...
We have a detachment mobilized, training now at Quantico to go overseas later this year. Today they got a day off, and it began with a det photo at the Iwo Jima memorial.
Among the crowd there was a large party in attendance at a Marine lieutenant's commissioning, and bus after bus of tourists. And one old timer, moving slowly but surely under his own power. His ball cap read, "IWO JIMA SURVIVOR."
This WWII vet spent a long time relaying stories about his battle, to a rapt audience. All the while, the other visitors moved around a small knot of young men arrayed around one old one passing the torch, absolutely oblivious. The Old Corps lives on!
:: Comments left behind ::
Long may the traditions be passed down.
I must admit - I didn't serve - when the time came in 1980 to say "yes or no" to the recruiter (who I did talk to), I said no. I often wonder how life would have been different
:: KG2V
May 10, 2008 03:49 PM
LtCol P,
As a newly retired Marine, this story is perfect. Who will listen to mine and your stories of our time in Iraq? Time will be the ultimate judge. As your new unit prepares to go forward you have my best wishes for success.
Semper Fi
Gunner Sears
:: Gunner Sears
May 11, 2008 03:47 PM
Thursday, May 8,
2008
He knows if you've been bad or good...
(08:52PM)
So be good for goodness sake!
Hotel Tango - OpForian Chris
:: Comments left behind ::
And when he joined up, the recruitment psychologist didn't believe in any sanity-clause....
;-)
:: Wilbur
May 9, 2008 04:25 AM
... and when I think of all the safety stuff (at least part of which was total nonsense) we went through just to do an M16 qual at Yakima last weekend...
Santa needs to sandbag that weapon or something to keep it from sliding around.
:: SSG Jeff (USAR)
May 9, 2008 08:08 AM
Real time off topic,
Ceiling @ about 2 grand max with the June gloom showin early, could not mistake the symphony of 4 big radials on the climb out from Burbank and I was not denied as a big and beautiful B-17 of an era gone by, lumbered into the gray May sky over my back yard. 5 mins. later, a B-25 Mitchell followed in kind. If my sons were here they would be crashing through the back door screaming as they do every year about "DAD the BOMBERS ARE BACK, THE BOMBERS ARE BACK!!!!" So my weekend is planned no doubt for the traditional walk-thru with the tribe in tow. Still have not convinced the wife that the KA-Ching for the 30 minuite fight is in our budget. Would be one hot ride to sit in the foreward bombadier bubble and watch the coast line slide underneath.....
:: Richard
May 9, 2008 05:14 PM
Wednesday, May 7,
2008
Great COIN Debate
(04:26PM)
A very interesting article by NPR's Guy Raz on the Army COIN debate that is currently running under the radar screen. I have frequently put forward the fact that I know many combat arms-types that are decidedly NOT on board with COIN -and think that the purpose of the Army is to kill uniformed enemy armies and break their stuff, and anything short of that is the job of somebody else. (Full Disclosure: I have fully embraced COIN, and see it as the future of warfare until China, Iran, Venezuela, or Russia up-arms to a serious level)
Anyway, here's the beef:
An internal Pentagon report is raising concerns about whether the Army's focus on counterinsurgency has weakened its ability to fight conventional battles. The report's authors — all colonels with significant combat experience — say the Army is "mortgaging its ability to (successfully) fight" in the future.
COIN has obviously been successful in Iraq, and if it is successfully employed in Afghanistan by NATO I imagine it will work there too. However, some interesting (and somewhat worrying) points are raised further in the piece:
Col. Sean MacFarland was among the first to successfully apply counterinsurgency doctrine in Iraq in 2006. And yet he was a co-author of the recent internal Army report suggesting that the Army is far too focused on counterinsurgency training. This singular focus, he writes, is weakening the Army.
The report cites field artillery as an example of an area that has suffered from inattention. Since 1775, artillery units have served as the backbone of the U.S. Army. But today, a stunning 90 percent of these units are unqualified to fire artillery accurately — the lowest level in history.
I wasn't aware of that factoid, but I believe it. FA Guys are not doing FA, they are MPs, "Infantillery", convoy security, or other necessary jobs. The COIN doctrine calls for a different force mix than the fight in the Fulda would have required. The days of synchronized artillery strikes and armored brigade charges are over (for the time being). The Army likes to "train the way they fight," and right now, we are not fighting with artillery. While that 90% number makes me a little uneasy, I understand it.
The good news here is that we are having this conversation, and have an Army where officers can come forward with these problems and have an open debate about them. In lesser armies, this would not happen.
:: Comments left behind ::
I thought the great COIN debate was whether or not we should get rid of the penny?
Perhaps the Army could take a look at the way the Navy trains.
Prior to an overseas deployment, each ship/submarine/aircraft squadron is required to be fully qualified and certified in each mission area. This remains true even if you know you are not going to use the vast majority of that training.
Case in point: ASW (Anti-submarine Warfare). How many times to the ships go out looking for bad guy subs these days? Not many, but you still have to practice this during the workups. A ship will go to the HOA and do nothing but Maritime Security Operations (MSO) for six months.
Perhaps a way could be found to incorporate periodic re-certification in things like artillery while still training to conduct MP/Infantry operations. I am sure there are other areas that are being allowed to atrophy, but should not.
When you stop training on your core areas/missions, you will not only lose those abilities, but you will lose certain non-written traditions that you never realized you had. This will have a seriously detrimental effect down the road when you need to shift back to a different war.
Note that the Marine Corps has seen that they need to get back to the deployments they have done for decades (i.e., "floats") in order to maintain and re-hone their core capability of amphibious assault.
I am not at all saying to back off from COIN, but I am saying we probably need to take a hard look at maintaining a harmonious training strategy to maintain core capabilities.
While I haven't read the report and value the opinion of guys like COL MacFarland, I'm with Charlie. In 1776, artillery was our indirect fire. Today, we use the USAF, the USN (principally aviation and missile cruisers) and Army Aviation to deliver standoff fires and conventional artillery is more directly related to the close fight. Consider how we structured our fires for Division and BDE level assaults in 2003. While I'm skeptical of the overused expression "Revolution in Military Affairs", the fact is we are transforming now and I'm not sure we fully grasp how. It strikes me that putting one of our BCTs into a close fight against an opponent's heavy org is a failure to properly synch fires during the shaping phase and a failure to maneuver unless we are confident that we can overmatch one for one on the basis of weapons system capability. To me the real risk is designing force structure to meet deployment restrictions rather than the threat. On a different note, historically, we fight 4GW and promptly forget it...from the RevWar (think Carolinas) to now. Fortunatly, we are blessed with smart, adaptive leadership. The key to it all.
:: RavenRock6
May 8, 2008 04:35 AM
I've got a couple of Army COINs.
From SF, 160th SOAR, Ranger's, etc.
I don't claim to have an answer. But Ravenrock6 makes an interesting point about how we have supplanted artillery for standoff fire from aircraft. But if this is indeed the case, then we cannot then argue against providing the AF/Navy with their aircraft with the argument that they don't aid our counterinsurgency efforts.
We can't have our cake and eat it too. We supply the AF/Navy, or we train and employ artillery, but we cannot starve both and claim that we are prepared for anything like a pseudo-conventional campaign (or even standoff fire assistance to COIN).
I argue that we should properly resource the long war, and this would enhance both the hearts and skills of our warriors. They deserve nothing less.
As an Arty Officer and an ANGLICO JTAC, I get really worried when people start talking about relying on Air Support and Naval Surface Fires in place of Arty. There will never be enough Air to go around and if operating away from the coast NSF can't come into play. Arty is the only all weather indirect fire asset that can provide accurate and timely fires to battalion. (F-18 are not all weather when Al Asad is Red). Artillery is a crucial asset that we will need to rely on at great length if we go into Iran, Syria, etc.
While a lot of Marine Arty Batteries are acting as TF MP and doing Civil Affairs, once they return from deployment, they are back out in the field to fire. A lot of senior Arty Officers are very worried because a lot of junior artillery officers are only getting about one year in a firing battery (two if they luck out and end up on a MEU). It is very possible in a two to three years, you could have Battery CO's who have never been an FDO or filled the role of a traditional Battery XO. I think the Marine Arty community is taking a lot of pro-active steps to ensure that the community keeps up it core skills even if they aren't meeting the METL's in the T&R manual. I suspect the Army is doing the same thing.
:: Punky
May 8, 2008 06:36 PM
The simple answer is: we have to train both. The problem is we simply don't have the time to do that. Maybe we will when we expand the army and are not deploying every other year.
Kevin
:: Kevin
May 11, 2008 08:50 PM
While the ideal answer is you train both, if I had to pick one or the other I'd still concentrate on traditional. Obviously, while we are in COIN operations, those fundamentals should be taught, but ultimately, no insurgency is going to truely threaten the territorial integrity of the US. An insurgency can wear at occupying American forces, but it can't consume them at the rate of a true bare knuckles conventional war. You could drop all of the casualties in OIF and OEF into one bad day off of Taiwan against China. It might take a little longer against a resurgent Russia under Putin's third term to rack those totals up but I think a divisional slugfest in Lithuania could hit that in two or three days... Summation, losing an insurgency is embarrassing, losing a proper war is much worse.
I think the real positive is that active duty officers are being allowed to voice these concerns, esepcially while actively engaging the very programs they have concerns about. That sort of active review is the real strength of ourarmed forces.
:: Mike
May 12, 2008 03:30 PM
Yes, the Army is weakened, but if you want to point the finger of blame, look to Wm. Jefferson C., and my good buddy and fellow Ohioan frmr. Congressman John Kasich. The "peace dividend" of the 90's is your cause, not COIN.
