Counterinsurgency Archives
Marines Gone "Rogue"??
By Lt Col P
"DELARAM, AFGHANISTAN -- Home to a dozen truck stops and a few hundred family farms bounded by miles of foreboding desert, this hamlet in southwestern Afghanistan is far from a strategic priority for senior officers at the international military headquarters in Kabul. One calls Delaram, a day's drive from the nearest city, "the end of the Earth." Another deems the area "unrelated to our core mission" of defeating the Taliban by protecting Afghans in their cities and towns.
"U.S. Marine commanders have a different view of the dusty, desolate landscape that surrounds Delaram. They see controlling this corner of remote Nimruz province as essential to promoting economic development and defending the more populated parts of southern Afghanistan."
I'll refrain from comment-- you be the judge!
"Don't Leave Too Soon"
By Lt Col P
Interesting article on 1st Battalion, 5th Marines from the LA Times:
Reporting from Nawa, Afghanistan - It was at the end of a recent after-lunch meeting, with the two sides sitting cross-legged on a tattered rug, exchanging pleasantries and enjoying sweet tea and stone-baked bread.Haji Mohammed Khan, district administrator for Nawa, a government bureaucrat with three decades' experience in war and shaky peace, had something he wanted to ask the Marines, some of whom will soon return to bases in the United States.
"Please," Khan said in a low voice, his sad eyes looking directly at his guests, "don't let us be here alone. You used your young people, your vehicles, your helicopters to help us. Please don't turn around and leave unfinished your business here."
We've read it before and said it before-- COIN is slow and painstaking, but it has to be given time. It looks like what we're doing is having an effect, finally. Let's finish it.
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More Steps Forward
By Lt Col P
"Advancing Marines Test New Afghan War Doctrine:"
BARCHA, Afghanistan (Reuters) – Winning ground is one thing. Convincing Afghan villagers you will not leave, abandoning them to a vengeful Taliban, is a bigger challenge for U.S. Marines advancing deep into southern Helmand province.The Marines, part of a 10,000-strong force sent to Afghanistan this year, have pushed south into hostile terrain, winning ground and pledging to build the long-term trust and security needed to prevent insurgents from returning.
A day after taking over the former home of a local doctor which had been used as a post by the Taliban, the Marines were building it into a base and trying to win over local people.
"You have to make a decision, please. You want to work with us or you want to work with the Taliban?" the clean-shaven young Marine Captain Junwei Sun asked a wizened and bearded village elder at the first "shura" -- or meeting -- with local people.
Although the title says "new," this ain't anything new. This is COIN 101, what the higher leadership should have been pushing since Day One. Security comes first; mutual trust follows. Believe me, it works.
Beyond Duty Released
By John
Few stories break the heart like Shannon Meehan and Roger Thompson's Iraq War memoir, Beyond Duty. Meehan, a 1st Cavalry Division tank commander and VMI graduate, may as well have titled it "heavy lies the crown," as Beyond Duty is the first book I've read that fully captures the crushing burden of combat leadership.
Meehan and Thompson (a professor of English at VMI), started writing the book after disaster struck -- Meehan, freshly promoted to acting company commander during an offensive into insurgent-infest Baquba, called in an airstrike which killed a house full of Iraqi civilians. Beyond Duty details that fateful day in the prologue, the rest of the story's arc rides wave after wave of hyper-realistic tension ultimately leading to Meehan's antagonizing decision -- send his men into the dragon's mouth and possible death, or safely negate a house full of unknown occupments with a precision guided airstrike.
I've read my share of Iraq and Afghanistan war memoirs, God knows there's plenty of them out there. This, however, is the first "under the helmet" account of the terrifying nature of MOUT operations that I've read. Further, Beyond Duty forces the audience to come to terms with the immense responsibility we place on kids who are often times fresh out of college. The decisions Meehan faced were terrifying, yet through those unforgiving experiences, the light of this wonderful generation of young men and women shone through. The tougher the fight became, the faster Meehan ascended into a strong, confident leader. The great tragedy of Beyond Duty --and indeed it is a tragic tale-- was that after an uninterrupted record of deeply admirable and virtuous leadership, one bad decision completely unraveled Meehan's confidence and demeanor. Indeed, the pain doesn't stop after the wound has healed.
Read Beyond Duty. Understand what we ask of these young men and women, the angry seas we ask them to navigate, the agonies of combat, and the crushing burdens of leadership.
Shannon and Roger will be on the Ed Morrissey Show at 4pm EST, Thursday 24 September. Our friends at WRKO Boston also have a must-listen interview up with Shannon and Roger, click through for the link.
Finally, I'm proud to say that Capt Shannon Meehan will be joining us here at OPFOR full time as a blogger. I expect that will happen when the buzz from Beyond Duty calms (and it's buzzing loudly, folks -- pass the word).
Disconcertingly Blunt
By Lt Col P
From the ever-zesty SWJ, I saw this today: "Sri Lanka’s disconcerting COIN strategy for defeating the LTTE". The thrust of the post is that yes, you can set aside the classic hearts-and-minds strategy and pursue the alternate, "chest and head" strategy, but that's a policy few if any Western governments would care to adopt. In the main, I agree.
However, I will point out that the strategy the Sri Lankan government appears to have adopted (successfully) in this case has one admirable element that we would do well to emulate, in our own way-- A single-minded, unwavering, ruthless pursuit of victory.
(The long and very ugly anti-Tamil campaign is not one of my areas of expertise, so perhaps there are nuances and unspoken truths that I'm missing. If so, do tell.)
Speaking of Good Solid COIN Advice
By John
I'm halfway into Chris Cocks' Fireforce, an inside look at 3 Commando, Rhodesian Light Infantry. The RLI's actions during the Rhodesian Bush War are a fascinating case-study in modern COIN ops -- some of their tactics groundbreaking (like the Fireforce concept, a highly effective aerial envelopment technique), others just stupid (like the RLI's strict "White's Only" rule). Don't have time for a big review, just think that any students of COIN ops should read into the Rhodesian War aggressively. Much to learn, both from their monumental successes and strategic failure.
Many thanks to Col P for initially sparking my interest in the Bush War, this must be the sixth book I've read on the subject.
GOOD SOLID C.O.I.N. ADVICE
By Lt Col P
The Torch highlights some good solid COIN advice found at Ricks' blog, and one excerpt is worth repeating here:
"7. Most important of all. The enemy must understand that you are ready to go to the end to win the war. That means a resolve for the long slog and a stomach for attrition. If the enemy thinks that you develop feet of clay rather quickly, he will continue fighting."
Oh, yes indeed. As I've stated before, this is where I think we as a nation are headed off the rails. I hope we adjust our course before it gets adjusted for us.
Adopting the British Light Infantry
By John
Intriguing piece from a Kiwi lieutenant. No doubt the light infantry concept is well suited to COIN ops. The British variant cleaned insurgent clock in Kenya and Malaya in the 50s, and the Rhodesian Light Infantry was one of the finest COIN outfits in modern history. Not sure if it's a logical formation for the US Army or not... figure I'll leave that one up to our resident green suiters.
Exit question: Wouldn't a Marine MEU fit the same bill here?
Interesting Editorial
By Townie 76
From today's Washington Post, "America will be better off, in the long run, for Obama's decision to expose the past practice of torture and ban its future use. But meanwhile, the country is fighting a war, and it needs to take care that the sunlight of exposure doesn't blind its shadow warriors."
Okay So It was Not My Last Post of the Year
By Townie 76
What do you think of these articles http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/israel/4031326/Israel-has-left-the-peace-process-in-ruins.html; http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/4045000/Hamas-is-the-obstacle-to-Middle-East-peace.html.
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The Air Force and COIN
By Slab
Small Wars Journal posted an article by Air Force LtCol Buck Elton, "Shortchanging the Joint Doctrine Fight: One Airman's Assessment of the Airman's Assessment". LtCol Elton's excellent article is a counterpoint to an earlier monograph, published in December 2007 by Air University, and written by Air Force Deputy Judge Advocate MajGen Charles Dunlap, entitled Shortchanging the Joint Fight? An Airman's Assessment of FM 3-24 and the Case for Developing Truly Joint COIN Doctrine.
I have not read MajGen Dunlap's article, as I was deployed in Iraq at the time watching the lessons of FM 3-24 put into practice by an Army cavalry troop. I find it interesting that MajGen Dunlap believes the Army and Marine Corps are shortchanging airpower in the COIN fight, as I spent quite a bit of time using rotary and fixed wing aviation in support of Apache Troop's objectives. However, LtCol Elton does a far better job of refuting the General's criticisms than I ever could, so I'll let him do the talking:
Many COIN and Irregular Warfare experts argue population control, legitimacy of the government and isolation of insurgents are key elements of success. Contrary to what General Dunlap suggests, airpower is a critical enabler that is absolutely necessary, but it is by no mean sufficient to defeating insurgencies. While criticizing the commitment of massive numbers of American boots-on-the-ground, he fails to discuss any historical COIN case studies where airpower replaced land power as the dominant military effort. From Malaya, to El Salvador, to the Greek Civil War to Vietnam, to Algeria, insurgencies are rarely, if ever, successfully crushed by an overwhelming foreign military force alone and there has never been an insurgency crushed by the overwhelming application of airpower alone. Ground forces, whether they are host nation security forces or external combat forces assisting the security forces, are necessary but also not sufficient. Of all the discussions about the best way to counter insurgencies, only General Dunlap argues airpower is necessary and sufficient. The harsh reality is that our Joint Force will be called upon to conduct many difficult missions and we must prepare for them together with the resources we have available. Advocating the types of wars the Air Force should fight (no ground troops) by only preparing for the wars they want to fight (airpower centric conflicts with peer competitors), while ignoring the type of fight our enemy wants to fight (al-Qaeda’s global insurgency) and the wars our President orders us to fight (Afghanistan and Iraq), is a terrible mistake. Our nation must be prepared to succeed in conventional, irregular, and hybrid conflicts such as Iraq and Afghanistan. If funding for new equipment and forces is constrained, the Air Force should be willing to consider some risk in capacity (not capability) for Major Combat Operations to increase the capability and capacity to conduct Irregular Warfare and COIN, while convincing our civilian leaders to supply adequate funding for all our threats and requirements. Our services shortchange the joint fight when they organize, train, and equip for only one type of conflict. General Dunlap shortchanges the doctrine development process by discrediting sister service doctrine and military operations to protect service’s budget equities.
H/T to SWJ
Update: Looks like several members of the Small Wars Council don't think quite as highly of LtCol Elton's article.
I am not convinced Buck like Dunlap ever read 3-24. He read passages and filled in with what he wanted it to say. More Hap Arnold airmindedness mess.
I saw LtCol Elton's article as being more in favor of joint mindedness, but perhaps I misread. I must admit that applauding a critique without having read the criticized work itself is less than exemplary scholarship on my part.
I have to say that when I read the line in his conclusion, "The United States Air Force is the most lethal, flexible, overwhelming and feared military force in the world," I snickered a bit.
