The Battle of New Market, 15 MAY 1864.

(John) From LtCol P's hometown rag, Readers Touch on Significant Points of Military History --

Recent columns have included information about the Marine Corps during the Civil War, and W.E. Crocken of Roanoke wrote that his "ancestors have a long record with the U.S. Marine Corps, and I thought it appropriate to share some family history with you. In brief, my great-grandfather, James Henry Crocken, served in the Corps for 20 years (1834 54). Following his discharge from his fourth re-enlistment, he was employed by the Virginia Military Institute as a musician (fifer), Ordnance and Quartermaster Sergeant and Manager of the Sutlers Store. He was the fifer at the Battle of New Market" on May 15, 1864.

New Market was the introduction to combat of the 258-man Cadet Corps of Virginia Military Institute. The young gentlemen of the corps acquitted themselves with distinction. They filled part of the line of attack and came under murderous fire from Union artillery. The cadets refused to stop their attack, in spite of suffering about 20 percent casualties: 10 cadets were killed and 47 wounded. The Confederate forces ended a threat to the Shenandoah Valley and Gen. Robert E. Lee's source of food for his Army.

Crocken's account continues: "When VMI reopened after the war, he [great-grandfather James Henry Crocken] established and managed the Sutlers Store at the Institute until July of 1882. He left VMI in July of 1882 to return 17 Dec., 1884, again as Ordnance and QM Sgt. He replaced a Mr. Hook. His salary ... was set at $35 per month. He terminated his affiliation with VMI on 1 August, 1886, when his bid for the Sutler's concession was not accepted."

The story of a life well-spent ends, "Finally, James Henry Crocken raised his family of 10 children in Lexington, Virginia. His son, William Jacob Crocken (my grandfather), graduated from VMI in 1887 -- his diploma hangs on a wall in my office."

STUTTGART, Germany — The U.S. Africa Command has shelved plans to build a new headquarters on the African continent in favor of placing staff there as needs arise.

The new command already uses 13 Offices of Defense Cooperation at U.S. embassies in African capitals. It plans to open 11 more over the next four years.

The command will also take over the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa, a 2,000-person base in Djibouti on Africa’s east coast.

AFRICOM had planned to select a site on the continent for a headquarters by Oct. 1, when it is to assume control of ongoing U.S. military missions there. The command last summer also favored building about six regional offices throughout the vast, 53-nation continent.

I find it tough to believe that an HQ cannot be established on the continent itself -Africa is a big place, and it does have countries friendly to the US. Until it finds a home:

The command is headquartered at Kelley Barracks in Stuttgart. Much of its personnel and duties are being inherited from the U.S. European Command, headquartered 10 miles to the east at Patch Barracks.

For far too long, in other words, German political leaders shied away from communicating a comprehensive strategic framework that defines the country’s national interests and addresses responses to the various threats. The conservative strategy paper defines Germany’s national interests in terms of five issue areas: (1) the fight against terrorism; (2) nuclear proliferation; (3) energy and pipeline security; (4) climate change; and (5) the prevention of conflicts.

My question: is this a blip on the radar, or are more countries going to start taking responsibility for themselves as they face real threats in the world? With declining military and defense spending throughout Europe, this type of move is a break from 50 years of relying on someone else to make defense decisions. We'll have to see how this plays out...

The U.S. government is likely to accept a request by the top American commander in South Korea to extend the length of tours by U.S. troops here and have their families accompany them, a report said Thursday.

South Korea welcomes the extended tours by U.S. forces, while some critics are worried that the family-accompanied program, along with a plan to pause the reduction of U.S. troops, would burden South Korean taxpayers.

The report said U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates will discuss the three-year, family-accompanied tour program for U.S. forces in Korea (USFK) when he visits Seoul in June.

Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is also in support of the plan, which has been pushed ahead by USFK Commander Gen. B. B. Bell, it said.

Currently, most U.S. troops here are required to serve one-year tours without their families. A USFK official said only 10 percent of the 27,000 USFK members are with their families now.

Here's a relevant example of this debate in real time: The Osprey vs. the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, or the Marines' new "swimming tank."

The Marines have given the Osprey (haunted by past technical issues) a good report card from a successful tour in Iraq, and have deemed it the next primary air mover for the Corps. The Osprey is a great example of a "small war" acquisition, because it facilities a very COIN-centric task: moving a rifle platoon a large distance at high (safe) altitude very quickly.

The EFV was developed to do a more "traditional" Marine Corps task: a beach assault under fire. However, that task is very "big war," and may have security repercussions with the proliferation of anti armor weapons and anti ship missiles. Also, it has had massive cost overruns:

The House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform found that major development flaws have pushed up the cost of the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle program by 168 percent per tank and pushed the production deadline back by eight years.

The Defense Department says it will acquire 593 of the amphibious assault vehicles from General Dynamics at a total cost of $13.2 billion, compared with an earlier projection of 1,025 tanks for $8.4 billion, according to a House Oversight Committee report released on Tuesday.

So if you are the Marines (imagine that) what do you buy? Ospreys or EFVs? This is akin to the Army's continuing issues with FCS, and how it is relevant to the COIN fight. One simple question (big or small) drives this entire process.

Gov. Janet Napolitano is again pleading for an extension of the border-security operation that has placed National Guard troops along the border since June 2006.

Known as Operation Jump Start, the mission was designed to bolster the border with thousands of National Guard troops until an equal number of Border Patrol officers could be hired to take their place.

But with Border Patrol staffing still inadequate and a planned virtual fence delayed by technical troubles, Napolitano, a Democrat, warned in a letter to congressional leaders Tuesday that a planned July 15 sunset of the operation would be "irresponsible."

"We respectfully request that Congress extend and fully fund Operation Jump Start at numbers necessary to maintain the hard-won improvements in operational control of the border," Napolitano wrote in a joint letter along with California Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger and New Mexico Gov. Bill Richardson.

I think that the timely use of the Guard to support civil authorities in times of disaster (which some define as the current situation on the border) is perfectly in line with its mission. The question that arises several months (or years) is mission creep. While the Guard is supposed to supplement civil authorities in times of crisis, it is not intended to BE the authority, especially for something like border patrol, clearly a domestic security mission. The Border Patrol should be the force that patrols the border, not the Guard. With all of the priorities that Guard has now, to include training for war overseas, preparing for disaster response missions, and patrolling the border is a mission that could be handed off to civilian law enforcement authorities in light of these other requirements.

Air Combat by Remote Control

The airman who fired that missile was 8,000 miles away, here at Creech Air Force Base, home of the 432nd air wing. The 432nd officially "stood up," in the jargon of the Air Force, on May 1, 2007. One year later, two dozen of its drones patrol the skies over Iraq and Afghanistan every hour of every day. And almost all of them are flown by two-man crews sitting in the air-conditioned comfort of a "ground control station" (GCS) in the Nevada desert.

Are remotely-driven Strykers, Bradleys, and Abrams that far off? The thought of a remote-controlled armor division is almost as implausible now as dropping bombs from airplanes must have seemed in 1914. However, the question now is with the success of the very human-intensive tactics of waging COIN neighborhood by neighborhood, will robots take the place of soldiers on the battlefield?

I doubt robots can fill the gap, but the "big war" types may latch on to this technology as the solution to the "next big one," while could better serve as an enabler for our current COIN operations.

Cononel Eddie S. Ray, USMC, is a Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom veteran, recipient of the Navy Cross and a leader among leaders.

“ Whenever possible, give a clear, cogent endstate and let people achieve the result, their way..” -- Colonel Eddie S. Ray

I rest my case.

Hotel Tango - OpForian Chris

Anyway, here's the beef:

An internal Pentagon report is raising concerns about whether the Army's focus on counterinsurgency has weakened its ability to fight conventional battles. The report's authors — all colonels with significant combat experience — say the Army is "mortgaging its ability to (successfully) fight" in the future.

COIN has obviously been successful in Iraq, and if it is successfully employed in Afghanistan by NATO I imagine it will work there too. However, some interesting (and somewhat worrying) points are raised further in the piece:

Col. Sean MacFarland was among the first to successfully apply counterinsurgency doctrine in Iraq in 2006. And yet he was a co-author of the recent internal Army report suggesting that the Army is far too focused on counterinsurgency training. This singular focus, he writes, is weakening the Army.

The report cites field artillery as an example of an area that has suffered from inattention. Since 1775, artillery units have served as the backbone of the U.S. Army. But today, a stunning 90 percent of these units are unqualified to fire artillery accurately — the lowest level in history.

I wasn't aware of that factoid, but I believe it. FA Guys are not doing FA, they are MPs, "Infantillery", convoy security, or other necessary jobs. The COIN doctrine calls for a different force mix than the fight in the Fulda would have required. The days of synchronized artillery strikes and armored brigade charges are over (for the time being). The Army likes to "train the way they fight," and right now, we are not fighting with artillery. While that 90% number makes me a little uneasy, I understand it.

The good news here is that we are having this conversation, and have an Army where officers can come forward with these problems and have an open debate about them. In lesser armies, this would not happen.