Army Archives
More on Intelligence Changes Needed in Afghanistan Part II
By Townie 76
Major General Flynn et al have created a stir this week with the publication of A Blueprint For Making Intelligence Relevant In Afghanistan causing all sorts of folks in Washington DC to have a case of high bile and spleenitis. Part of the problem is that Flynn and his co-authors had the temerity to publish the article through a think tank, The Center for New American Security (CNAS) and to by-pass the Army Bureaucracy. In fact Secretary Gates, while expressing support for the report, commented through his spokesman on the unique way it was distributed. Actually I commend Flynn and his authors for the unorthodox method they employed, it accomplished what they wanted, a quick hit that was not stonewalled by the mandarins which make up the Army and in particular the Army Senior leadership.
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An Officer and a Creative Man
By Townie 76
From the New York Times today,
It doesn’t need to be this way in the Army. After all, the Marine Corps has succeeded in inducing its officers to operate independently. More than twice as many Marine survey respondents as Army respondents — 58 percent — said that their service encouraged risk-taking. Marine culture is different because the career Marine officers who shape it are, on average, less risk-averse than career Army officers.
General defends court martial for pregnant soldiers
By Townie 76
This on BBC; regardless of what you think, this will not play well in Peoria! Here is lead from the BBC article:
A US Army general in northern Iraq has defended his decision to add pregnancy to the list of reasons a soldier under his command could face court martial.
Book Review from WaPO
By Townie 76
From today's Washington Post, a book review of "'The Fourth Star' by David Cloud and Greg Jaffe"
Cloud and Jaffe have produced a worthwhile and fascinating account packed with many insights about officership, promotion and command in the army and civil-military relations. However, the authors note only in passing the larger political framework behind the military questions. The Bush administration made the decision to go to war in Iraq with a limited number of troops despite significant dissent within the army. The subsequent insurgency and civil war killed or wounded more than 30,000 American servicemen and women as the administration and Gens. Casey and Abizaid continued a failed policy. But changing political conditions can also affect generalship. By 2007 with the Democrats taking control of both houses of Congress, Bush was so weakened politically that Petraeus, the savvy new commander in Iraq, could significantly change policy in ways that his predecessors could not for lack of insight, will or political ability.
How Much Is Private?
By Townie 76
From today's New York Times, Captain (Retired) Shannon Meehan is quoted.
'“To me,” Mr. Meehan said, “the healing power of being able to write through everything, talk through everything, really helped me make order of it.”'
Stray Rounds
By Townie 76
Some Stray Rounds for your consideration.
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More Fallout from Hood
By Shannon P. Meehan
Brief forward (John): All, we're honored to have with us a new blogger -- Shannon Meehan. Shannon is -of course- a VMI man and an Army armor officer with combat experience in Iraq. He's also the author of Beyond Duty, a gritty war memoir that's well worth your time. Shannon has an insider edge on the Hood fallout, as he was treated in an office next to Hasan's (here's a link to a Dallas Morning News piece, hot off the wires, where Shannon is quoted extensively). Please join me in welcoming our newbie to the family -- all of us at OPFOR are very excited to have him.
Hasan’s violent action leaves one dumbfounded and near speechless over the tragedy that occurred at Ft Hood. But as we sift through the remains of that horrific day, my greatest concern moving forward is that his act could serve as a major step backward for the Army in its attempt to heal soldiers that are suffering and may need to seek the advice or counsel of the psychiatrists the Army provides.
Given that Hasan was a psychiatrist for the Army, his brutal actions are the greatest violation of trust between a doctor and patient. This may leave soldiers reluctant to be honest with their psychiatrists or counselors. Hasan’s primary job as a soldier and psychiatrist for the Army was to help soldiers heal, and his actions were in direct contrast with this. He has cast a cloud over all Army psychiatrists sincerely trying to build a legitimate trust with their patients. He has given pause to soldiers thinking about confessing their pains or seeking counsel. And that is something I feel is incredibly important, especially given my experiences with writing a memoir and confessing my own pains, and how that has helped me.
There is such an importance in soldiers being able to tell their stories, and they should tell their story. They should feel comfortable telling their story. What has happened here, I fear, will stop soldiers from reaching out, telling their story, and seeking any counsel they may need.
"Maj. Hassan's Worst Offense"
By Townie 76
In today's WaPo, Colbert King writes; "For the formal charges, Hasan will be tried in a court of law. But a verdict on him as a sworn military officer already can be rendered."
David Ignatius on the US Military
By Townie 76
From today Washington Post, good article on the U S military.
More On the Fort Hood Fuckbag
By Lt Col P
We skewer the WaPo when they print weird shit, but we also like to highlight them when they do good work. Some of my favorite WaPo features are the online discussions. The questions and comments are almost always as illuminating as the answers, and sometimes more so. Recently, they had a former Army officer and lawyer online to discuss the Fort Hood massacre. He acquitted himself well-- I strongly recommend it to all hands.
Also, this too is a must-read, found by way of MMM's Buzzworthy column. The links in this article are worthy of bookmarking, and the Steyn-isms are, as usual, priceless.
Read and heed!
Breaking at Military.com
By John
One Officer, Two Soldiers Suspected in Hood Rampage
Update from LtCol P... As of 1130 Kabul time, Fox News is reporting 12 dead and 31 wounded, with the shooter-- an Army psychiatrist-- critically wounded but alive and in custody.
The gunman, Major Nidal Malik Hasan, first said to have been killed, was wounded but alive in a hospital under military guard, said Lt. Gen. Bob Cone at Fort Hood. He was shot four times, and was on a ventilator and unconscious, according to military officials. "I would say his death is not imminent," Cone said.
Yeah, they need to keep him under guard.
So, he was pissed about what-- British treatment of Catholics in Ulster? No, can't be that. Wait-- he's gotta be a Basque separatist. Nope, not that either. Wait, wait, I got it-- TIBET. He's protesting Chinese repression in Tibet. No??
What then? DO TELL, MAJOR.
Educating Our Officers
By Townie 76
There has been much discussion in recent weeks about the need for a better educated officer corps. Major General (retired) Scales in the October 2009 issue of the Armed Forces Journal International wrote “Unless intellectual excellence is tied to the services’ personnel systems, true reform is impossible.”
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Beyond Duty Released
By John
Few stories break the heart like Shannon Meehan and Roger Thompson's Iraq War memoir, Beyond Duty. Meehan, a 1st Cavalry Division tank commander and VMI graduate, may as well have titled it "heavy lies the crown," as Beyond Duty is the first book I've read that fully captures the crushing burden of combat leadership.
Meehan and Thompson (a professor of English at VMI), started writing the book after disaster struck -- Meehan, freshly promoted to acting company commander during an offensive into insurgent-infest Baquba, called in an airstrike which killed a house full of Iraqi civilians. Beyond Duty details that fateful day in the prologue, the rest of the story's arc rides wave after wave of hyper-realistic tension ultimately leading to Meehan's antagonizing decision -- send his men into the dragon's mouth and possible death, or safely negate a house full of unknown occupments with a precision guided airstrike.
I've read my share of Iraq and Afghanistan war memoirs, God knows there's plenty of them out there. This, however, is the first "under the helmet" account of the terrifying nature of MOUT operations that I've read. Further, Beyond Duty forces the audience to come to terms with the immense responsibility we place on kids who are often times fresh out of college. The decisions Meehan faced were terrifying, yet through those unforgiving experiences, the light of this wonderful generation of young men and women shone through. The tougher the fight became, the faster Meehan ascended into a strong, confident leader. The great tragedy of Beyond Duty --and indeed it is a tragic tale-- was that after an uninterrupted record of deeply admirable and virtuous leadership, one bad decision completely unraveled Meehan's confidence and demeanor. Indeed, the pain doesn't stop after the wound has healed.
Read Beyond Duty. Understand what we ask of these young men and women, the angry seas we ask them to navigate, the agonies of combat, and the crushing burdens of leadership.
Shannon and Roger will be on the Ed Morrissey Show at 4pm EST, Thursday 24 September. Our friends at WRKO Boston also have a must-listen interview up with Shannon and Roger, click through for the link.
Finally, I'm proud to say that Capt Shannon Meehan will be joining us here at OPFOR full time as a blogger. I expect that will happen when the buzz from Beyond Duty calms (and it's buzzing loudly, folks -- pass the word).
WTF; How Did This Happen?
By Townie 76
From an Editorial in the Army-Times, it was stated:
If you pick up a book on leadership you’ll find a recurring theme: Listen to your employees. After all, they are the ones on the front lines, face to face with the customers.
That advice applies equally in the military. But even a cursory analysis of the camouflage uniform debacle indicates that Army leadership didn’t get the word.
The Army’s employees — soldiers — have been complaining about the camouflage uniform almost since Day One. Oh, troops love the cut, the fabric, the pockets — but the camouflage pattern works only in urban terrain.
The ACU is ineffective in Iraq; it’s a disaster in Afghanistan.
You don’t need an MBA or an expensive study to determine the effectiveness of the camouflage uniform. Take it to the battlefield and see if a soldier fades into the terrain. If he does, it works. If he is visible — “sticks out like a sore thumb,” as one soldier described it — it doesn’t. Period.
Now, several years and $5 billion — and heaven knows how many lives — later, the Army brass is finally addressing the problem. Within the next month, two different camouflage patterns will be put to the test in Afghanistan.
The tests should provide data to be used — we hope — in the development and deployment of a more effective combat uniform.
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A Very Bad Mistake
By Lt Col P
I couldn't believe this when I read it-- "Army Tells Dad His Soldier-Son Killed in War ... But He Wasn't" -- and I still don't fully understand it. Can someone explain it to me?
LtCol P's Update:
Thanks, everyone. I truly could not makes heads or tails out of this.
And thank you, Paul Hirsch, for making sure that this heroic soldier's name is properly known to all.
Never Set "Patterns"
By Lt Col P
At least, don't set patterns that don't work.
The Army is considering a switch over to Multi-cam from the current ACU.
Since I'm not in the Army and don't have to live with the current pattern (or deal with a switch), I'll only ask the question-- how much money is it going to cost to swap out all the deuce gear, the packs, the holsters, and so on?? Ouch.
War Poetry Comes from the Heart and not the Head!
By Townie 76
I saw this the other day in Chuck Shepherd, “News of the Weird” 9 August 2009 edition, and I quote, “British Broadcasting Corp. announced in May that it would "revive an art form" by dispatching a poet to the front lines in Afghanistan to embed with UK troops. BBC selected prominent poet Simon Armitage to mark "a new era in war poetry for the 21st century."”
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Thirty Three Years and Ten Days
By Townie 76
The morning of July 21, 1976 it was a typical hot and humid morning at Fort Bragg North Caroline. Unlike my fellow ROTC cadets I was not getting my Fatigues and gear ready for the parade, rather I was changing into a set of Tropical Worsted (the Old Army Tan summer uniform) for my commissioning as a second lieutenant in the United States Army.
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Another Retiree With Too Much Time on His Hands
By Townie 76
I am a big fan of the Non-Commissioned Officer Corps, and I feel the year of the NCO is a good thing, however the some of the suggestions of Jimmie W. Spencer (CSM, USA RET) in this week’s edition of the Army Times are just plain wrong. They are listed below in quotes and my thoughts on each one are contained below the suggestion.
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In Honor of and the Memory of the Men of the 121st Field Artillery Battalion 32nd Infantry Division (Red Arrow)
By Townie 76
Today, as the world rightly remembers the valiant sacrifice of the men of Allied Armies who landed at Sword, Juno, Gold, Omaha, and Utah beaches on the coast of France, we sometimes forget, that on the other side of the world, Allied Armies were locked in a struggle against the Armies of Imperial Japan.
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More on Tom Rick's notion to close West Point
By Townie 76
Here are some additional comments on Tom Rick's notion to close West Point, the first, is from the series On Leadership entitled "Any Point to West Point"; the second is a transcript of a Washington Post on-line session with Tom Ricks on Monday April 20, 2009. I ask that you read both pieces in their entirety before reacting viscerally.
I would point out for the purpose of edifying, that there have been proposals throughout the history of our nation to close West Point and by default the other service academies. These proposals have gone no where, as Colonel Pat Lang stated on Sic Semper Tyrannis, hell has not fury like West Point graduates.
Should We Get Rid of West Point?
By Townie 76
From today's Washington Post, Tom Ricks writes: "They are crackerjack smart and dedicated to national service. They remind me of the best of the Ivy League, but too often they're getting community-college educations."
Join the Light Infantry!
By John
Forget the recruitment difficulties, logistical clusters, and geographical overstretch for a moment and quietly acknowledge one single, simple truth.... damn the British Army makes good commercials!
Oh and that whole 'valley of death' thing? Forgedaboutit. They've moved at least half a league onward.
ASU Uniform Variants
By Townie 76
Not sure what the Army Uniform Board is up to, but it is clear they have too much time on their hands. Here are pictures of two variants of the ASU for Officers, one would have sewn on epaulets (like the current Greens) with a should board that would slide over the epaulets for Dress--making the Army look like the Air Force; the second variant would be pin on epaulets with the traditional shoulder boards for Dress. What a waste of time. While I won't have to wear the uniform as a Class A (retirement looms) making one uniform for Class A and Dress makes sense, particularly since we wear them so infrequently. Of course given what has come out of the Army Uniform Board and their decision we would wear white shirts when we wear the uniform as Class A or Class B (with and without jacket) making us look like Shopping Mall Guards I should not have expected any less.
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British Military
By Townie 76
Good article on British Military in Economists. http://www.economist.com/world/britain/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13022177
Ode to the Warrior Class
By Slab
Our good friend and fellow Institute man Michael Solovey is working on yet another print honoring our warriors. This one, titled "Ode to the Warrior Class", is a tribute to our heritage and the warriors who have gone before. To quote Michael:
This main image could be a Marine or Soldier. He looks off into battle with allusions to other great warrior cultures in the background--Vikings, Spartans, and Romans. Across the sky, there are silhouettes of Blackhawks, Hueys, and Cobras flying into battle. This future print will be a watercolor with the intent of celebrating the Warrior Class and what we do as a profession.
Here is the concept sketch he sent me. Continue to check the Solovey art website for updates.
Additionally, I created a Military Artwork category for more posts about the work of Michael Solovey and his fellow artists.
Previous work by Michael Solovey:
MARSOC Artwork*
Thus Ever To Tyrants
* Also, Michael posted an update on his MARSOC print, titled "Precision Pride" in the comments section.
All the prints are signed & numbered and ready for release next week. This print is also in memory of Corpsman Luke Milam (Upper left-hand corner). I spoke with his family this week and have given the original to them. Please keep them in your prayers. If interested in one of these prints (they are going quickly already) please send me an email at soloveyart@earthlink.net. Appreciate the support. Semper Fi!
Michael Solovey VMI '96
Ready, Fire, Aim
By Townie 76
"The Army mistakenly sent letters addressed "Dear John Doe" to 7,000 family members of soldiers who died in Iraq and Afghanistan, unleashing calls from troubled relatives and prompting a formal apology yesterday from the Army's top general."
Someone above the rank of Major needs to lose their job! Who was checking this?
Army-Navy Pranks Go Airborne
By John
Great plan, but execution was lacking by about 100ft.
Is it just me, or is the rivalry now more about pranks than the actual game?
Navy had the last laugh, btw.
Hotel Tango: Captain's Journal
Thoughts on the Army Service Uniform
By Townie 76
Surprise, Surprise, I have some thoughts on the new Army Service Uniform—some good and some bad.
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Army Dwell Time leads to more "conventional" training
By Charlie
This is a pretty interesting development. Is this "last-war-itis", "next-war-itis", or training time better suited to COIN?
FORT IRWIN, Calif. (Army News Service, Aug. 27, 2008) -- Dwell time for Soldiers between deployments is expected to increase to 17 months next year, and almost to 24 months by 2011, said Army Chief of Staff Gen. George W. Casey Jr. He said this will allow the National Training Center to once again focus on "conventional operations" and not just counter-insurgency training.Gen. Casey made his remarks during an interview outside the town of Medina Jabal in the National Training Center's range area, "the box," during a visit to NTC Aug. 14.
This adjustment, Casey said, would involve including "major conventional operations training" as well as "irregular warfare training" at NTC over the next couple of years, as Soldiers spend more time at home and not deployed.
"And we're already starting the planning to reset the scenarios and the OPFOR [opposing force], so that we can do that," Casey said.
Look, if this incorporates OIF I-style maneuver warfare training -fine. If this is Fulda Gap training -fighting the Krasnovian rifle regiments, then I think it is a step back. More:
"What I've seen now across the Army. We are a combat-seasoned force. Some of the battalions out here-60, 70, 80 percent-combat veterans, Gen. Casey said. "And so they know how to fight. And right now, we're focused on irregular warfare. And a lot of the skills that they have are directly transferable to...major conventional operations." Gen. Casey said that the time he spent in Iraq changed his views on the relationship between training and the versatility of the force.
How about some training in transferring from Phase III (combat, lead flying) to Phase IV (restoring order, transitioning to civil authorities)?
"When I was a divisional commander in Germany in '99 to 2001, if you had asked me where I should optimize my training on the spectrum of conflict so I could be the most versatile, I would have said, If I can do conventional war, I can do anything."After 32 months in Iraq, I don't believe that...mostly the Soldiers that have been to Iraq and Afghanistan don't believe that, either. There's enough difference, some fundamental differences between irregular warfare and major conventional warfare that we need to...be more versatile," Gen. Casey said.
Hmmm... My thoughts on this vary. On the one hand, balancing the force for conventional combat rules seems like a good idea. At the same time, each day spent learning to mass division artillery fires and perform battalion-level armor assaults is one less day devoted to COIN training, Arabic/Afghan language and cultural familiarization. If more dwell time relieves enough pressure on the force to do both -why not?
Some Thoughts on Force Structure in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Georgia
By Charlie
Austin Bay writes that a “Peacekeeping Brigade” or “PKB” is the ideal force package to respond to a Georgia-like crisis. According to COL Bay, a PKB would be comprised of “at least two engineer battalions with attached military police, medical, Civil Affairs, signal units and lots of media connectivity. Add Special Forces with their linguistic talents and a light infantry battalion for local security. Embed non-governmental organizations with the guts to participate and promise support to NGOs who choose to operate on their own but would accept clean water and blankets”
The structure of Army brigade combat teams has been a topic of conversation among Army strategists (or those that imagine themselves strategists) since its inception. Many officers simply believe that the idea of a BCT is simply a re-hash of the regimental combat team system in WWII. Other Infantry types disparage the current BCT construct because it only contains 2 –instead of 3 –infantry battalions. BCTs claim to be “modular,” which indicates that there is a “plug and play” relationship between units. In reality, this could prove to be very difficult to anyone attempting to structure a mission-tailored force.
That being said, a “PKB” to respond to a Russian invasion of a satellite country, or a re-structured BCT to deal with a theatre-specific challenge may complicate matters, because it deprives another deploying BCT assets it needs for its mission. Re-thinking the BCT concept to allow for more modularity and force-tailoring may be necessary for the changing missions that Army will face in the future. As the Iraq combat mission draws down, force levels may remain constant, but “BCTs” may be replaced with “MTTs” or some other evolution of the “transition team” construct. This could include training teams with security, support, intel, engineer and CA elements that are included. The point is that these evolving force requirements do not match the current BCT construct –but they need to.
A new look at force structure concepts may be necessary as we move past our initial “transformation” hurdles that the military faced in 2004, but are much less relevant in 2008.
Fred Kagan: Army Promoting the Right Officers
By Charlie
Most of today's Army generals rose through the ranks during the Cold War as armor, infantry, or artillery officers who were trained to fight large-scale, head-to-head battles against enemies of comparable strength—for instance, the Soviet army as its tanks plowed across the East-West German border.The problem, as many junior officers have been writing over the last few years, is that this sort of training has little relevance for the wars of today and, likely, tomorrow—the "asymmetric wars" and counterinsurgency campaigns that the U.S. military has actually been fighting for the last 20 years in Bosnia, Panama, Haiti, and Somalia, as well as in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Kagan writes on the dramatic departure that the recent Army General Officer promotion board has taken by including GEN Petraeus and taking into account COIN and asymmetric warfare experience vice traditional peacetime Army "check the block" career progression.
Interesting:
At least eight special-operations officers are on the list (though not all of them are identified as such), as well as the unit commanders of various "light" forces—in Stryker light-armor brigades or the 10th Mountain Division—that have tended to be ignored by the Army's "heavy"-leaning armor and artillery chiefs.
The article also mentions a MP Intel Colonels getting bumped to one star as well. Both of those disciplines, as well as civil affairs and SF, are vital to the current conflict that we are (and will be) engaged in. Having a future flock of flag officers who understand the new threat dynamic is absolutely essential in a security environment where wars are increasingly being fought within -not between- nation states.
HUGE: Army Transition Teams now Prime for Promotion
By Charlie
Soldiers that serve on our Transition Teams (TTs) and our Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are developing exactly the type of knowledge, skills and abilities that are vital for our Army to be effective in an era of persistent conflict. These are tough, demanding positions and the members of these teams are required to influence indigenous or surrogate forces as they execute missions that are of vital interest to this Nation. The tasks associated with Transition Teams, from direct combat to stability operations, will be a major part of full spectrum engagement in theaters of interest now and for the foreseeable future. I want to ensure that the officers that lead these teams are recognized and given the credit they deserve.I am directing that the Major's positions on these teams be immediately designated and codified in DA PAM 600-3, for all branches, as Key and Developmental (KD). Any officer holding one of these positions will be considered "KD" for his or her branch as a Major. Additionally, these officers will be afforded the opportunity, should they desire, to hold an additional 12/24 months of a branch specific KD position (e.g. XO, S-3, etc). Our promotion board guidance already stresses the importance of these positions and this additional information will be added to all upcoming board instructions. Additionally, because the success of these teams requires our best leaders, I have directed HRC to award Centralized Selection List (CSL) Credit for LTCs serving specifically in the TT Commander positions that have direct leadership responsibility for a training/transition team.
The implications of this decision -making an embedded trainer billet equal to an S3 or XO- will be sweeping across the Army. Training host nation forces has never been a central tenet of Army doctrine –it has been traditionally reserved for SF. Recognizing that advising host nation forces is now a central mission of the Army is another step in re-aligning the force to fight the war we are actually embroiled in. This is a crucial step to carrying out the COIN doctrine, and (more importantly ingraining it into the Army bureaucracy).
This lets the Army captain and major that take training and advisory billets with host nation forces compete for promotion against the officers that get company command, or XO and S3 billets in line units. In the long term, this will mean that future LTCs and COLs with this invaluable host nation training experience will be in command of battalions and brigades. This is good news for the Army, and for America.
Happy Birthday Army!
By Charlie
FORT MYER, Va. (Army News Service, June 12, 2008) -- When the bugle plays reveille at 6:30 a.m., it usually signifies the start of the day for Soldiers on Fort Myer. Thursday morning more than 2,000 Soldiers and DoD employees listened to reveille from the Summerall Field parking lot, where they gathered for the Department of the Army Staff Run.From the Army Site:
Two hundred and thirty-three years ago, the United States Army was established to defend our Nation. From the Revolutionary War to the Global War on Terror, our Soldiers remain Army Strong with a deep commitment to our core values and beliefs. This 233rd birthday commemorates America’s Army – Soldiers, Families and Civilians – who are achieving a level of excellence that is truly Army Strong both here and abroad. Their willingness to sacrifice to build a better future for others and to preserve our way of life is without a doubt, the Strength of our Nation.
HOOAH!
The Army Bullet Issue
By Charlie
After the raucous UAV debate below, I think I’ll breach another sensitive topic: bullets.
Everyone knows the broad-brush strokes of this story. The Army went to 5.56X45 mm round during the Cold War, primarily because it was a lighter round, meaning that troops could carry more of them in combat, and deliver them more accurately through the M16 rifle, which was introduced in 1963.
Now, the battlefield has changed, and stopping power now has become more of an issue than the number of bullets carried by soldiers:
Current and former soldiers interviewed by The Associated Press said the military's M855 rifle rounds are not powerful enough for close-in fighting in cities and towns in Iraq and Afghanistan.Speaking with reporters at a conference in Huntsville, Casey said leaders are constantly soliciting feedback from soldiers in the field and were aware of complaints about the M855 ammunition.
"To effectively prepare them we have to adapt as the enemy adapts, and that is some of the feedback we have gotten," Casey said. "We'll evaluate it quickly and then we'll decide how we want to proceed."
…
The M855 rounds were designed decades ago to puncture the steel helmets of Soviet soldiers from hundreds of yards away. Some soldiers said that they are not large enough to stop an enemy immediately in close quarters.
So the obvious next step is the 7.62X51 round, which is still used in M14, M240B, and the 7.62X39 used in a galaxy of Warsaw-Pact weaponry, from PK machine guns to AK-47s.
I’m all for giving the line troops what they want, and if what they need to fight the war are heavier weapons, let’s push some 7.62 weaponry and ammunition stocks down to a few line infantry units and see how they like them.
Commenters: Fire for effect, but let’s not accuse those who advocate 5.56 ammo as pro-Al Qaeda because it takes a few more rounds to take them down.
Army Fights To Control Its Air Space (!)
By Charlie
This burns me. John and I recently had a phone conversation over the continued flailing of the Air Force over trying to exert control over ALL UAVs in the air, using the iron-clad logic of “if it is in the air, the Air Force should own it.” This logic apparently works on many people that have never realized that aviation supports ground ops, which are inherently tied to a ground maneuver commander, who needs to have operational control of all units in his battle space.
Yet, the effort continues, via Strategy Page:
May 23, 2008: U.S. Air Force generals were not happy recently when their boss, the Secretary of Defense, publically chastised them for not getting enough of their Predator UAVs into the air over Iraq and Afghanistan, where they could do the combat troops on the ground the most good. The air force promptly ordered more Predators into the combat zone, and began flying more sorties, which soon doubled the hours Predators were in the air.Now it's payback time. The air force has deployed pundits pointing out that more Predators in the air is not the problem, but a "common picture" of what is on the ground, and what is in the air. The air force is using the situation to call again for them to be given control of all large (roughly twenty pounds or more) UAVs. This would enable the air force to standardize sensors, and data collected, so there would be a common picture.
Right, because that is the issue here, the “common picture.” Again, who does this common picture support? The ground maneuver commander, who (gasp) is probably not an Air Force officer, but more likely an Army BCT or Marine RCT commander. Adding another layer of bureaucracy into this picture is a waste of time during wartime:
But the ground combat officers see it differently. For the guys on the ground, the UAVs have become a matter of life and death, and they often don't know in advance when they will need them. To the soldiers, the UAV is no more of an obstacle to other aircraft than artillery shells and stray bullets. The air force (and army helicopters) have long since learned how to coexist with shells and bullets. So why not use the same rules for UAVs? The air force is adamant that the UAVs have to eventually get transponders (which may take a while for under ten pound UAVs), and continue to play by the rules used for manned aircraft.
Right, and I don’t want to turn this into an anti-Air Force rant (I like the Air Force, Really!) , but priorities need to be reviewed. What are the pros and cons of taking UAVs out of the hands of combat commanders and placed in the hands of Air Force Liaison ops officers up a couple of echelons? If anything, the Army should be “deploying pundits” (If you are a deployable pundit, e-mail me, I want your story!) to argue for re-integrating the Air Force into the Army Air Corps to counter this line of “if its in the air, its ours” argument.
John says I just want to clarify here, I was not taking the Air Force's side on the UAV debate. The USAF is becoming the "me me me" service, and I think that petty turf wars like that ultimately harm the overall war effort.
Update 2 From our comments comes the Air Force side, from a fella who knows the business:
To begin with, I am an Air Force officer. I am a graduate and former instructor of the USAF Weapons School (which means I spend A LOT of time trying to figure out how best to employ our assets to kill the enemy in the most spectacular ways possible. This also means, that if you are not a “Patch wearer” you will find me to be gruff/arrogant/conceited/and much worse with little tolerance for “herbivores,” no offense to any who may be such). Finally, I’ve been to Iraq. I severed my time in Baghdad with the 1st CAV, so I speak Army about as fluently as any Air Force officer can and I know exactly what air power does and does not do in the current conflict.There is a difference between what the Army does with ISR and how the Air Force does ISR. We, in the Air Force, have many, many analysts pouring over the imagery, video feeds, moving target indications, and signals intelligence that our aircraft collect. Some of this is done on the aircraft themselves but the vast majority of it is done by guys on the ground back in the States. They correlate information, reference databases and conduct forensic review of various information sources. It takes many, many people to do this and the footprint for pushing these guys forward would be unbearable.
The Army, in my experience, generally just wants a UAV to fly over an area and if they see something on the feed good, if they don’t, oh well. The Air Force, on the other hand, collects the video regardless of what was initially seen because we can use it to build or contribute to other products. There is a lot more analysis done on Air Force owned and operated UAVs than on Army UAVs (different uses, different mindsets—I’ve been there and seen it myself). So when Secretary Gates says, “put 50 more airframes into theater to support the Army” what the Air Force hears is “put 50 more airframes in Iraq and find 5,000 more analysts to exploit the data.” As you can imagine, it ain’t easy finding, let alone training, 5,000 analysts out of thin air.
Great COIN Debate
By Charlie
A very interesting article by NPR's Guy Raz on the Army COIN debate that is currently running under the radar screen. I have frequently put forward the fact that I know many combat arms-types that are decidedly NOT on board with COIN -and think that the purpose of the Army is to kill uniformed enemy armies and break their stuff, and anything short of that is the job of somebody else. (Full Disclosure: I have fully embraced COIN, and see it as the future of warfare until China, Iran, Venezuela, or Russia up-arms to a serious level)
Anyway, here's the beef:
An internal Pentagon report is raising concerns about whether the Army's focus on counterinsurgency has weakened its ability to fight conventional battles. The report's authors — all colonels with significant combat experience — say the Army is "mortgaging its ability to (successfully) fight" in the future.
COIN has obviously been successful in Iraq, and if it is successfully employed in Afghanistan by NATO I imagine it will work there too. However, some interesting (and somewhat worrying) points are raised further in the piece:
Col. Sean MacFarland was among the first to successfully apply counterinsurgency doctrine in Iraq in 2006. And yet he was a co-author of the recent internal Army report suggesting that the Army is far too focused on counterinsurgency training. This singular focus, he writes, is weakening the Army.The report cites field artillery as an example of an area that has suffered from inattention. Since 1775, artillery units have served as the backbone of the U.S. Army. But today, a stunning 90 percent of these units are unqualified to fire artillery accurately — the lowest level in history.
I wasn't aware of that factoid, but I believe it. FA Guys are not doing FA, they are MPs, "Infantillery", convoy security, or other necessary jobs. The COIN doctrine calls for a different force mix than the fight in the Fulda would have required. The days of synchronized artillery strikes and armored brigade charges are over (for the time being). The Army likes to "train the way they fight," and right now, we are not fighting with artillery. While that 90% number makes me a little uneasy, I understand it.
The good news here is that we are having this conversation, and have an Army where officers can come forward with these problems and have an open debate about them. In lesser armies, this would not happen.
Stop the Presses!
By Charlie
The Army has a good idea on Captain retention (I know):
WASHINGTON (Army News Service, April 15, 2008) - In an effort to encourage more mid-grade officers to remain in service, the Army is again offering a "menu of incentives" for active-component captains that includes options for a cash bonus, attendance at graduate school or the Defense Language Institute."The Army recognizes the tremendous experience and professionalism of the captains serving in our Army today," said Col. Brian Baldy, director of Officer Personnel Management, Human Resources Command. "This program is an effort to retain these great officers as the Army transforms and grows. We need to retain these quality officers and this program is being executed to do just that."
The incentives are available to eligible captains from April 7 through Nov. 30.
The menu of options available this year are:
1) The cash option, payable in the same $25,000, $30,000, or $35,000 tiers based on the officer's accessed branch;
2) The Expanded Graduate School Program option, which is fully funded graduate school; or
3) The Defense Language School option, based upon a pre-Defense Language Aptitude Battery score.
An eligible officer will only be able to select one option in exchange for a three- year non-concurrent active-duty service obligation if accepting the cash option, or a 3:1 active-duty service obligation in the case of accepting the expanded graduate school program or attendance at the Defense Language Institute.
This is really a step forward for the army in their retention efforts. Offering a grad degree or a marketable foreign language skill to a captain may just prove to be the deciding factor in someone's decision to stay in. Also, the option of language school (previously reserved for only billeted officers in a translator slot) may be a GI-Bill-type step forward for America in the globalized international economy. An entire generation of American business leaders with military experience and language skills may be in development here, which could only be a net plus for the country as a whole.
...Which just goes to prove that a blind squirrel finds an acorn once and a while.
Palate Cleanser
By Charlie
After John's horrible Muppet post, we need to set things right:
Infantry!
By Charlie
Cool video for all the elevenbees out there:
Stability Operations Now Part of Army’s Core Mission
By Charlie
While embracing reality, this move is likely to rankle some of the Army's "old corps." What I mean by that is that there is a sizeable chunk of the Army, especially in the combat arms branches, that think the mission of the infantry is only "to close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver to defeat or capture him, or to repel his assault by fire, close combat, and counterattack." Not included in that is building schools, policing foreign cities, monitoring infrastructure, training local security forces,etc.
WASHINGTON (Army News Service, Feb. 25, 2008) -- Soldiers have been in Iraq keeping the peace, battling insurgents, protecting civilians and helping to rebuild that country for nearly five years. The Army now recognizes that work, called “stability operations,” as part of a Soldier’s core mission and made it so in the new field manual for operations, FM 3-0, which will be released later this week.The change comes because the U.S. government has identified that failed and failing states are breeding grounds for terrorists and insurgents, said Lt. Col. James H. Boozell, an Army G3 branch chief for the stability operations and irregular warfare division at the Pentagon.
“When local government can’t provide the civil security and civil control necessary for its people, terrorists are allowed to thrive,” he said. “If we stabilize governance, it will provide the level of civil security and control that disallows the growth of terrorism and insurgency.”
What we face is a near-term certainty of the continuation of "irregular warfare" wherever we fight, in the brushfire war after next. It is good that the Army recognizes this, but it will be a continuing challenge to split-train our 4GW forces on 3GW tactics. Face it, the 3GW mindset isn't going away any time soon.
Quote of the Week
By Charlie
"What do you mean I don't understand the commander's intent? His intent is to win, Right?"
-Unnamed Infantry LT
Petraeus Eyed for NATO Command?
By Charlie
The Department of Defense is considering moving the main architect of a troop "surge" strategy, Gen. David Petraeus, out of Iraq and giving him a top NATO command job, The New York Times reported on its website late Jan. 20.Citing an unnamed senior Pentagon official, the newspaper said the department was weighing "a next assignment for Petraeus," now the top U.S. military commander in Iraq, and that the job of NATO supreme commander was a possibility.
"He deserves one and that has also always been a highly prestigious position," the report quotes the official as saying. "So he is a candidate for that job, but there have been no final decisions and nothing on the timing."
Coming off of Gates’ comments last week about NATO –if there is one man who can fix the endemic problems that the alliance has, it is Petraeus.
The Army’s “Captain Gap”
By Charlie
Most of the officers who commissioned from 2001-2005 will be getting promoted to captain soon if they haven’t already, and many from my year group plan on leaving the service as soon as possible.
Guys that I thought would stay in 20+ years and become the CJCS are cashing it in for the civilian world. Lacking empirical evidence on this, I’ll stick to the anecdotal. When I deployed, I noted that captains seemed to be in short supply, leaving lieutenants to step up and work above heir paygrade, unsupervised, or majors to take on additional duties. This phenomenon is apparently still going on, a contact deploying at Fort Bragg gave me similar info: a plethora of LTs and no one to train/mentor/guide them, and a command group that was experienced (majors and the colonel) but given a inherently flawed organization to lead.
The Army recognized this problem, and realized how important retention was for the mid-level officers and NCOs (I put it on par with recruiting fresh troops –keeping the experienced ones is just, if not more, necessary) and implemented a bonus for captains that signed on for additional time. $25,000 for regular Army captains who re-upped, but none for the Reserve or the Guard.
Another issue that ties into this is expanding the active military, which despite it being talked about quite a bit, has yet to materialize on the ground. No new divisions have been flagged, however, there are some recruiting efforts for RC to AC (Reserve Component to Active Component) and operation Warrior Trainer, BUT they both require release from the Guard which requires permissions from the Guard chain of command.
Many of the reasons for young officers getting out of the active Army are not related to deployments: frustration with command environments, wanting to do something “different,” wanting to go to graduate school, etc. On the Reserve side, deployments are the primary reason people seem to be bailing: two year+ deployments in 4 years cause citizen-soldiers to loose focus on the “citizen” part. Frustration with command climate is simply a new Army versus old Army clash, young leaders focused on teaching their men phrases in the local language, and sergeant majors focused on whether reflector belts are being worn properly on-base.
Is this a problem and can it be stopped: Until there are numbers to back up this widely- observed phenomenon, it can be dismissed as idle talk and speculation. However, whether mid-level officer retention is prioritized and dealt with seriously is a good test that will tell us what the Army will look like in 10-15 years. If it is ignored, quality officers will leave, leaving the not-so-quality guys behind to pin on general.
