Army Archives
Great COIN Debate
By Charlie
A very interesting article by NPR's Guy Raz on the Army COIN debate that is currently running under the radar screen. I have frequently put forward the fact that I know many combat arms-types that are decidedly NOT on board with COIN -and think that the purpose of the Army is to kill uniformed enemy armies and break their stuff, and anything short of that is the job of somebody else. (Full Disclosure: I have fully embraced COIN, and see it as the future of warfare until China, Iran, Venezuela, or Russia up-arms to a serious level)
Anyway, here's the beef:
An internal Pentagon report is raising concerns about whether the Army's focus on counterinsurgency has weakened its ability to fight conventional battles. The report's authors — all colonels with significant combat experience — say the Army is "mortgaging its ability to (successfully) fight" in the future.
COIN has obviously been successful in Iraq, and if it is successfully employed in Afghanistan by NATO I imagine it will work there too. However, some interesting (and somewhat worrying) points are raised further in the piece:
Col. Sean MacFarland was among the first to successfully apply counterinsurgency doctrine in Iraq in 2006. And yet he was a co-author of the recent internal Army report suggesting that the Army is far too focused on counterinsurgency training. This singular focus, he writes, is weakening the Army.The report cites field artillery as an example of an area that has suffered from inattention. Since 1775, artillery units have served as the backbone of the U.S. Army. But today, a stunning 90 percent of these units are unqualified to fire artillery accurately — the lowest level in history.
I wasn't aware of that factoid, but I believe it. FA Guys are not doing FA, they are MPs, "Infantillery", convoy security, or other necessary jobs. The COIN doctrine calls for a different force mix than the fight in the Fulda would have required. The days of synchronized artillery strikes and armored brigade charges are over (for the time being). The Army likes to "train the way they fight," and right now, we are not fighting with artillery. While that 90% number makes me a little uneasy, I understand it.
The good news here is that we are having this conversation, and have an Army where officers can come forward with these problems and have an open debate about them. In lesser armies, this would not happen.
Stop the Presses!
By Charlie
The Army has a good idea on Captain retention (I know):
WASHINGTON (Army News Service, April 15, 2008) - In an effort to encourage more mid-grade officers to remain in service, the Army is again offering a "menu of incentives" for active-component captains that includes options for a cash bonus, attendance at graduate school or the Defense Language Institute."The Army recognizes the tremendous experience and professionalism of the captains serving in our Army today," said Col. Brian Baldy, director of Officer Personnel Management, Human Resources Command. "This program is an effort to retain these great officers as the Army transforms and grows. We need to retain these quality officers and this program is being executed to do just that."
The incentives are available to eligible captains from April 7 through Nov. 30.
The menu of options available this year are:
1) The cash option, payable in the same $25,000, $30,000, or $35,000 tiers based on the officer's accessed branch;
2) The Expanded Graduate School Program option, which is fully funded graduate school; or
3) The Defense Language School option, based upon a pre-Defense Language Aptitude Battery score.
An eligible officer will only be able to select one option in exchange for a three- year non-concurrent active-duty service obligation if accepting the cash option, or a 3:1 active-duty service obligation in the case of accepting the expanded graduate school program or attendance at the Defense Language Institute.
This is really a step forward for the army in their retention efforts. Offering a grad degree or a marketable foreign language skill to a captain may just prove to be the deciding factor in someone's decision to stay in. Also, the option of language school (previously reserved for only billeted officers in a translator slot) may be a GI-Bill-type step forward for America in the globalized international economy. An entire generation of American business leaders with military experience and language skills may be in development here, which could only be a net plus for the country as a whole.
...Which just goes to prove that a blind squirrel finds an acorn once and a while.
Palate Cleanser
By Charlie
After John's horrible Muppet post, we need to set things right:
Infantry!
By Charlie
Cool video for all the elevenbees out there:
Stability Operations Now Part of Army’s Core Mission
By Charlie
While embracing reality, this move is likely to rankle some of the Army's "old corps." What I mean by that is that there is a sizeable chunk of the Army, especially in the combat arms branches, that think the mission of the infantry is only "to close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver to defeat or capture him, or to repel his assault by fire, close combat, and counterattack." Not included in that is building schools, policing foreign cities, monitoring infrastructure, training local security forces,etc.
WASHINGTON (Army News Service, Feb. 25, 2008) -- Soldiers have been in Iraq keeping the peace, battling insurgents, protecting civilians and helping to rebuild that country for nearly five years. The Army now recognizes that work, called “stability operations,” as part of a Soldier’s core mission and made it so in the new field manual for operations, FM 3-0, which will be released later this week.The change comes because the U.S. government has identified that failed and failing states are breeding grounds for terrorists and insurgents, said Lt. Col. James H. Boozell, an Army G3 branch chief for the stability operations and irregular warfare division at the Pentagon.
“When local government can’t provide the civil security and civil control necessary for its people, terrorists are allowed to thrive,” he said. “If we stabilize governance, it will provide the level of civil security and control that disallows the growth of terrorism and insurgency.”
What we face is a near-term certainty of the continuation of "irregular warfare" wherever we fight, in the brushfire war after next. It is good that the Army recognizes this, but it will be a continuing challenge to split-train our 4GW forces on 3GW tactics. Face it, the 3GW mindset isn't going away any time soon.
Quote of the Week
By Charlie
"What do you mean I don't understand the commander's intent? His intent is to win, Right?"
-Unnamed Infantry LT
Petraeus Eyed for NATO Command?
By Charlie
The Department of Defense is considering moving the main architect of a troop "surge" strategy, Gen. David Petraeus, out of Iraq and giving him a top NATO command job, The New York Times reported on its website late Jan. 20.Citing an unnamed senior Pentagon official, the newspaper said the department was weighing "a next assignment for Petraeus," now the top U.S. military commander in Iraq, and that the job of NATO supreme commander was a possibility.
"He deserves one and that has also always been a highly prestigious position," the report quotes the official as saying. "So he is a candidate for that job, but there have been no final decisions and nothing on the timing."
Coming off of Gates’ comments last week about NATO –if there is one man who can fix the endemic problems that the alliance has, it is Petraeus.
The Army’s “Captain Gap”
By Charlie
Most of the officers who commissioned from 2001-2005 will be getting promoted to captain soon if they haven’t already, and many from my year group plan on leaving the service as soon as possible.
Guys that I thought would stay in 20+ years and become the CJCS are cashing it in for the civilian world. Lacking empirical evidence on this, I’ll stick to the anecdotal. When I deployed, I noted that captains seemed to be in short supply, leaving lieutenants to step up and work above heir paygrade, unsupervised, or majors to take on additional duties. This phenomenon is apparently still going on, a contact deploying at Fort Bragg gave me similar info: a plethora of LTs and no one to train/mentor/guide them, and a command group that was experienced (majors and the colonel) but given a inherently flawed organization to lead.
The Army recognized this problem, and realized how important retention was for the mid-level officers and NCOs (I put it on par with recruiting fresh troops –keeping the experienced ones is just, if not more, necessary) and implemented a bonus for captains that signed on for additional time. $25,000 for regular Army captains who re-upped, but none for the Reserve or the Guard.
Another issue that ties into this is expanding the active military, which despite it being talked about quite a bit, has yet to materialize on the ground. No new divisions have been flagged, however, there are some recruiting efforts for RC to AC (Reserve Component to Active Component) and operation Warrior Trainer, BUT they both require release from the Guard which requires permissions from the Guard chain of command.
Many of the reasons for young officers getting out of the active Army are not related to deployments: frustration with command environments, wanting to do something “different,” wanting to go to graduate school, etc. On the Reserve side, deployments are the primary reason people seem to be bailing: two year+ deployments in 4 years cause citizen-soldiers to loose focus on the “citizen” part. Frustration with command climate is simply a new Army versus old Army clash, young leaders focused on teaching their men phrases in the local language, and sergeant majors focused on whether reflector belts are being worn properly on-base.
Is this a problem and can it be stopped: Until there are numbers to back up this widely- observed phenomenon, it can be dismissed as idle talk and speculation. However, whether mid-level officer retention is prioritized and dealt with seriously is a good test that will tell us what the Army will look like in 10-15 years. If it is ignored, quality officers will leave, leaving the not-so-quality guys behind to pin on general.
