One of my faults is I am a thinker; that I often question the status quo, the why things are. One of my favorite web sites to visit is Tom Dispatch. Many in the military would not read Tom Dispatch as it routinely questions the very underpinnings of how things are done in the United States in particular in the National Security arena.
Several weeks ago, Tom Dispatch published an extended article on the shadow war in Africa. In part it questioned why the United States military has divided the world into six fiefdoms or Combatant Commands. This week there is an extended debate between a spokesman; for United States Africa Command and Tom Dispatch. I commend the original and the letter to editor and the response to the letter to the editor, as they are enlightening.
I have wondered for quite a while, why the United States requires six regional military commands. The short answer is they are a continuation of our division of the world during World War II into Theaters of War. In fact they are often referred to as Theaters by today’s military. But that is not the sole reason. The United States being the dominate Western partner in our Cold War against global communism required the ability to establish priorities for the employment of our military. Lastly, today’s Combatant Commands and the defined power of the Commander[1], is an outgrowth of the debacle that was Grenada and Lebanon in the early 80’s. In the case of Grenada it was each service Chief adding their forces to the mix resulting in a Cluster Firetruck. In the case of Lebanon it was the failure of United State European Command to accept responsibility of the bombing in Beirut that left countless Marines dead. As a result in the Goldwater-Nichols Act the power of the services over operational matters was severely constrained and the Combatant Commanders were ultimately responsible for determining which military capabilities were required for a specific operation.
While Senator Goldwater and Representative Nichols should be commended for their singular pursuit of Operational efficiency within the Department of Defense, there has been an unintended consequence to this action.
First and foremost the Combatant Commanders have become de Facto Pro Counsels for their respective Regional Commands. In many cases they are the representatives of the United States Government who have the most exposure in their particular Theater. As such Military Power has become the dominat element of the United States National Power (Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic.)
Second, the Department of Defense regional division of the world differs from the Department of State regional division of the world. Thus the Department of State Regional Director for Near East must coordinate diplomatic activities in two Combatant Commanders Areas of Responsibility (Africa Command and Central Command). More importantly, while attempted with Africa Command, there is generally no high ranking member of the Foreign Service within the Headquarters of the Regional Combatant Commands. The only presence in the Regional Combatant Commands is the Political Advisor who is a Senior Member of the Foreign Service but from my experience has little influence inside the State Department.
Third, because of the immense power of the Combatant Commanders and the fact that the Chain of Command as specified in 10 USC § 162 runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Combatant Commander, the Combatant Commander has direct access to the Commander-in-Chief and as such the Executive is more likely to contemplate Military Action first and foremost.
The question that should be debated not only by the military but also by an informed citizenry is the organization of the Regional Combatant Commands making the United States imperialistic in the execution of its foreign policy?
I have believed for a long time that there is a need for a new National Security Act for the 21st Century.[2] Among the provision I would like to see is the common alignment of Regions across the entire federal government. While there may be arguments for different divisions it seems that a whole government approach would benefit from all the players reading off the same script. I think it also time to consider rather than having the Department of Defense Combatant Commanders being the lead that perhaps it is time of the Department of State to take the lead.
The goal of whatever any National Security Act ought to be strengthening the Security of our nation while at the same time assuring the other nations of the world that we are not in fact militaristic imperialists. Unfortunately given the deep divisions in Washington I fear that neither party will take the lead in advocating for shaping our National Security Structure for the realities of the 21st Century.
[1] There are six Regional Combatant Commands: United States Northern Command, Southern Command, European Command, Central Command, Africa Command, and Pacific Command and three functional Combatant Commands: United States Special Operations Command, Transportation Command, Strategic Command. In addition there are two Sub-unified Commands, United States Forces Korea under the Combatant Command Authority (COCOM) of Pacific Command, and Cyber Command under the COCOM of Strategic Command. See map http://www.defense.gov/news/UCP_2011_Map4.pdf
[2] The last major reorganization of the Department of Defense was the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986; it was a major reorganization of the Department of Defense but hardly the radical reorganization of the National Security Act of 1948; which not only created the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, but also created the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council.
Are we getting involved in wars in which our homeland is not directly threatened??
Nuff said.
Townie,
Good post and one which requires a much fuller response. So – more to follow. In the meantime:
The POLAD is a liaison. S/he has to use her or his native intelligence and political skills to influence the COCOM. Otherwise, s/he is just a conduit to/from State. This is because State has taken a back seat to the military in the last 20 years.
Most of us here remember the abject cowardice of our Foreign Service in 2003-7 – in the search for volunteers for Iraq and A-stan, how many career officers refused to serve where our nation required. Now, in my new capacity I see a lot of new blood willing to go (and have gone), or retired/former military being brought in to do the job.
The process of alignment is a good idea, and bears more thought. My concern is that we will end up creating generalissimos, and regions that are uneven in their power and resources. For example, the Far East has a definite, measurable DIME threat in PRC. Africa? There's InfoWar and Economic chaos that can't be overcome without wiping out the existing controls in African countries, i.e. kingpins, tribal politics.
Dave,
We already have generalissimos they are called Combatant Commands or Pro Counsel if you like. I am very aware that the POLAD is a Liaison and impotent at that. I am not sure that it was cowardice on the part of the State Department but rather fear and loathing of the military. Unfortunately once placed in charged the military are reluctant to accept that perhaps there is another way.
"Most of us here remember the abject cowardice of our Foreign Service in 2003-7 – in the search for volunteers for Iraq and A-stan, how many career officers refused to serve where our nation required."
I see that DaveO has bought into the media-propagated myth; hook, line & sinker.
Every single Foreign Service (FS) position in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan has been filled by a volunteer, every year, since 9/11. No positions went unfilled, and there's not one verifiable example that can be given of an FSO who "refused to serve" in those areas.
Frankly, the FS assignments process simply doesn't work the same way as the military's; fully-staffed diplomatic units don't deploy as a group, individual officers "bid" on various available positions about a year in advance of the end of their present assignment. When language training is required, they may bid two years in advance of the date they'll actually arrive at post.
So it's not like FSOs are surprised when they get their assignment orders and then go AWOL or desert. State has come up with a number of incentives to make the warzone assignments more attractive, which has helped make this a non-problem, despite all the hue and cry the resulted from _one_ FSOs whining at a semi-public "town hall" meeting.
Don't believe everything you read in the Washington Post or New York Times; it's not like they have an incentive to make service members, in or out of uniform, look good. Quite the opposite, judging by their products.
Interesting. As a member of the State Department, I occasioanally get to go to classes with the Foreign Service. One of the topics brought up this morning by the old timers (not me) was the revolt of the career FSO back in 2002-3: resignations in protest of service. The eyewitness anecdotes corroborate (sp?) the reports coming from other government sources. Yes, you're correct that no jobs eventually went unfilled, but it took some brave men and women volunteering to break the paradigm of dissent toward Mr. Bush's War.
Now, were these resignations actually resignations of position, followed by retirement (and therefore, for monetary reasons, not really 'resignations') I don't know. And I frankly don't care about the administrative maneuver – the heart of it was a lack of heart, spine, and honor.
It's not a "media myth" in our Nation's State Department. So, rather than waste time with the WaPo or the Slimes, I'll listen to the honorable men and woman who witnessed the event, and stayed to serve our great Nation to the best of their diplomatic ability.
Townie:
There's a pretty good book out there called "State of Disrepair" (?) mentioned this morning that compares DoS to DoD. Have you run across it in your studies? It was mentioned this morning as we discussed the organization of DoS, but I'm not familiar with it yet.
This GWOT has had an impact on the members of our diplomatic corps that bodes well for the US of A.
Have not seen the book "State of Disrepair" however I found this link http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/11/…. I basically concur with your comments can quibble around the edges.
There were indeed some few resignations in protest of the Iraq war, I recall one or two that got enough publicity that I read about them later.
But 2002-3 was either during the build-up (including diplomatic maneuvering) to the invasion, the ground war itself, or the first nine months of occupation. And while there was the CPA during that period, there was no embassy, no PRTs yet, and there was a lot of fumbling around in terms of civilian governance and reconstruction in Iraq, only some of which can fairly be laid at State's door.
State's biggest fumble in terms of staffing, in the early post-invasion days, was in failing to make its staffing requirements enough of a priority in its assignments process. Lots of deserved criticism was aimed at State for providing relatively inexperienced FSOs to take on huge responsibilities with little oversight or guidance. Basically, they sent whomever had the right language skills who could be spared without overly inconveniencing existing embassy missions.
(As for myself, I spent nearly all of 2003 and most of 2004 in uniform, away from the Department of State, nearly all of that time either in Iraq or coming/going to-from Iraq.)
The problem you are highlighting is one of institutional perspectives. The military is accustom to chains-of-command. And we are accustom to operating with economy of force. Rather than have individual military commanders in each country with his own available forces, we consolidate them all into each region and then delegate them out as necessary to meet conflict or peacetime needs.
The State Department does not view itself the same way. The regional director at State has ZERO authority over the ambassadors within their region. The Ambassador has supreme authority within their country, to include the employment of US military forces. So before you could even attempt to put a State Department guy in charge, you would have to put them in charge of their own folks within each country and that's not how DoS works.
I understand your concern that the COCOM has the appearance of having the most power within "their region" but the reality is, State has far more power within each country in that region. The COCOM has to maintain contacts with each nation's CHOD and senior leaders but has very little ability to develop a coherent policy across the region. State on the other hand has a very direct relationship with the leader of each nation and has the ability to deal politically with only the concerns of that nation.
We have COCOMs so that we can efficiently manage our forces. But efficiency does not equal effectiveness and so we do as much as we can across as wide an area as possible. State is more focused on effectiveness with very little efficiency and only cares about their own little country. I get that the impression to the world may be different but it is quite simply wrong. The Military does not have more power than State in this regards, it just manages it differently.
State will not, in my opinion, agree to a situation in which there is one supreme regional ambassador who oversees each of the country ambassadors because that would diminish their ability to work one on one with that country.
EUCOM is an example of this problem. It is very interested in what Israel is doing. But it also has to focus on Turkey. And Georgia. And the Baltic states. Oh, and the Balkans. But the ambassador to Israel only has to deal with Israel. All of his resources are devoted to that one effort. Meanwhile, EUCOM is pulling guys from Israel to send them to the Balkans. And when their rotation is up, they get to go to Georgia. Then they bounce to Turkey. The COCOM's power is so diffuse that its hardly overwhelming. State is very focused and therefore leverages more influence in each country.
BK you are absolutely correct that the Ambassador is the most important person in a particular country–his powers are "extraordinary and plenipotentiary" and the personnel representative of the President in a particular country. Clearly nothing happens in that country without first obtaining the approval of the Ambassador. As I said the second most important aspect is for State and DoD to look through the same lenses at the world, once that occurs perhaps then we can consider further reforms. But it is clear that our National Security System is in bad need of overhaul, to include State.
I believe you mean "Proconsul" vice"Pro-Counsel. I'll get back with more comments later. I'm interested in this because I worked the Unified Command Plan for the Army in the mid 70s until, thank goodness and Bernie Rogers, I escaped to Ft Riley, Kansas, where such weighty matters disappeared from our concerns.