The Dangers of Making Everything a COIN Fight

At the end of the Vietnam War, based on the bad taste of that experience, the United States Army undertook a deliberate expulsion of Counter Insurgency Doctrine from the collective psyche of the conventional force. Any discussion of Counterinsurgency doctrine was relegated to the soldiers who comprised the Special Forces. It was their raison d’être and the Conventional Army as a whole focused on waging General War against either the Soviets or the North Koreans.

In the 1980’s and 90’s the Army acknowledge, to some extent, that it could be involved in what was euphemistically referred to as “Operations Other Than War.” Never receiving much attention outside the confines of Service Schools, it was a concept that was a mile wide and an inch deep. Although the bulk of the Army’s operations during this period were operations best described as being “Operations Other Than War.”

In 2003 the United States invaded Iraq and quickly defeated the Conventional Army of Saddam Hussein. Just as quickly it found itself in what became quickly apparent as being a Counterinsurgency with elements of ethnic strife and civil war thrown in for good measure. As a result of that experience the United States Army and the United States Marine Corps produced under the guidance of then Lieutenant General’s David Petraeus, USA and James Matthis, USMC, an updated Counterinsurgency doctrine referred to as FM 3-24 in the Army.

Under now General Petraeus, Commander MNFI, the use of Counterinsurgency doctrine has been acclaimed to be responsible for the improved security in Iraq. Afghanistan, which has been the forgotten theater in our war on terrorism, is now the priority as it appears the Taliban are reasserting their influence in the country. As a result, General Petraeus now the CENTCOM Commander, and Secretary Gates, the Secretary of Defense, have concluded that the United States and its NATO Allies are involved in a Counterinsurgency fight in Afghanistan. A new Commander and more troops will give him the flexibility to secure the country and allow the national government to gain popular support.

I don’t want to sound like the contrarian, but maybe we need to step back and determine what is really going on in Afghanistan.

As a historian I am acutely aware that what we call Afghanistan has been the graveyard of empires. In the last two hundred years both the British and Soviet Union both have suffered military defeats at the hands of the Afghanistan. They were defeated not by conventional armies but by the various tribes, sometimes working together sometimes not, waging tribal warfare.

Here are some facts which I believe have some bearing on Afghanistan:

• Pashtun Tajik Hazara Uzbek Turkmen are the major tribes of Afghanistan, with Pashtun being the largest.

• The members of these tribes identify first and foremost with their immediate family or clan and the tribe.

• The western concept of nationhood is foreign to the tribes of Afghanistan; first and foremost they are Pashtun etc.

• Islam is important, but not the center of their life the tribe and family is important.

• They are suspicious of anyone outside their tribe and family.

• They are content with their folkways.

• The various tribes will work together if it is to expel and invader.

Questions which need to be asked?

• Is Afghanistan a nation or a collection of tribes and tribal governments which at times work together but more often than not fight each other?

• Are the Taliban religious zealots or are they waging tribal warfare?

• Can democracy thrive in such an environment?

• How much capital should we spend to form a National Army and Police Force?

• Are we viewing Afghanistan through the lens of our Western culture or their culture?

Until we answers these questions and many more, to reach a conclusion that we are involved in a counterinsurgency is fraught with danger. We could and probably are caught up in tribal struggles. In fact we might be more successful if we abandon the concept of Afghanistan as a nation and rather allowed it to break into tribal regions. We might find that we will achieve more success at less cost. Treating Afghanistan as it a potential democracy and it is involved is a counterinsurgency may be in the end be as disastrous for the United States as it was for the Soviet Union.