How to Lose in Afghanistan

Anthony Cordesman writes in today Washington Post that

“. . .Yet they can win only if they are allowed to manage both the civil and military sides of the conflict without constant micromanagement from Washington or traveling envoys. They must be given both the time to act and the resources and authority they feel they need. No other path offers a chance of a secure and stable Afghanistan free of terrorist and jihadist control and sanctuaries. . .”

Comments

  1. Solomon2 says:

    I doubt Karzai will permit the U.S. to manage the civil side of things, nor will he cooperate with governance efforts. Increasing U.S. forces leaves them vulnerable to a political turn of fortune that could deprive them of logistic support and leave them surrounded by a hostile population.

    What to do? Perhaps decentralizing the Afghan system, building up local institutions, diverting funds to them and ignoring the bleats for useless bribes from the central government. Make fixing the police and courts a priority, so criminal and Talib elements can actually be prosecuted successfully and civil suits disposed of without resort to Taliban justice. Possibly a revised U.N. mandate would be useful.