Intriguing piece from a Kiwi lieutenant. No doubt the light infantry concept is well suited to COIN ops. The British variant cleaned insurgent clock in Kenya and Malaya in the 50s, and the Rhodesian Light Infantry was one of the finest COIN outfits in modern history. Not sure if it’s a logical formation for the US Army or not… figure I’ll leave that one up to our resident green suiters.
Exit question: Wouldn’t a Marine MEU fit the same bill here?
The author is suggesting the Brits and “Commonwealth” armies move to a rifle platoon organization that is very close to what the USMC has had since the Raiders of WWII (your last comment re: 31st MEU). Other than some interesting comments regarding the functions of different types of infantry on the COIN scale, I didn’t see much useful info.
Think the only Commonwealth armies that matter anymore are New Zealand, Australia, and Canada…. perhaps India as well.
The 29th Infantry, headquarted at Ft Belvoir, is designated as a “light” division. Plus a half dozen independent “light” brigades.
http://www.army.mil/info/organization/unitsandcommands/nationalguardunits/
interesting article, from the very interesting SWJ, edited by the very tall and always interesting bill nagle. that lieutenant is thinking hard about the problem.
to answer your exit question, remember that the MEU is not infantry/infantry is not the MEU. the MEU is a task-organized expeditionary force, with infinitely flexible subordinate units, that have proven themselves time and again capable of mutating into various temporary tactical formations, and then reassuming their standard structure for other operations, like some vicious lightning-fast don’t-fuck-with-me chameleon.
just my opinion.
While the Brits and the Rhodesians did indeed kick the crap out of insurgents, this was largely due to a) the poor quality of the opposition and b) tactics that would be blocked as warcrimes in this day and age. While both were formidable fighting forces and much more than a match for their opposition on the open battlefield, they also widely used collective punishment and pre-emptive and suggestive attacks. That is to say they would attack not only enemy strong points that had not yet attacked, but also positions that seemed to be becoming hotbeds. The Brits in particular were ready to crash on a village if there was any indication there was local unrest. Effective tactics, but no longer politically feasible
Not sure about the Brits in Malaya/Kenya, but the protected village concept and dabbles in chemical warfare on the Rhodesian side is all I can think of for warcrimes (and we still had a sizable chemical inventory at the time).
Most of the terr kills in Rhodesia came from Fireforces guided in by the Selous Scouts, or large scale raids against camps in the frontline states. All within the rules of war.