Opportunity, Missed

By Lt Col P

As promised, a few comments on the article I linked below, on the very beginnings of what turned into the Anbar Awakening. On what could have been, possibly, but wasn't an alternate ending to OIF-2.

Let's get a few things out of the way. First of all, VF is not a publication I normally read. In fact, I'm not sure I've ever read it. Second, the author and the editors probably have a deep-seated policial axe to grind with the Bush Administration. All that being said, the essentials of the story are, as far as I know, correct.

As far as I know. And in this case, I know a good deal. Among other things, Colonel John Coleman (VMI 76, and an exceptional officer) told me the tale a few years ago, when he was about to retire. It was clear to me that this was an exceptional story, and when he suggested (!) that I keep it to myself for obvious reasons, I had no problems with that. Col onel Coleman thought then that this was an effort well worth pursuing. To put it another way, I thought it was a stunning turn of events; if anything, that article is a mild version of events.

What makes Coleman's opinion the key to understanding the opportunity that was offered here-- and missed-- is that if anyone would have been in a position to scoff at counterfeit engagements, it would have been the I MEF leadership. They had been forced, virtually at gunpoint, into a union with the Fallujah Brigade, and had endured more than their share of charlatans and hustlers. (They had also had a taste of the real deals too, like the Showanis.) If Colonel John Coleman thought that the people he met with were speaking with authority, and were capable of doing what they said, he would have the experience to know it.

Furthermore, I have had all of this confirmed by a 3d CAG officer I know well, who was deeply involved with economic engagement before and after this. And, I have seen the documents in Mr Jones's possession, and unless they are very clever fabrications, they bear out the facts. They are priceless historical documents, and I hope they get preserved properly.

I said that, as far as I know, the essentials of the story in the article are true; but I think the author jumps the rails in a few places. For one, he places the blame squarely on the Bush White House. That's one possibility, but not a certainty. There were others involved, and they shouldn't be let off the hook so easily.

What I think is beyond a doubt is that if we had taken the risk and accepted this offer at face value, we'd be a year ahead of where we are now. I have often said that the failure to score a decisive blow at Fallujah in early 2004, or rather the failure to allow I MEF to deliver that blow, set us back a full year. We could have recovered, at a much reduced cost, all of that time and more. And a lot of good men paid the price. But there's nothing to be done about it except to square up to the facts and absorb the lessons.

May 15, 2009 04:45 PM Leadership ~ Our Beloved Corps ~ The Long War

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Comments

The article was well written overall. I distinctly remember reading about how the German police were used in germany after the war by the allied forces.

I also remember that the leaders in WWII had a lifetime of experience of dealing the after effects of WWI. They also had, in some cases, heresay knowledge of the after effects of the carpet bag era.

Knowing some about the State Department, their actions do not suprise me at all.

I also am not sure if the assessment of being one year ahead is accurate. I think it may be more. We will never know.

And what little I know about John Coleman (I was a rat '79) his judgement was pretty good.

Tom W · May 18, 2009 02:24 PM