Partner's in Command

What struck me, as I read this book, is that if either Marshall or Eisenhower’s careers were duplicated in the Army today, they would have both retired as Lieutenant Colonels — at best. While I believe it is absolutely essential that our leaders have experienced Command, the success of Marshall and Eisenhower in fashioning Strategic Plans which won World War II, makes me wonder if our template career path, which makes it easy for the Personnel pukes to make safe decisions, may not deprive our Army of the next Marshall or Eisenhower.

Partners in Command; George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower in War and Peace; Mark Perry, Penguin Books, New York New York, 2007, 413 pages + notes and index.

I commend this book, to every student of Modern Anglo-American Military History. This book is a rich, detailed, and readable account of the relationship between Marshall and Eisenhower and the development of the Grand Strategy for fighting World War II. It could easily be entitled, Marshall’s Lieutenant.

The central thesis of this book, that from the earliest days of World War II Marshall and Eisenhower was partners in shaping the Strategic response of the United States to the aggression of the Axis powers. Eisenhower who was Marshall’s pick to be the head of the Army War Plans division, was responsible for developing the outline of the United States Europe first Strategy.

More importantly, it highlights the tensions, which existed between the United States and the United Kingdom in fashioning grand strategy for World War II. While the United States favored an early return to the continent, the United Kingdom, led by the pugnacious Prime Minister, favor a less direct (read the soft under belly approach) towards defeating Chancellor Hitler and Nazi war machine. Today, we speak of the special relationship, but that special relationship developed because Marshall and Eisenhower held steadfast to the basic Strategic outline developed immediately following Pearl Harbor and through the force of their personalities persuaded the British the American Strategic Plan was the proper strategy.

Coalition warfare is not easy, as Marshall and Eisenhower learned. If the British were difficult to deal with, the French were down right impossible. But it was not just the political mine fields which Marshall and Eisenhower had to deal, they also had to deal with the oversize personalities of the military leaders of not only the United States but also the United Kingdom.

While many fare well in this book, there are some whose reputation is further tarnished. Patton and Montgomery come across as not only prima donna but also as oversized personalities whose petulance’s often threatened to derail the unity required for coalition warfare. Bradley, who is widely viewed by historians as being the soldier’s general, fares well but with some tarnish on his reputation. Mark Clark, who has a mixed reputation amongst historians, reputation is further blemished. He comes across as an impossible personality, more interested in documenting his accomplishments, that doing what is necessary to win a war. Always looming in the background of this story is Douglas MacArthur and Marshall’s need to balance the needs of Europe while ensuring that the Economy of Force campaigns of the Pacific were supplied with the minimum essential capabilities to hold the Japanese empire at bay until Nazi German were defeated.

What struck me, as I read this book, that if either Marshall or Eisenhower careers were duplicated in the Army today, they would have both retired as Lieutenant Colonels at best. While I believe it is absolutely essential that our leaders have experienced Command, the success of Marshall and Eisenhower in fashioning Strategic Plans which won World War II, makes me wonder if our template career path, which makes it easy for the Personnel pukes to make safe decisions, may not deprive our Army of the next Marshall or Eisenhower.

This book is a worthwhile addition to the library of any student of military history.