The Air Force and COIN

By Slab

Small Wars Journal posted an article by Air Force LtCol Buck Elton, "Shortchanging the Joint Doctrine Fight: One Airman's Assessment of the Airman's Assessment". LtCol Elton's excellent article is a counterpoint to an earlier monograph, published in December 2007 by Air University, and written by Air Force Deputy Judge Advocate MajGen Charles Dunlap, entitled Shortchanging the Joint Fight? An Airman's Assessment of FM 3-24 and the Case for Developing Truly Joint COIN Doctrine.

I have not read MajGen Dunlap's article, as I was deployed in Iraq at the time watching the lessons of FM 3-24 put into practice by an Army cavalry troop. I find it interesting that MajGen Dunlap believes the Army and Marine Corps are shortchanging airpower in the COIN fight, as I spent quite a bit of time using rotary and fixed wing aviation in support of Apache Troop's objectives. However, LtCol Elton does a far better job of refuting the General's criticisms than I ever could, so I'll let him do the talking:

Many COIN and Irregular Warfare experts argue population control, legitimacy of the government and isolation of insurgents are key elements of success. Contrary to what General Dunlap suggests, airpower is a critical enabler that is absolutely necessary, but it is by no mean sufficient to defeating insurgencies. While criticizing the commitment of massive numbers of American boots-on-the-ground, he fails to discuss any historical COIN case studies where airpower replaced land power as the dominant military effort. From Malaya, to El Salvador, to the Greek Civil War to Vietnam, to Algeria, insurgencies are rarely, if ever, successfully crushed by an overwhelming foreign military force alone and there has never been an insurgency crushed by the overwhelming application of airpower alone. Ground forces, whether they are host nation security forces or external combat forces assisting the security forces, are necessary but also not sufficient. Of all the discussions about the best way to counter insurgencies, only General Dunlap argues airpower is necessary and sufficient. The harsh reality is that our Joint Force will be called upon to conduct many difficult missions and we must prepare for them together with the resources we have available. Advocating the types of wars the Air Force should fight (no ground troops) by only preparing for the wars they want to fight (airpower centric conflicts with peer competitors), while ignoring the type of fight our enemy wants to fight (al-Qaeda’s global insurgency) and the wars our President orders us to fight (Afghanistan and Iraq), is a terrible mistake. Our nation must be prepared to succeed in conventional, irregular, and hybrid conflicts such as Iraq and Afghanistan. If funding for new equipment and forces is constrained, the Air Force should be willing to consider some risk in capacity (not capability) for Major Combat Operations to increase the capability and capacity to conduct Irregular Warfare and COIN, while convincing our civilian leaders to supply adequate funding for all our threats and requirements. Our services shortchange the joint fight when they organize, train, and equip for only one type of conflict. General Dunlap shortchanges the doctrine development process by discrediting sister service doctrine and military operations to protect service’s budget equities.

H/T to SWJ

Update: Looks like several members of the Small Wars Council don't think quite as highly of LtCol Elton's article.

I am not convinced Buck like Dunlap ever read 3-24. He read passages and filled in with what he wanted it to say. More Hap Arnold airmindedness mess.

I saw LtCol Elton's article as being more in favor of joint mindedness, but perhaps I misread. I must admit that applauding a critique without having read the criticized work itself is less than exemplary scholarship on my part.

I have to say that when I read the line in his conclusion, "The United States Air Force is the most lethal, flexible, overwhelming and feared military force in the world," I snickered a bit.

July 13, 2008 03:43 PM Counterinsurgency ~ Strategery ~ The Long War

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Comments

CLM

Mrs. Davis · July 13, 2008 04:14 PM

Amen. There's a growing number of us Zoomies who recognized the failures of the fighter mafia well before Gates cleaned shop, and realized that we are mostly a support service.

Was great to read an in-house refutation of General Dunlap's column.

John · July 13, 2008 04:27 PM

Big damned waste of money is what they are. I have spoken with two field grade Marine officers who were in OIF and they said after that F-16 wasted the Marine command track they would absolutely not call for air unless it was Navy or Marine. I know from the first Gulf that they could not be trusted not to smoke friendlies too. I saw a few examples of that happen. It must be that missiles from 20 miles away mentality.

By the way Air Force - - you can't take and hold shit with an airplane.

USMC Steve · July 14, 2008 05:25 AM