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The Future of Jointness?
By Charlie
Two articles recently caught my eye that appeared to counter the idea of "jointness." "Jointness" is the idea that all of the services can work together, under a unified command structure, to accomplish a mission.
Quoth FM 101-5-1:
joint force (JP 1-02) - A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single commander authorized to exercise operational control. See FMs 100-5, 100-15, 100-20, and JP 0-2.
The first article is by Charles Dunlap, entitled "Take Closer Look At Air Force's Nuclear Blunder." In the article, MG Dunlap lays out his view of the Air Force's handling of the nuclear mission. He says the following:
STRATCOM is the heir to the fabled Strategic Air Command, which was legendary for its draconian discipline and obsession with all things nuclear within the Air Force. In 1992 "Air" was dropped from the title when the command added Navy forces and converted itself into a joint-service organization.Even so, STRATCOM remained wedded exclusively to its nuclear mission - until, that is, the arrival in 2004 of the highly respected Marine general (and now vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) James E. Cartwright.
Almost immediately, Gen. Cartwright set out to redirect STRATCOM away from a nuclear-only focus to missions seemingly more relevant to a post-9/11 world. Writing in Joint Force Quarterly in 2006, he acknowledged his command's "legacy" nuclear responsibilities, but emphasized the addition of seven new "distinct global missions." As brilliant as it appeared at the time, diffusing the command's concentration away from the nuclear mission now warrants re-evaluation.
The Strategic Air Command (SAC) , according to the infallible Wikipedia: "was both a major command and a "specified command" in the U.S. Air Force and was the operational establishment in charge of America's land-based bomber aircraft and land-based ballistic missile strategic nuclear arsenal from 1946-92." MG Dunlap argues that the Air Force handled the mission better when it was exclusively an Air Force -not a joint- mission.
The next article that caught my eye was (brace yourself) the Army's TF Odin from the NYT: At Odds With Air Force, Army Adds Its Own Aviation Unit. I'm not sure how true this one is, as it quotes several (of course) anonymous "officers." It does, however, paint a decidedly partisan picture of inter-service rivalry:
But now in Iraq, the Army has quietly decided to try going it alone for the important surveillance mission, organizing an all-Army surveillance unit that represents a new move by the service toward self-sufficiency, and away from joint operations.
Later in the piece, they threw out this whopper which leads me to lend less credibility to the article:
Army and Marine Corps officers in Afghanistan have complained that Air Force pilots flying attack missions in support of ground operations do not come in as low as their Navy and Marine counterparts.
The "joint" environment seems to be where the entire DOD is heading. I think these types of articles are more growing pains than (to quote the NYT) moves "away from joint operations."
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Comments
"Strategic Air Command, was legendary for its draconian discipline and obsession with all things nuclear within the Air Force."
SAC was that way because they never wanted to make the mistake of carrying live nuclear ordinance across the country on accident, because someone was not paying attention.
SAC should never have been forced away from thier mission values.
Being an old SAC missileer, my first thought on flying nukes unknowingly was "Wouldn't have happened in SAC." Curt LeMay took SAC by the scruff of the neck and remade it in his image. Nothing was more serious than nukes--or else.
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With the exception of A-10s I corroborate that last quote:
"Army and Marine Corps officers in Afghanistan have complained that Air Force pilots flying attack missions in support of ground operations do not come in as low as their Navy and Marine counterparts."
I don't think that is a "wopper" at all. In combat and training operations Air Force "high flyers" as we called them would demand making a pass over the target area for "safety" which would usually negate their mission because other non-Air Force aircraft or indirect fire was inbound. Then the "high flyers" would bitch because they had not dropped their ordinance.
Marine and Navy pilots would do what we on the ground cleared them to do when we cleared them to do it. Again the exception was A-10 who "broke" the Air Force rules when we on the ground cleared them hot.