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Obstacle Emplacement in the COIN Fight
By Charlie
North of the Green Zone, in Iraq, the Army’s new COIN doctrine is being put to the test as a wall is being erected in the southern third of Sadr City. The construction of this barrier is an odd mix of new and classical approaches to combat, engineering, and counterinsurgency. Here is a recent report from the New York Times on the progress:
This is the war over the wall. It is a daily battle of attrition waged over the large concrete barrier that the Americans have been building across Sadr City in the hope of establishing a safe zone in the southern tier of the Shiite enclave.The Americans began building the wall a month ago, working east to west. The work started at night but soon extended into the day as American commanders sought to speed up the construction….Supporters of Moktada al-Sadr, the anti-American cleric, denounced the wall as a nefarious effort to divide the city. Militia fighters with rocket-propelled grenades, machine guns and small arms have been trying to halt its construction. …Those efforts have failed, and the barrier is now 80 percent complete.
Interestingly, the idea of putting up barriers to restrict your enemy’s movement is a conventional one. The emplacement of obstacles has been contemplated by Army engineers since the Fulda gap planning (which may have recently stopped). The (old) Army FM 3-0 defines this as Countermobility, which:
.. denies mobility to enemy forces. It limits the maneuver of enemy forces and enhances the effectiveness of fires. Countermobility missions include obstacle building and smoke generation.
However, the placement, circumstances, and purpose of this wall in the southern third of Sadr city are directly inline with the new Army doctrine. Clever obstacle emplacement by maneuver commanders and combat engineers has been commonplace in Iraq for a while. Marines and soldiers quickly realized that Anti Coalition Forces were uncomfortable engaging them outside of certain distances, and employed obstacles such as barriers and wire to increase standoff distances. The relentless emplacement of this massive barrier is meant to do several things: increase standoff distance for Mahdi Army mortars targeting the Green Zone, disrupt movement of Special Group members and their supply lines, and increase the ability of Iraqi and Coalition forces to project power into the sprawling slum. This plan sounds good, because it is right out of the book:
FM 3-24: Military Aspects of Terrain for CounterinsurgencyB-4. At the tactical level, Soldiers and Marines consider different details of the military aspects of terrain
to describe the operational environment.Obstacles. In addition to terrain obstacles, obstacles in a COIN environment include anything
that hinders insurgent freedom of operation or counterinsurgent operations. Traffic control
points, electronic security systems, and guard plans are examples of obstacles to insurgents.
By utilizing effective obstacle emplacement in a complex urban environment, Coalition and Iraqi forces are slowly and methodically demonstrating a fusion of countermobility and counterinsurgency.
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Comments
Interesting slideshow in the NY Times -- photos of the wall, etc.
Photo 8 of 9 in that slideshow is very interesting.... a world in which an M1A1 Abrams was providing overwatch for a patrol of T72s and BMPs was barely conceivable when I joined the Army.
SSG Jeff (USAR):
That was the photo on the front page of the Times yesterday, at least in the west coast edition.
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The usage and effectiveness of Countermobility also underscores the disparity in munitions between both sides, and allows the American, Coalition, and Iraqi forces to be able to bring their greater firepower to bear against insurgents.
The insurgents greatest advantage- their usage of light weapons enchances their mobility, and allows them to conduct hit and run operations (which has it's greatest value within the realm of media perception). However, these walls remove their tactics from the playbook, becuase A) they deny them the ability to hit and run, and B) deny them the range of their small arms- and allows the Americans to bring their technological edge into play.
In short, it reduces them to Marshal Petain's old maxim "le feu tue" (fire kills).