This burns me. John and I recently had a phone conversation over the continued flailing of the Air Force over trying to exert control over ALL UAVs in the air, using the iron-clad logic of “if it is in the air, the Air Force should own it.” This logic apparently works on many people that have never realized that aviation supports ground ops, which are inherently tied to a ground maneuver commander, who needs to have operational control of all units in his battle space.
Yet, the effort continues, via Strategy Page:
May 23, 2008: U.S. Air Force generals were not happy recently when their boss, the Secretary of Defense, publically chastised them for not getting enough of their Predator UAVs into the air over Iraq and Afghanistan, where they could do the combat troops on the ground the most good. The air force promptly ordered more Predators into the combat zone, and began flying more sorties, which soon doubled the hours Predators were in the air.
Now it’s payback time. The air force has deployed pundits pointing out that more Predators in the air is not the problem, but a “common picture” of what is on the ground, and what is in the air. The air force is using the situation to call again for them to be given control of all large (roughly twenty pounds or more) UAVs. This would enable the air force to standardize sensors, and data collected, so there would be a common picture.
Right, because that is the issue here, the “common picture.” Again, who does this common picture support? The ground maneuver commander, who (gasp) is probably not an Air Force officer, but more likely an Army BCT or Marine RCT commander. Adding another layer of bureaucracy into this picture is a waste of time during wartime:
But the ground combat officers see it differently. For the guys on the ground, the UAVs have become a matter of life and death, and they often don’t know in advance when they will need them. To the soldiers, the UAV is no more of an obstacle to other aircraft than artillery shells and stray bullets. The air force (and army helicopters) have long since learned how to coexist with shells and bullets. So why not use the same rules for UAVs? The air force is adamant that the UAVs have to eventually get transponders (which may take a while for under ten pound UAVs), and continue to play by the rules used for manned aircraft.
Right, and I don’t want to turn this into an anti-Air Force rant (I like the Air Force, Really!) , but priorities need to be reviewed. What are the pros and cons of taking UAVs out of the hands of combat commanders and placed in the hands of Air Force Liaison ops officers up a couple of echelons? If anything, the Army should be “deploying pundits” (If you are a deployable pundit, e-mail me, I want your story!) to argue for re-integrating the Air Force into the Army Air Corps to counter this line of “if its in the air, its ours” argument.
John says I just want to clarify here, I was not taking the Air Force’s side on the UAV debate. The USAF is becoming the “me me me” service, and I think that petty turf wars like that ultimately harm the overall war effort.
Update 2 From our comments comes the Air Force side, from a fella who knows the business:
To begin with, I am an Air Force officer. I am a graduate and former instructor of the USAF Weapons School (which means I spend A LOT of time trying to figure out how best to employ our assets to kill the enemy in the most spectacular ways possible. This also means, that if you are not a “Patch wearer” you will find me to be gruff/arrogant/conceited/and much worse with little tolerance for “herbivores,” no offense to any who may be such). Finally, I’ve been to Iraq. I severed my time in Baghdad with the 1st CAV, so I speak Army about as fluently as any Air Force officer can and I know exactly what air power does and does not do in the current conflict.There is a difference between what the Army does with ISR and how the Air Force does ISR. We, in the Air Force, have many, many analysts pouring over the imagery, video feeds, moving target indications, and signals intelligence that our aircraft collect. Some of this is done on the aircraft themselves but the vast majority of it is done by guys on the ground back in the States. They correlate information, reference databases and conduct forensic review of various information sources. It takes many, many people to do this and the footprint for pushing these guys forward would be unbearable.
The Army, in my experience, generally just wants a UAV to fly over an area and if they see something on the feed good, if they don’t, oh well. The Air Force, on the other hand, collects the video regardless of what was initially seen because we can use it to build or contribute to other products. There is a lot more analysis done on Air Force owned and operated UAVs than on Army UAVs (different uses, different mindsets—I’ve been there and seen it myself). So when Secretary Gates says, “put 50 more airframes into theater to support the Army” what the Air Force hears is “put 50 more airframes in Iraq and find 5,000 more analysts to exploit the data.” As you can imagine, it ain’t easy finding, let alone training, 5,000 analysts out of thin air.
If the “common picture” is really the problem they can get on the network and get the feed just like everyone else.
The UAV’s that operate below the coordination altitude belong to the Army and USMC just like the helicopters, bullets and shells which move around there as well.
There is entirely too much posturing and politicking going on for a country at war…there are some people out there that should really be ashamed of themselves.
“Nothing can stop the Army Air Corps!”
Amen, brother.
Too many empires. And of course that’s why the separation happened in the first place. But as an Army Viet Nam Vet, it used to irritate me seeing the Air Force and Navy take care of their own prior to providing support to us Army pukes. (Air Force and Navy enlisted personnel had better living quarters than Army Officers where I was based.)
And while we’re on the subject of eliminating things that don’t make sense, can we include the Warrant Officer branch?
Let see, what is the real difference between the Air Force controlling UAVs and the Army controlling UAVs.
1. The USAF flies them from Nevada; the Army flies them in theater.
2. The USAF takes some washed up Jet Jockey, teaches him how to fly a video screen, whereas the Army takes a 18 year old.
John: Add this to my list I why I loathe the USAF.
If and when this whole thing in Iraq falls apart, I hope maybe… just maybe… the military structure can take a good, hard look at itself and realize how f-ed up it can be.
We are a peacetime military in the middle of a war.
Sergeants major check soldiers’ socks leaving the wire to make sure we’re wearing green or black socks.
MP’s spending their time in theatre running speed traps on Camp Victory and writing (I shit you not) traffic tickets. That’s right… traffic tickets.
Colonels and generals are playing tug-of-war over airspace.
This is really stupid already.
I mean, you don’t see insurgents bickering about who can lay IED’s in whose AO, right?
If it wasn’t so tragic, it’d be a hilarious comedy.
I think the Air Force is struggling with trying to remain relevant in a post cold war era, especially when war fighting is trending toward low-level insurgency style conflicts. I say we allow the Air Force to play with the Global Hawks and the Marines and Army play with the Predators and Reapers. That should keep everybody happy!
The Air Force has a way to go:
1. Having been to all sorts of AF, Marine, Navy and Army posts (CONUS and overseas), the AF, almost in every case, has swank facilities compared to the other services. Why?
2. While attending AWS (now EWS) at Quantico, the AF Ln O to the Marines there – like the other service Ln Os, gave a broad overview of his service and missions, manning, etc. Just one issue that brought hoots and groans from the Marine aviators in the audience was the fact that AF fighter squadrons don’t “own” their own a/c nor maintain them. There is a whole ‘nother maintenance squadron that does that. Twice the numbers of people.
3. Why is the ratio of officers to enlisted in the AF so high?
4. Why does duty in the AF – on so many levels – seem the antithesis of the warrior ethos?
5. OK, enough hammering. The AF does lots of jobs and does them very well. They do, however, need to get past the notion that short of massive nuke strikes, wars are won from from the air. They’re not. It takes people (hey, AF….invest more pilots in the CAS mission and have more AF types go to Army infanty/mech battalions to call for CAS).
Finally, toughen up the AF recruit training a bit and focus a bit more on defense of your vital assets. Remember some gent with really bad teeth, totally illiterate in his own language and could not turn on a PC…but armed with a .303 Enfield could easily get close enough to a/c to fire enough rounds into them….and turn your a/c into useless junk. The RAF has the RAF Regiment (the RAF’s “infantry” and security). Take a look. Maybe something to be learned there.
Finally II: Folks we’re on the same “side”. We all need to exploit our synergism. We also need to NOT waste the taxpayers money.
Old Marine Grunt sends
This looks amazingly like The A-10 Saga: Chapter 2.
Some of you have seen this before on this site and others because to put it simply, if you are going to dredge up the same arguments, then I’m just going to keep using the same counter-points…
To begin with, I am an Air Force officer. I am a graduate and former instructor of the USAF Weapons School (which means I spend A LOT of time trying to figure out how best to employ our assets to kill the enemy in the most spectacular ways possible. This also means, that if you are not a “Patch wearer” you will find me to be gruff/arrogant/conceited/and much worse with little tolerance for “herbivores,” no offense to any who may be such). Finally, I’ve been to Iraq. I severed my time in Baghdad with the 1st CAV, so I speak Army about as fluently as any Air Force officer can and I know exactly what air power does and does not do in the current conflict.
There is a difference between what the Army does with ISR and how the Air Force does ISR. We, in the Air Force, have many, many analysts pouring over the imagery, video feeds, moving target indications, and signals intelligence that our aircraft collect. Some of this is done on the aircraft themselves but the vast majority of it is done by guys on the ground back in the States. They correlate information, reference databases and conduct forensic review of various information sources. It takes many, many people to do this and the footprint for pushing these guys forward would be unbearable.
The Army, in my experience, generally just wants a UAV to fly over an area and if they see something on the feed good, if they don’t, oh well. The Air Force, on the other hand, collects the video regardless of what was initially seen because we can use it to build or contribute to other products. There is a lot more analysis done on Air Force owned and operated UAVs than on Army UAVs (different uses, different mindsets—I’ve been there and seen it myself). So when Secretary Gates says, “put 50 more airframes into theater to support the Army” what the Air Force hears is “put 50 more airframes in Iraq and find 5,000 more analysts to exploit the data.” As you can imagine, it ain’t easy finding, let alone training, 5,000 analysts out of thin air.
Add to that the fact that you have to deconflict the frequencies being used for all of those additional aircraft. Its not that it can’t be done. It just can’t be done quickly or easily. Here in the States, the electromagnetic spectrum is carefully controlled and managed by the FCC. There is very little of that being done in Iraq. And you don’t really want your UAV suddenly falling under the control of somebody who doesn’t realize they are controlling a UAV. It happens, we lose aircraft because of it.
Of course, if you add 50 aircraft to the skies, you need a way of deconflicting them from other aircraft. Two UAVs trade paint in the sky, that’s bad. A UAV gets sucked into a jet engine or impacts a tail rotor and you have a much bigger problem. So somebody has to sort this mess out, particularly over the most congested airspace on the planet, Baghdad.
The Joint Forces Air Component Commander does not have to be an Air Force guy. It only has to be the guy with the preponderance of air assets AND the ability to control them. The Army ALWAYS has the preponderance of air assets. But the Army is NEVER the JFACC because they cannot control the airspace. Army airspace management is procedural. In other words, they use specific means of deconflicting the airspace based on what they are being told. They do not have the radars or the air traffic control systems necessary to keep aircraft from flying into each other.
Since most Army air assets fly below 3,000 feet and use visual deconfliction or established air corridors to navigate around, the problem is manageable. Above 3,000 feet and you now have aircraft that are unable to use visual deconfliction and you require greater flexibility than that provided by air corridors. So you need actual air traffic controllers who are staring at radar scopes who can clear aircraft into particular areas, demand altitude changes, and recommend different flight paths. The Army is currently not equipped, manned, or trained to do this and unless they are willing to start spending the Air Force’s equivalent budget to do just that INSTEAD of buying tanks or housing Soldiers, its probably best that the Air Force retain that capability on its own.
This is what drives the UAV fight. The Air Force doesn’t really care about owning the UAVs. What we do care about is the fact that operators who are not pilots (that is FAA-certified) are driving non-standardized systems around ABOVE 3,000 feet (this includes the Shadow, Warrior Alpha, and I-GNAT). That means there are assets out there that do not necessarily conform to any air traffic control standard being flown by guys who have not undergone the very precise training of pilot/navigator school and therefore you just rapidly increased the likelihood of something very, very bad happening.
Plus, if you actually want your UAVs to be more useful than 7-11 store cameras with wings, it would be nice if your information went somewhere other than just the TOC floor. There is a huge gain to be had from the TOC being able to see the video, don’t get me wrong, but there is even more that could be done if the imagery went to the same places that our current Predator feeds went. The SOF guys like the analysis we provide because they let the video go back to the highly trained analysts in the States. The conventional Army prefers a more direct video but they lose out on all that potential analysis. Good for right now but not good for the longer term fight.
Cheers!
BK, greatly appreciate your comments and expertise, thanks so much for participating.
I’m going to focus on one thing that you said, as it kinda-sorta plays into part of Charlie and I’s discussion.
There is a difference between what the Army does with ISR and how the Air Force does ISR. We, in the Air Force, have many, many analysts pouring over the imagery, video feeds, moving target indications, and signals intelligence that our aircraft collect. Some of this is done on the aircraft themselves but the vast majority of it is done by guys on the ground back in the States. They correlate information, reference databases and conduct forensic review of various information sources. It takes many, many people to do this and the footprint for pushing these guys forward would be unbearable.
This is a problem. A big one.
The Air Force has mandated that all these extras.. extra regs, extra mission requirements, extra personnel.
So when a wartime need arises, the Air Force has a dozen reasons as to why it “can’t” do it.
Simplicity is everything. If UAV force (and supporting elements) are so cumbersome and complex that they can’t perform their mission, then something in the chain is broken and needs to be adjusted.
What John said. It’s nice to have all those extra analysts, sure. But are they absolutely necessary? What’s wrong with getting intel NOW NOW NOW while waiting to get future analyst capabilities in place?
Maybe it’s my green background, but telling grunts that you can’t fill an immediate tac/op need because you require 5,000 analysts back in the states doesn’t make much sense to me.
Though I will again defer to john in thanking BK for giving us a wider shot of this debate.
It appears to me that the Air Force wants to still operate like the Post Office and the ground forces are looking for someone with the same sense of urgency as Federal Express.
Wasn’t “jointness” supposed to cure these problems?
The Marine who owns the airspace is not the RCT (or BLT) commander, but the MAGTF commander– hence the “AG” in the title, for Air-Ground. I comprehend why the USAF wants to do this, but it is a ham-handed way to deal detailed coordination issues. It also highlights some still-pressing gaps in joint ops. Not good.
Fair points. But you’ll note that reason we can’t send UAVs out the door like Dorito’s is only PARTLY because of the number of analysts we rely upon to do the job. The first two issues I mentioned are non-starters to begin with: frequency and airspace deconfliction.
Getting the information to the analysts is a bonus or perk that contributes to the JOINT fight because now you have assets from tactical through theater to national that can all leverage the same information. Furthermore, more often than not, I found that the S2s that I worked with were always surprised to see what products they could have been getting vice what “soda straw” view they actually ended up with. Sometimes, you don’t know what you “need” until somebody shows it to you.
And just because the asset can feed the analysts back in the States in no way impedes the ability of the commander at the tactical level to receive the data in his TOC or even into his vehicles via OSRVT or ROVER. So you don’t actually lose anything there.
The key though is to come up with a way to “turn the sky dark with UAVs” that does not endanger the lives of the manned aircraft (which includes the Army’s guys, too!) and doesn’t unnecessarily impact the efficiency of the effort. I’ve seen targets where there were three or four full-motion video assets all looking at. (I understand why it was done that way but there are also opportunities to improve their effectiveness.)
The Air Force isn’t saying, “hey Army, you need to use your UAVs the same way we do!” Instead, we want to standardize the training of the UAV pilots (possibly like how the Air Force and Army both go through Army helicopter training) to ensure safety of flight and we want to standardize the aircraft to make them more efficient (their feeds go someplace other than the TOC) and safer (transponders, etc.) What the Army has now is a great “lets fix it now, lets not worry about tomorrow” approach that gets the info but continues to complicate matters. If we get ahead of this problem now, we might actually be able to make the system better.
With regards to “jointness,” the Air Force UAVs feed directly into the TOCs/OSRVT/ROVER for the joint players. The Army/USMC UAVs do not feed outside of their own systems (with the exception of a limited SIPR postings that are turned on and off at the local level). The Air Force has pushed ALOs/JTACs and now ISRLOs down to the Division and Brigade levels, has added additional analysts at the Corps level, and has offered to bring Army LNOs into our explotiation centers to improve the Army-Air Force jointness. So far, the Army has been reluctant to give up anyone to that tasking (and with good reason, your folks are heavily committed). But the Air Force is trying to be as joint as possible.
A quick note about the maintenance squadrons. This is an issue that goes back and forth even in the Air Force. But the simple fact of the matter was, the Air Force was trying to fix a long standing problem, that only pilots get command positions. So to give the maintenance community more opportunities to command, they broke out the maintainers from the flying squadron, left the pilot in charge of the pilots and put a maintainer in charge of the maintainers.
It did NOT double the number of personnel. It did add some additional admin bodies (though the Air Force has since “fixed” this problem). But what it did do was give more command opportunites to non-flyers. Its hard to argue that this was a bad idea.
The problem, if you are a flyer, is that maintenance rates appear to have dropped off significantly after this occurred with the excuse being that now you didn’t have a flyer, who was concerned with operational rates and winning wars (as if the maintenance officers didn’t care about this), in charge of the wrench turners. Personally, I like to see a guy who actually understands what the troops do for a living in charge of them. Pilots in charge of pilots, maintainers in charge of maintainers.
But that’s just my opinion and I could be wrong about the efficiency of that effort.
Charlie and Gents,
This fight is far older than the introduction of UAS into theater – call it Billy Mitchell’s Revenge. General Merrill McPeak (“Leave the Flying to Us”) and General John J. Jumper promulgated and enforced an Air Force-centric view of warfare. The Army was forced to rely on the USAF’s intelligence analytical cells and collection systems during the final years of the Clinton administration. The USAF’s Counterland doctrine required pilots to ignore qualified green-suiters who could do the job of the ETACs. This was also seen in the requirement to get combat controllers attached to Army Special Forces’ A-teams in Afghanistan. This all changed in OIF in 2003. The USAF became the second biggest killer of American soldiers and marines on the battlefield – so bad that Rumsfeld had to take official notice.
Under Rummie’s Rules, the Air Force had to accede to Joint Controllers. In my experience, only one soldier (a major) did the job of an ETAC – but he was required to lie and call himself a tech sergeant before the pilot in command would listen. The Joint Controller concept has been around for many years prior, but could only go ahead when the incidents of fratricide soared.
ISR is done differently by all the services. A common picture is possible and is done every single day. We have poured hundreds of millions into the solutions and there is no single solution because the problems are technological and man-power. The systems must be able to handle terabytes of data. An mpeg from Predator is nice, but it’s rather like strawberry shortcake – lots of air and sweetness but nothing on which to sustain a determined ground operation.
Intel analysts have to go through terabytes of data from the whole family of Ints to contend with. And where do these analysts and techs come from? The Army downsized it’s intelligence analyst force to almost zero: key MOS disappeared or had their training changed based on the Army’s forced-reliance on the USAF. So that means lots of contractors and govvies fill the void.
So: Our Air Force is doing it’s usual song and dance:
1. Hunting down more money for it’s own baronies through the lamest of disingenuous maneuver: an alleged lack of a common picture.
2. Taking operational and tactical necessities away from the soldiers in order to protect aerial prerogatives and perks.
Every time I have to work with the USAF I wonder just who’s side our Air Force is on? It may not on Bin Laden’s and Mullah Omar’s side, but it sure isn’t on the side of our Army and Marine Corps and Navy either.
No, that’s simply not correct. The Air Force does not want to control tactical UAV’s.
And I think you need to be cognizant of differences in the meaning of “control.” There’s a difference between which service buys, maintains, mans and operates assets and how assets are “controlled” in joint doctrine. For example, there are Air Force helicopter units that are currently controlled by the land component commander while others are controlled by the CFACC. Naval aviation is “controlled” by the CFACC. Those Air Force guys on convoy duty aren’t taking order from the CFACC either. Regardless, the fact is that both the land component and air component commanders both work for the JOINT force commander which has been the essence of joint doctrine since 1943 – even when the USAF did not yet exist.
BK makes an outstanding point about procedural vs positive control, I hadn’t thought about that one. USMC UAVs are already integrated into the Marine Air Command and Control System, so it isn’t an issue for us. I will point out an error on your part – I have watched ROVER feeds off of USMC owned and operated UAVs on numerous occasions.
I think BK makes some excellent points about standardizing UAS operations across the services. There are a staggering number of ISR platform types flying over there, manned and un-manned, and it is pretty difficult to keep up with all of the various platforms and their capabilities. Also, the request and tasking process for ISR assets is nowhere near as smooth as for CAS assets. I was frustrated more than once when I received last minute notification that I would be receiving ISR support for several hours. When you have your PCC/PCI and rest plan all figured out for a multi-day op and then learn that you now have to stay up 4-6 more hours talking to an asset you didn’t request, it’s sort of irritating.
IMO, let the AF keep the strategic UAS assets that operate above the coordinating altitude. The Navy and Marine Corps have some unique requirements that might require our own strategic UAS, but both services also have the necessary organizations to provide positive control for those platforms. The AF should be the lead agency on procurement and doctrine. Let the Army and Marine Corps continue to operate tactical level UAS, which only require procedural control and do not require the same detailed analysis as strategic assets.
Slab,
Sorry if I misspoke, my point wasn’t that Army/USMC UAVs couldn’t be seen on ROVER (both can be) but that USAF feeds can be seen on ROVER and then also fed back to our exploitation centers. The USMC/Army UAVs can be seen on ROVER as well but cannot be fed back to the exploitation center (unless the SIPR feed is up and they get permission to access that IP, something the 6 was usually against for outside agencies).
The AFFOR A2 last year directed “make ISR like CAS.” And a CONOPS was actually developed to leverage a number of the processes used in the CAS process in order to better task ISR. This included a JARN type of procedure in which anyone requiring ISR could request it through a chat room wherein the collection managers above them could approve the request or could offer up an alternative asset. The CONOPS got staffed through Air Force channels pretty quickly but the Corps CM shot it down. (The reasons were varied, and I agree with many of them, but it was still frustrating to hear, “The Air Force isn’t being responsive enough” but then have the Corps refuse to implement a procedure that would have made it more responsive.)
By the way, when I say Corps here, I am referring to the Army III Corps, not the USMC.
Cheers.
DaveO,
I believe there may be some misconceptions (very common ones) in your post about USAF views on CAS.
The MNF/C-I requirement is for us to be able to have aircraft over a Troops-in-Contact situation in a given amount of time. The Air Force has scheduled aircraft and established orbits that allow us to meet that requirement anywhere in Iraq. If you want us there sooner, put it in the guidance and we will adjust as necessary. There is a problem with the air tasking process that involves both the Air Force AND the Corps, but its outside the scope of this discussion for now.
CAS is a difficult and highly dangerous mission. From 20,000 feet, or even as low as 10,000 feet, you can NOT tell the difference between friendly and enemy ground forces with the Mark 1 eyeball. Targeting pods have made this much better and additional technologies such as Blue Force Tracker and Situational Awareness Data-Link, help but they don’t solve the problem. The actual solution to this problem is correct processes.
In the history of CAS there are many, many unfortunate incidents of fratricide. In the vast majority of these cases, the problem was not that the pilot couldn’t tell friend from foe (as noted above, he can’t), but that the process was not adhered to and somebody inadvertently called in fires on their own position. So it takes specialized training and PRACTICE to make sure that these things don’t happen under the stresses of combat.
For this reason, we have JOINT terminal attack controllers. The JTAC is a graduate of the JOINT Firepower Control Course (or its equivalent). The Marine and Navy ANGLICOs count. The British/Aussie/Canadian/Dutch/German/and hell even the ROK JTACs all count. Nobody says that Air Force jets will ONLY drop for Air Force JTACs. What the JOINT publication 3-09.3 does say is that you will have a certified JTAC controlling close air support. The Army has chosen not to send its troops through the JFCC, instead, demanding that the Air Force put Air Liaison Officers and JTACs into their units to help not only with the control of CAS but also with the planning of integrated air-land battle. And the Air Force said, “okay.” But nobody said, “I’m not going to drop bombs for some Army dude.”
Additionally, if you read JP 3-09.3, you will find guidance in there for “CAS without a JTAC.” We used to call this “emergency CAS” but we realized that just because you didn’t have a JTAC with you didn’t necessarily mean it was an emergency and we didn’t want to get caught up in semantic discussions about what did constitute an “emergency.” (Was it friendly casualties? Proximity to the enemy? Force ratios?) Instead, we just say, “hey, you gotta JTAC? Nope? Okay, lets go with the established procedures then for CAS without a JTAC.” And that’s a process that every one of our CAS pilots actually trains to for just those situations. If you need air support, you will get air support. We don’t care what uniform you are wearing. But there a procedures in place to save people from their own ignorance.
With regards to who supports what, yes, Attack Aviation provides support to ground maneuvers. But you have to understand the limits of their platform. Attack Aviation can not take a beating but more importantly, they are limited in the weapons they carry. Admittedly, they are more responsive in the right situations with the right targets. CAS is a hammer which is not always appropriate for killing the fly, but it has its place as well. One of my favorite incidents was the pursuit of five insurgents into a building. The Army engaged it with a TOW, a Javelin, and then Attack Aviation hit it with two Hellfires and a couple hundred rounds of 30 mike-mike. Then we watched the five insurgents run out the back of the building, across the street, and into another house. Finally, the JTAC was able to convince the commander (a difficult task for a Senior Airmen talking to a light colonel) that the jets overhead could engage with the new “low collateral damage” bomb. Once the commander gave the thumbs up, one bomb was dropped on the house. Half the house collapsed but none of the surrounding structures were damaged. And all five insurgents were found dead inside. Not always the right tool, but when it is, we are effective. I can’t tell you how many times I’ve seen Army commanders ask for Attack Aviation to “level that building.” No offense, but you can’t do it. You can put lots of holes in it, but if you want it leveled, you want a bomb and that means CAS. Lastly, and most importantly, its the Army guy (or the Marine) who decides if the Air Force can employ, not the Air Force. Its the Army commander who is afraid of collateral damage (because he’s the one who’ll have to pay the reparations and apologize) not the pilot. We do what we’re told to do and any limits you see on airpower are *almost* always the restrictions applied to us by the land owning commander.
But otherwise, you are correct. When I was in MND-B, I spent my days egging the CG’s HMMWV and pulling the plugs to the CHOPS computers. I would stealing cigarettes from the Sergeants Major and I figured out ingenious ways to crash Shadow UAVs. But hey, that’s what the Air Force paid me for, right?
So when Secretary Gates says, “put 50 more airframes into theater to support the Army” what the Air Force hears is “put 50 more airframes in Iraq and find 5,000 more analysts to exploit the data.” As you can imagine, it ain’t easy finding, let alone training, 5,000 analysts out of thin air.
It might help if the intel specialists that they do have were used properly. A friend of mine is an Air Force Reserve major and intel specialist. He’s currently in Iraq working on truck convoys instead of his career specialty. This isn’t to say that truck convoys are unimportant – it’s a very important and dangerous job. It just seems like a misuse of personnel for an intel officer to be doing the job.
BK,
My misconceptions come from my weekly contact with our Air Force over issues of targeting, C4ISR, bandwidth, the intel processes and such. There is no problem that exists that our Air Force doesn’t have a new-fangled, previously-cancelled piece of hardware it presents as a solution.
On the warrior-side the Air Force has wonderful people. On the systems-engineering side the govvies and contractors are very patriotic. But when it comes to money from Congress… no Jekyll could claim this Hyde.
But rest easy, the Army still has General Casey.
sweet page, great discussion. having some varied joint background, and now in a unit solving joint issues- BK is the man. for all the vets here who generalize and who’s world stopped when they retired – get up on the news! adversarial roles propogated to service members by bitter codgers do not improve or faciliate where all services are going. the “lifers” like me see the vast changes, and like where it’s going. I don’t have to list any credentials here when the unfortunate civilian survives a proximity attack where the insurgent is killed, but the villager lives. Or when the person on the ground looks up and doesn’t care what service flag is on the side- they just know protection is in place. airspace control means lives protected – and is not akin to the effect of issuing traffic tickets. read, read, read, and leave the TV off for a while.
sweet page, great discussion. having some varied joint background, and now in a unit solving joint issues- BK is the man. for all the vets here who generalize and who’s world stopped when they retired – get up on the news! adversarial roles propogated to service members by bitter codgers do not improve or faciliate where all services are going. the “lifers” like me see the vast changes, and like where it’s going. I don’t have to list any credentials here when the unfortunate civilian survives a proximity attack where the insurgent is killed, but the villager lives. Or when the person on the ground looks up and doesn’t care what service flag is on the side- they just know protection is in place. airspace control means lives protected – and is not akin to the effect of issuing traffic tickets. read, read, read, and leave the TV off for a while.
The thing is the army with it’s Hunter UAV (MQ-5) has logged more sorties if OIF than the AF has with predator. In response to “the army just flies over an area and if it sees something on the feed then great” remark; you ever hear of scouting?
When we need intel we need intel and with the AF denying requests more than half the time the Army getting their own (even if it ticks off the AF that we don’t use pilots to fly them) is better of for everyone on our team.
Operationally Responsive Space Ors
The “Training and Tactical Operationally Responsive Space (ORS)