Events like these have become commonplace as neither American nor Iraqi Security Forces have been patrolling the streets of Sadr City. Even though Muqtada al Sadr has declared a cease-fire, the Sadr City District has been a very dangerous place for Coalition forces. The lower-class neighborhoods of eastern Baghdad (Sadr City) continue to remain an Al Sadr stronghold. So much so, that the area has been cordoned and Iraqi and Coalition forces do not venture into the majority of the eastern Baghdad slums. The area is laced with IEDs and armed criminal elements that will stand and fight, if confronted. So, the majority of the Coalition’s security is facing inward and the city streets are patrolled from the sky. Contrary to some reports, Sadr City is not under siege. There are control points to stem the influx of illegal weapons, but people are free to come and go as they please.

Rest assured, Sadr City is under constant surveillance. High above the attacking Apache, an Unmanned Arial Vehicle (UAV) circled the district. Air Force controllers watched the Apache attack and the enemy speed away in their streaming video broadcast from the drone. They stalked the vehicle as it sped through the streets like a hawk circling its prey. When the thugs finally stopped in an empty field, another Hellfire screamed out of the evening sky. This time both criminals were killed and the vehicle and mortar were destroyed.

There may not be a cop on every corner in Sadr City, but the ISF and American Forces can see what is going on and they can swiftly react to acts of aggression. For some time now, there has been a tense stalemate in Sadr City. Al Sadr’s radical followers continue to conduct violent acts in the form of mortar and rocket attacks, IED attacks on Coalition and Iraqi Security forces, and outright skirmishes with the authorities. More often than not, the fighters are rounded up or killed, but they continue to harass the establishment.

All the while, the vast majority of the civilian population is trying to live a peaceful life amid this small groups’ struggle for power and influence. Security is slowly returning to the other districts of Baghdad and as the streets become safer, overall life is improving for the every-day Iraqi. The streets are being cleaned up, markets, parks and schools are open and there is a glimmer of hope for the future. Bread winners are returning to work and children are returning to school.

But Muqtada and his followers do not want the people of Sadr City to gain hope for their future. Their power comes from the downtrodden, from the poor, from the disadvantaged. They want to have continued chaos in Sadr City, Baghdad and Iraq. Stability is their enemy. So, Sadr’s supporters roam the streets in armed gangs, lob mortar rounds at American facilities, plant IEDs and rocket the International Zone. Recently, after British troops withdrew from the streets of Basra, Sadrist thugs took over Iraq’s second largest city.

Last month, the Iraqi government moved to restore law and order in Basra. Until then, Muqtada al Sadr and his radical followers enjoyed a shaky stalemate with the Coalition forces and the government in Baghdad. Al Sadr, who has been hiding in Iran, has issued a fatwa declaring a cease-fire with the Multi-National Forces in Iraq. He has been literally sitting on the sidelines, waiting for American forces to go home. But, his Mahdi army has seized every opportunity to make trouble. Some – many – of Muqtada Al Sadr’s followers have violated the cease-fire and have quickly been killed or captured.

When the ISF moved to retake Basra, Sadrist thugs throughout the country counterattacked from Basra to Nasiriyah to Sadr City. Last week, Iranian-made 107mm rockets were hurled across the Tigris River into the International Zone from the most southern reaches of Sadr City. Iraqi Security Forces quickly moved into that area with coalition support. They have built a temporary barrier that separates the southern edge of the district from the rest of Sadr City. The rocket teams that have not been killed have been forced out of effective range to be able to hit the International Zone. While the ISF are in the lead, there is a considerable Coalition force supporting the Iraqis, particularly in the air.

With support of the Coalition, Iraqi Security Forces have had great success in neutralizing, killing and destroying the mortar and rocket teams who were firing from within Sadr City. “We have taken out literally dozens of those teams” Rear Admiral Greg Smith, Director of Communications for the Multi-National Force – Iraq, added that some of these criminals were, “in the process of setting up to fire.” These criminals were lobbing rockets across the Tigris River, attempting to hit government and Coalition targets in the International Zone. Most of the rockets fell short, killing and injuring innocent Iraqi civilians.

The burned out vehicles we are seeing in the streets on the nightly news belong to rocket and mortar teams, victims of precision weapons launched from Unmanned Arial Vehicles (UAVs) or Apache helicopters. The enemy cannot escape the watchful eyes of coalition forces. “What you have is a very persistent coverage from the air by US forces.” Smith went on to say, “We spot ‘em, we track ‘em and we kill ‘em.”

Still, the levels of violence today are higher than they were before Easter Sunday. There was a serious peak of violence after the Iraqi government moved to take back the streets of Basra. The number of incidents has recently decreased, but is still elevated in nearly every category.

What is Next?

The next few weeks will be crucial to bringing the citizens of Sadr City into the fold. Today, Muqtada al Sadr has a significant following within the slums of the city named after his martyred father. But, his influence is waning. Extremists want him dead and moderates are considering reconciliation. The Iraq government will be pumping $150,000,000 into the southern extremities of Sadr City. The money will be used to revitalize the areas that are under government control. If the moderates see that the government is making an effort to help the people of Sadr City, they may be inclined to denounce the violent elements that control their neighborhoods.

Even then, the future of the citizens of Eastern Baghdad, and most of southern Iraq, rests in the hands of Muqtada al Sadr and the violent factions within his following. If the government of Iraq can provide some political accommodations to the Sadrists, if Al Sadr can be convinced that he can maintain his power base peacefully, if the extreme shi’a can reconcile with the moderate shi’a, there might be a chance of a peaceful outcome in Sadr City.

Let us all hope that sane minds prevail because if they don’t, a military operation will be needed to clear Sadr City, ala Najaf, Fallujah and Basra. Muqtada Al Sadr needs to realize that we can do this the easy way or the hard way, but the Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces will not be deterred from bringing peace and stability to all the people of Iraq, including those in Sadr City.

Richard S. Lowry is the author of Marines in the Garden of Eden and The Gulf War Chronicles.

In 2003, the battalion moved into central Iraq to conduct what is known as Security and Stability Operations (SASO), following the charge to Baghdad. Malay became the military governor of Diwaniyah and the province was relatively quiet, but it wasn’t unusual to see the local civilians firing weapons into the sky during weddings and other celebrations. The gunfire was sparse and usually concentrated to a single point in the city.

When the people in this primarily Shia city learned of the death of Uday and Qusay Hussein, the celebrations started immediately. A trickle of shooting into the air quickly picked up to a volume of fire that Malay had not seen before or since. “If an airplane had flown over the city, it would have been shot to pieces.” One Marine was hit by a falling bullet, scores of people were injured in the city and some were killed by rounds coming back down to earth. As Malay watched the massive demonstration of celebratory gunfire emanating from Diwaniyah, he thought to himself that if that amount of fire were ever directed in anger at his Marines, the enemy would have shot the walls down and the Marines would have had everything they could do to get out of there alive. That was a mind-boggling thought, considering the amount of combat power available within a Marine infantry battalion. That night he thought to himself, “We have not seen the end of this yet.”

Haunted by the images of Diwaniyah, Patrick Malay had intently followed the rise in violence in Iraq. In early 2004, when he learned that his Marines would return to Iraq, he had a feeling in his gut that this next deployment was going to get ugly. He immediately began to prepare for another fight. The Darkhorse Marines trained from before dawn until after dark. Malay wanted to prepare his Marines as thoroughly as possible for what he knew would be a difficult deployment. First, they concentrated on the basics – assault, security and support. Malay believed in Ron Christmas’ mantra that attention to detail would save lives in urban fighting.

He stripped his infantry of their supporting arms. They trained without machine guns or rockets. Squad leaders prepared their Marines to fight as if they would be the only ones on the battlefield. They trained to fight as an independent team—no Marine ever making an uncovered move or operating alone. The Marines worked day and night to hone their basic infantry skills. Colonel Malay knew that the coming fight would be placed squarely on the shoulders of his infantry squads, so he initiated a qualification process for each of his squad leaders. He trained them, tested them and hand picked them. No one would lead a squad without first having proven his abilities to his peers and to Colonel Malay. Final approval only came after a personal interview.

When it came time to conduct their MOUT training, the Marine Corps’ training centers were strained to capacity. The Darkhorse Marines could not find a facility to conduct their urban warfare training. So, Pat Malay turned to Stu Segall Productions, San Diego’s only full-service TV and movie studio.

Pat Malay heard about this TV studio-turned-training-ground through some of his Marines. Malay met with Segall and soon his Marines were attending training exercises on Stu’s Mean Arab Street. Shockingly, Stu’s actors started out beating Malay’s Marines in the faux urban fights. A handful of actors and truck drivers repeatedly won the firefights. The shock of Stu’s actors defeating Malay’s Marines could have caused a lesser leader to discontinue the exercises, but it only made Malay, and his staff, stand up and take note. The Darkhorse Marines could learn much in this environment. So, Colonel Malay expanded the training at the studio. Soon, everyone in the battalion was included.

Stu broke out his make-up artists and amputee-actors. He found Iraqi immigrants who lived in the San Diego area and together they created Hyper-Realistic environments where the Marines had to deal with distressed civilians, gruesome casualties and enemy fighters, all at once. Some of the Marines did not do well under the pressure of the exercises, others excelled. Assignments were adjusted, Marines who excelled, Like Corporal Terrence vanDoorn, were given additional responsibilities and those who didn’t get it were moved to where they were better suited.

Soon, the Darkhorse Marines were running scenarios and winning. Squads and fire teams were moving through the urban environment on muscle memory. They were dealing with insurgent fighters, civilians and casualties in a professional manner. They could adjust to situational changes with little or no conversation. The squads and fire teams worked in concert with only a nod or hand gesture commanding a change in focus. Stu Segall’s facility provided the venue to hone Malay’s Marines into an urban fighting unit. The training psychologically prepared them for what they were going to see. Malay credits this training for saving uncountable Marine lives.

Having prepared as best they could, the Marines on 3/5 returned to Iraq in September. Lead elements began arriving in Camp Fallujah on the 10th of September but most of the Marines left San Diego on September 11th. The entire battalion was in place by the 14th and they quickly started relieving Greg Olson’s 2/1 Marines, veterans of the first Fallujah fight. It was ‘game on’ from day-one for the Dark Horse Marines. They immediately assumed responsibility for TCP-1 and twenty-two miles of MSR MOBILE as they began detailed planning for their participation in the fight to free Fallujah.

Colonel Malay recently reflected on his planning philosophy,

"You got to plan and then you create an order. You tell the men what to do, not how to do it. You push that stewardship and empowerment – that decision-making – down to the lowest level and give them their boundaries, give them an end state and then turn them loose. They will usually do stuff much, much better than you would have ever envisioned."

Colonel Malay and his Marines’ participation in the fight in Fallujah was essential to the success in clearing the city. Soon, I will post Part II of this discussion on the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines. The entire story will be in “New Dawn.”

Richard S. Lowry is the author of Marines in the Garden of Eden and The Gulf War Chronicles.

Last September, I said that the cumulative trajectory of political, economic and diplomatic developments in Iraq was upwards, although the slope of that line was not steep. Developments over the last seven months have strengthened my sense of a positive trend. Immense challenges remain and progress is uneven and often frustratingly slow; but there is progress. Sustaining that progress will require continuing U.S. resolve and commitment. What has been achieved is substantial, but it is also reversible. Five years ago, the statue of Saddam Hussein was toppled in Baghdad. The euphoria of that moment evaporated long ago. But as Iraq emerges from the shattering violence of 2006 and the early part of 2007, there is reason to sustain that commitment and the enormous investments we have made both in the lives of our young brave men and women and our resources. Let me describe the developments upon which I base such a judgment.
Reconciliation: National and Provincial Politics
The first is at the national level in the form of legislation and the development of Iraq’s parliament. In September, we were disappointed that Iraq had not yet enacted some key pieces of legislation. In the last several months, however, Iraq’s parliament has formulated, debated vigorously, and in many cases passed legislation dealing with vital issues of reconciliation and nation building. A pension law extended benefits to individuals who had previously been denied them because of their service under the former regime. The Accountability and Justice Law (de-Ba'athification reform), passed after lengthy and often contentious debate, reflects a strengthened spirit of reconciliation, as does a far-reaching Amnesty Law.
The Provincial Powers Law is a major step forward in defining the relationship between the federal and provincial governments. Passage of this legislation required debate about the fundamental nature of the state, similar in its complexity to our own lengthy and difficult debate over states' rights. The Provincial Powers Law also called for provincial elections by October 1, 2008, and an Electoral Law is now under discussion that will set the parameters for elections. All major parties have announced their support for these elections, which will be a major step forward in Iraq's political development and will set the stage for national elections in late 2009.
In January, a vote by the Council of Representatives to change the design of the Iraqi flag means the flag now flies in all parts of the country for the first time in years. The passage of the 2008 budget, with record amounts for capital expenditures, insures that the federal and provincial governments will have the resources for public spending. All of this has been done since September. These laws are not perfect and much depends on their implementation, but they are important steps.

Also important has been the development of Iraq’s Council of Representatives (CoR) as a national institution. Last summer, the CoR suffered from persistent and often paralyzing disputes over leadership and procedure. Now, it is successfully grappling with complex issues and producing viable tradeoffs and compromise packages. As debates in Iraq’s parliament became more about how to resolve tough problems in a practical way, Iraqi politics have become more fluid. While politics still have a sectarian bent and basis, cross-sectarian coalitions have formed around issues, and sectarian political groupings which often were barriers to progress have become more flexible.
Let me also talk about the intangibles: attitudes among the population and the conversations that are occurring among Iraqi leaders. In 2006 and 2007, many people understandably questioned whether hatred between Iraqis of different sectarian backgrounds was so deep that a civil war was inevitable. The Sunni Awakening movement in al-Anbar, which so courageously confronted al-Qa’ida, continues to keep the peace in the area and keep al-Qa’ida out. Fallujah, once a symbol for violence and terror, is now one of Iraq’s safest cities. The Shi’a holy cities of an-Najaf and Karbala’ are enjoying security and growing prosperity in the wake of popular rejection of extremist militia activity. The Shi’a clerical leadership – the Marja’iyyah – based in an-Najaf – has played a quiet but important role in support of moderation and reconciliation. In Baghdad, we can see that Iraqis are not pitted against each other purely on the basis of sectarian affiliation. The security improvements of the past months have diminished the atmosphere of suspicion and allowed for acts of humanity that transcend sectarian identities.

When I arrived in Baghdad a year ago, my first visit to a city district was to the predominantly Sunni area of Dora. Surge forces were just moving into the neighborhoods still gripped by al-Qa’ida. Residents also were being terrorized by extremist Shi’a militias. Less than a year later, at the end of February, tens of thousands of Shi’a pilgrims walked through those streets on their way to Karbala’ to commemorate the martyrdom of Imam Hussein. Sunni residents offered food and water as they passed through, and some joined the pilgrimage.
News from Iraq in recent weeks has been dominated by the situation in Basrah. Taken as a snapshot, with scenes of increasing violence, and masked gunmen in the streets, it is hard to see how this situation supports a narrative of progress in Iraq. There is still very much to be done to bring full government control to the streets of Basrah and eliminate entrenched extremist, criminal, and militia groups.
When viewed with a broader lens, the Iraqi decision to combat these groups in Basrah has major significance. First, a Shi’a majority government, led by Prime Minister Maliki, has demonstrated its commitment to taking on criminals and extremists regardless of sectarian identity. Second, Iraqi Security Forces led these operations, in Basrah, and in towns and cities throughout the south. British and U.S. elements played important roles, but these were supporting roles, as they should be.
The operation in Basrah has also shaken up Iraqi politics. The Prime Minister returned to Baghdad from Basrah shortly before I left for Washington – and he is confident in his decision and determined to press the fight against illegal groups, but also determined to take a hard look at lessons learned. The efforts of the government against extremist militia elements have broad political support as a statement April 5 by virtually all of Iraq’s main political leaders – Sunni, Shi’a, and Kurd – made clear.
A wildcard remains the Sadrist Trend – and whether the Iraqis can continue to drive a wedge between other elements of the Trend and Iranian-supported Special Groups. A dangerous development in the immediate wake of the Basrah operation was what appeared to be a reunification between Special Groups and the mainline Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM). We also saw a potential collapse of the JAM “freeze” in military operations. As the situation unfolded however, Muqtada as-Sadr issued a statement that disavowed anyone possessing “heavy weapons” – which would include the signature weapons of the Special Groups. This statement can further sharpen the distinction between members of the Sadrist Trend, who should not pose a threat to the Iraqi state, and members of Special Groups, who very much do.
One conclusion I draw from these signs of progress is that the strategy that began with the Surge is working. This does not mean, however, that U.S. support should be open-ended or that the level and nature of our engagement should not diminish over time. It is in this context that we have begun negotiating a bilateral relationship between Iraq and the United States. In August, Iraq’s five principal leaders requested a long-term relationship with the United States, to include economic, political, diplomatic, and security cooperation. The heart of this relationship will be a legal framework for the presence of American troops similar to that which exists in nearly 80 countries around the world.
The Iraqis view the negotiation of this framework as a strong affirmation of Iraqi sovereignty – placing Iraq on par with other U.S. allies and removing the stigma of Chapter VII status under the U.N. Charter, pursuant to which Coalition forces presently operate. Such an agreement is in Iraq’s interest – and ours. U.S. forces will remain in Iraq beyond December 31, 2008, when the U.N. resolution presently governing their presence expires. Our troops will need basic authorizations and protections to continue operations – and this agreement will provide those authorizations and protections.
The agreement will not establish permanent bases in Iraq, and we anticipate that it will expressly foreswear them. The agreement will not specify troop levels, and it will not tie the hands of the next Administration. Our aim is to ensure that the next President arrives in office with a stable foundation upon which to base policy decisions, and that is precisely what this agreement will do. Congress will remain fully informed as these negotiations proceed in the coming weeks and months.
Mr. Chairman, significant challenges remain in Iraq. A reinvigorated cabinet is necessary both for political balance and to improve the delivery of services to Iraq’s people. Challenges to the rule of law, especially corruption, are enormous. Disputed internal boundaries – the Article 140 process – must be resolved. The return of refugees and the internally displaced must be managed. The rights of women and minorities must be better protected. Iraqis are aware of the challenges they face, and are working on them.
Iraq’s political progress will not be linear. Developments which are on the whole positive can still have unanticipated or destabilizing consequences. The decision to hold provincial elections – vital for Iraq’s democratic development and long-term stability – will also produce new strains. Some of the violence we have seen recently in southern Iraq reflects changing dynamics within the Shi’a community as the political and security context changes. Such inflection points underscore the fragility of the situation in Iraq, but it would be wrong to conclude that any eruption of violence marks the beginning of an inevitable backslide.
Economics and Capacity Building
In September, I reported to you that there had been some gains in Iraq’s economy and in the country’s efforts to build capacity to translate these gains into more effective governance and services. Iraqis have built on these gains over the past months, as is most evident in the revival of marketplaces across Iraq and the reopening of long-shuttered businesses. According to a Center for International Private Enterprise poll last month, 78 percent of Iraqi business owners surveyed expect the Iraqi economy to grow significantly in the next two years.

With the improving security and rising government expenditures, the IMF projects that Iraq’s GDP will grow 7 percent in real terms this year, and inflation has been tamed. The Iraqi Dinar remains strong and the Central Bank has begun to bring down interest rates.
Iraq’s 2008 budget has allocated $13 billion for reconstruction, and a $5 billion supplemental budget this summer will invest export revenues in building the infrastructure and providing the services that Iraq so badly needs. This spending also benefits the United States – Iraq recently announced its decision to purchase 40 commercial aircraft from the U.S at an estimated cost of $5 billion.
As Iraq is now earning the financial resources it needs for bricks and mortar construction through oil production and export, our primary focus has shifted to capacity development and an emphasis on local and post-kinetic development through our network of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and ministerial advisors. The era of U.S. funded major infrastructure projects is over. We are seeking to ensure that our assistance, in partnership with the Iraqis, leverages Iraq’s own resources. Our 25 PRTs throughout Iraq have been working to improve provincial and local governance capabilities, particularly in budget design and execution. They are also helping to establish critical linkages between provincial and federal governments. Our PRTs are great enablers, and we are working to insure their continued viability as our forces redeploy. The relatively small amounts they disburse through Quick Response Funds (QRF) have major impacts in local communities, and congressional support is important, as it is for other vital programs in the FY-08 Global War on Terror Supplemental request.

Iraq increasingly is using its own resources to support projects and programs that we have developed. It has committed nearly $200 million in support of a program to provide vocational training for concerned local citizens who stood up with us in the Awakening. Our technical assistance advisers have helped design new procurement procedures for Iraq’s Oil Ministry. We developed the technical specifications from which Iraq’s state-owned oil company will build new oil export platforms and underwater pipelines worth over a billion dollars. And in Baghdad, in the last three months the municipality has stepped up to take over labor contracts worth $100 million that we had been covering under the Community Stabilization Program.
Like so much else, Iraq’s economy is fragile, the gains reversible and the challenges ahead substantial. Iraq will need to continue to improve governmental capacity, pass national-level hydrocarbon legislation, improve electrical production and distribution, improve the climate for foreign and domestic investment, create short- and long-term jobs and tackle the structural and economic problems of the vital agricultural sector. We will be helping the Iraqis as they tackle this challenging agenda, along with other international partners including the United Nations and the World Bank.
Regional and International Dynamics
Along with the security surge last year, we also launched a diplomatic surge – focused on enhancing UN engagement in Iraq, anchoring the International Compact with Iraq, and establishing an expanded neighbors process, which serves as a contact group in support of Iraq.
The United Nations has taken advantages of an expanded mandate granted to the Untied Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) to increase the scope of its activities and the size of its staff. Under dynamic new leadership, UNAMI is playing a key role in preparing for provincial elections and in providing technical assistance to resolve disputed internal boundaries. UNHCR has returned international staff to Iraq to assist with the return of internally displaced persons and refugees. The International Compact with Iraq provides a five-year framework for Iraq to reform its economy and achieve economic self-sufficiency in exchange for long-overdue Saddam era debt relief. Preparations are underway for a ministerial level Compact meeting in Sweden next month; 74 nations were represented at last year's gathering in Egypt.
Iraq's neighbors also understand they have a major interest in Iraq's future. Turkey hosted the second ministerial meeting of Iraq's neighbors in November, and Kuwait will host the third meeting later this month. In addition to all of Iraq’s neighbors, these expanded neighbors conferences also include the Permanent Five members of the Security Council, the Arab League, and the G-8.
Support from Arab capitals has not been strong – and must improve, for the sake of Iraq and the sake of the region. Bahrain’s recent announcement that it will return an ambassador to Baghdad is welcome, and other Arab states should follow suit. Iraq is a multi-ethnic state, but it is also a founding member of the Arab League and an integral part of the Arab world. Last month, Iraq hosted a meeting of the Arab Parliamentary Union, bringing the leaders of Arab parliaments and consultative councils to Iraq for the first major inter-Arab gathering since 1990. It is noteworthy that the meeting was held in the Kurdish city of Irbil, under the recently redesigned Iraqi flag, highlighting both the remarkable prosperity and stability of Iraq’s Kurdish Region and the presence of the Iraqi federal state. We hope that this event will encourage more active Arab engagement with Iraq, and we expect that Prime Minister Maliki’s effort against Shi’a extremist militias in Basrah will receive Arab support.
The presence of the PKK terrorist organization in the remote mountains of Iraq along the Turkish border has produced tension between Turkey and Iraq, and led to a Turkish cross-border operation in February, including movement of Turkish ground forces into Iraq. At the same time, both governments are working to strengthen their ties, and Iraqi President Talabani made a successful visit to Turkey in March.
Syria plays an ambivalent role. We have seen evidence of efforts to interdict some foreign fighters seeking to transit Syria to Iraq, but others continue to cross the boarder. Syria also harbors individuals who finance and support the Iraqi insurgency.
Iran continues to undermine the efforts of the Iraqi government to establish a stable, secure state through the authority and training of criminal militia elements engaged in violence against Iraqi security forces, coalition forces and Iraqi civilians. The extent of Iran’s malign influence was dramatically demonstrated when militia elements armed and trained by Iran clashed with Iraqi government forces in Basrah and Baghdad. When the President announced the Surge, he pledged to seek out and destroy Iranian-supported lethal networks inside Iraq. We know more about these networks and their Quds Force sponsors than ever before – and we will continue to aggressively uproot and destroy them. At the same time, we support constructive relations between Iran and Iraq and are participating in a tripartite process to discuss the security situation in Iraq. Iran has a choice to make.
Looking Ahead
Mr. Chairman, almost everything about Iraq is difficult. It will continue to be difficult as Iraqis struggle with the damage and trauma inflicted by 35 years of totalitarian Ba'athist rule. But hard does not mean hopeless, and the political and economic process of the past few months is significant. I must underscore, however, that these gains are fragile, and they are reversible. Americans have invested a great deal in Iraq, in blood as well as treasure, and they have the right to ask whether this is worth it, whether it is now time to walk away and let the Iraqis fend for themselves. Iraq has the potential to develop into a stable, secure multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian democracy under the rule of law. Whether it realizes that potential is ultimately up to the Iraqi people. Our support, however, will continue to be critical. I said in September that I cannot guarantee success in Iraq. That is still the case, although I think we are now closer. I remain convinced that a major departure from our current engagement would bring failure, and we have to be clear with ourselves about what failure would mean.

Al-Qa’ida is in retreat in Iraq, but it is not yet defeated. Al-Qa’ida's leaders are looking for every opportunity they can to hang on. Osama bin Ladin has called Iraq "the perfect base," and it reminds us that a fundamental aim of Al-Qa’ida is to establish itself in the Arab world. It almost succeeded in Iraq; we cannot allow it a second chance.
And it is not only Al-Qa’ida that would benefit -- Iran has said publicly it will fill any vacuum in Iraq, and extremist Shi’a militias would reassert themselves. We saw them try in Basrah and Baghdad two weeks ago. And in all of this, the Iraqi people would suffer on a scale far beyond what we have already seen. Spiraling conflict could draw in neighbors with devastating consequences for the region and the world.
Mr. Chairman, as monumental as the events of the last five years have been in Iraq, Iraqis, Americans and the world ultimately will judge us far more on the basis of what will happen than what has happened. In the end, how we leave and what we leave behind will be more important than how we came. Our current course is hard, but it is working. Progress is real although still fragile. We need to stay with it.
In the months ahead, we will continue to assist Iraq as it pursues further steps toward reconciliation and economic development. Over time, this will become increasingly an Iraqi process, as it should be. Our efforts will focus on increasing Iraq's integration regionally and internationally; assisting Iraqi institutions locally and nationally to strengthen the political process and promote economic activity; and supporting United Nations’ efforts as Iraq carries out local elections toward the end of the year. These efforts will require an enhanced civilian commitment and continued support from the Congress and the American people.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, I want to recognize and thank all those who serve our country in Iraq, military and civilian. Their courage and commitment, at great sacrifice, has earned the admiration of all Americans. They certainly have mine, and it is an honor to be with them.

Since September, levels of violence and civilian deaths have been reduced substantially, Al Qaeda-Iraq and a number of other extremist elements have been dealt serious blows, the capabilities of Iraqi Security Force elements have grown, and there has been noteworthy involvement of local Iraqis in local security. Nonetheless, the situation in certain areas is still unsatisfactory and innumerable challenges remain. Moreover, as events in the past two weeks have reminded us and as I have repeatedly cautioned, the progress made since last spring is fragile and reversible. Still, security in Iraq is better than it was when Ambassador Crocker and I reported to you last September, and it is significantly better than it was 15 months ago when Iraq was on the brink of civil war and the decision was made to deploy additional US forces to Iraq.

A number of factors have contributed to the progress that has been made. First, of course, has been the impact of increased numbers of Coalition and Iraqi Forces. You are well aware of the U.S. surge. Less recognized is that Iraq has also conducted a surge, adding well over 100,000 additional soldiers and police to the ranks of its security forces in 2007 and slowly increasing its capability to deploy and employ these forces.

A second factor has been the employment of Coalition and Iraqi Forces in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations across the country, deployed together to safeguard the Iraqi people, to pursue Al Qaeda-Iraq, to combat criminals and militia extremists, to foster local reconciliation, and to enable political and economic progress.

Another important factor has been the attitudinal shift among certain elements of the Iraqi population. Since the first Sunni “Awakening” in late 2006, Sunni communities in Iraq increasingly have rejected AQI’s indiscriminate violence and extremist ideology. These communities also recognized that they could not share in Iraq’s bounty if they didn’t participate in the political arena. Over time, Awakenings have prompted tens of thousands of Iraqis—some, former insurgents—to contribute to local security as so-called “Sons of Iraq.” With their assistance and with relentless pursuit of Al Qaeda-Iraq, the threat posed by AQI—while still lethal and substantial—has been reduced significantly.

The recent flare-up in Basrah, southern Iraq, and Baghdad underscored the importance of the ceasefire declared by Moqtada al-Sadr last fall as another factor in the overall reduction in violence. Recently, of course, some militia elements became active again. Though a Sadr standdown order resolved the situation to a degree, the flare-up also highlighted the destructive role Iran has played in funding, training, arming, and directing the so-called Special Groups and generated renewed concern about Iran in the minds of many Iraqi leaders. Unchecked, the Special Groups pose the greatest long-term threat to the viability of a democratic Iraq.

As we look to the future, our task together with our Iraqi partners will be to build on the progress achieved and to deal with the many challenges that remain. I do believe that we can do this while continuing the ongoing drawdown of the surge forces.

The Nature of the Conflict

In September, I described the fundamental nature of the conflict in Iraq as a competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources. This competition continues, influenced heavily by outside actors, and its resolution remains the key to producing long-term stability in Iraq.

Various elements push Iraq’s ethno-sectarian competition toward violence. Terrorists, insurgents, militia extremists, and criminal gangs pose significant threats. Al Qaeda’s senior leaders, who still view Iraq as the central front in their global strategy, send funding, direction, and foreign fighters to Iraq. Actions by neighboring states compound Iraq’s challenges. Syria has taken some steps to reduce the flow of foreign fighters through its territory, but not enough to shut down the key network that supports AQI. And Iran has fueled the violence in a particularly damaging way, through its lethal support to the Special Groups. Finally, insufficient Iraqi governmental capacity, lingering sectarian mistrust, and corruption add to Iraq’s problems.

These challenges and recent weeks’ violence notwithstanding, Iraq’s ethno-sectarian competition in many areas is now taking place more through debate and less through violence. In fact, the recent escalation of violence in Baghdad and southern Iraq was dealt with temporarily, at least, by most parties acknowledging that the rational way ahead is political dialogue rather than street fighting.

Current Situation and Trends

As I stated at the outset, though Iraq obviously remains a violent country, we do see progress in the security arena.

As this chart [Slide 1] illustrates, for nearly six months, security incidents have been at a level not seen since early-to-mid-2005, though the level did spike in recent weeks as a result of the violence in Basrah and Baghdad. The level of incidents has, however, begun to turn down again, though the period ahead will be a sensitive one.

As our primary mission is to help protect the population, we closely monitor the number of Iraqi civilians killed due to violence. As this chart [Slide 2] reflects, civilian deaths have decreased over the past year to a level not seen since the February 2006 Samarra Mosque bombing that set off the cycle of sectarian violence that tore the very fabric of Iraqi society in 2006 and early 2007. This chart also reflects our increasing use of Iraqi-provided reports, with the top line reflecting Coalition and Iraqi data and the bottom line reflecting Coalition-confirmed data only. No matter which data is used, civilian deaths due to violence have been reduced significantly, though more work clearly needs to be done.

Ethno-sectarian violence is a particular concern in Iraq, as it is a cancer that continues to spread if left unchecked. As the box on the bottom left of this chart [Slide 3] shows, the number of deaths due to ethno-sectarian violence has fallen since we testified last September. A big factor has been the reduction of ethno-sectarian violence in Baghdad, density plots for which are shown 3 in the boxes depicting Iraq’s capital over time. Some of this decrease is, to be sure, due to sectarian hardening of certain Baghdad neighborhoods; however, that is only a partial explanation as countless sectarian fault lines and numerous mixed neighborhoods still exist in Baghdad and elsewhere. In fact, Coalition and Iraqi Forces have focused along the fault lines to reduce the violence and enable Sunni and Shia leaders to begin the long process of healing in their local communities.

As this next chart [Slide 4] shows, even though the number of high profile attacks increased in March as AQI lashed out, the current level of such attacks remains far below its height a year ago. Moreover, as we have helped improve security and focused on enemy networks, we have seen a decrease in the effectiveness of such attacks. The number of deaths due to ethno-sectarian violence, in particular, has remained relatively low, illustrating the enemy’s inability to date to re-ignite the cycle of ethno-sectarian violence.

The emergence of Iraqi volunteers helping to secure their local communities has been an important development. As this chart [Slide 5] depicts, there are now over 91,000 Sons of
Iraq—Shia as well as Sunni—under contract to help Coalition and Iraqi Forces protect their neighborhoods and secure infrastructure and roads. These volunteers have contributed significantly in various areas, and the savings in vehicles not lost because of reduced violence—not to mention the priceless lives saved—have far outweighed the cost of their monthly contracts.

Sons of Iraq have also contributed to the discovery of improvised explosive devices and weapons and explosives caches. As this next chart [Slide 6] shows, in fact, we have already found more caches in 2008 than we found in all of 2006. Given the importance of the Sons of Iraq, we are working closely with the Iraqi Government to transition them into the Iraqi Security Forces or other forms of employment, and over 21,000 have already been accepted into the Police or Army or other government jobs. This process has been slow, but it is taking place, and we will continue to monitor it carefully.

Al Qaeda also recognizes the significance of the Sons of Iraq, and AQI elements have targeted them repeatedly. However, these attacks—in addition to AQI’s use of women, children, and the handicapped as suicide bombers—have further alienated AQI from the Iraqi people. And the tenacious pursuit of AQI, together with AQI’s loss of local support in many areas, has substantially reduced its capability, numbers, and freedom of movement. This chart [Slide 7] displays the cumulative effect of the effort against AQI and its insurgent allies. As you can see, we have reduced considerably the areas in which AQI enjoys support and sanctuary, though there clearly is more to be done.

Having noted that progress, AQI is still capable of lethal attacks, and we must maintain relentless pressure on the organization, on the networks outside Iraq that support it, and on the resource flows that sustain it. This chart [Slide 8] lays out the comprehensive strategy that we, the Iraqis, and our interagency and international partners are employing to reduce what AQI needs. As you can see, defeating Al Qaeda in Iraq requires not just actions by our elite counter-terrorist forces, but also major operations by Coalition and Iraqi conventional forces, a sophisticated intelligence effort, political reconciliation, economic and social programs, information operations initiatives, diplomatic activity, the employment of counterinsurgency principles in detainee operations, and many other actions. Related to this effort, I applaud Congress’ support for additional intelligence, 4 surveillance, and reconnaissance assets in the upcoming Supplemental, as ISR is vital to the success of our operations in Iraq and elsewhere.

As we combat AQI, we must remember that doing so not only reduces a major source of instability in Iraq; it also weakens an organization that Al Qaeda’s senior leaders view as a tool to spread its influence and foment regional instability. Usama bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri have consistently advocated exploiting the situation in Iraq, and we have also seen AQI involved in destabilizing activities in the wider Mid-east region.

Together with the Iraqi Security Forces, we have also focused on the Special Groups. These elements are funded, trained, armed, and directed by Iran’s Qods Force, with help from Lebanese Hezbollah. It was these groups that launched Iranian rockets and mortar rounds at Iraq’s seat of government two weeks ago, causing loss of innocent life and fear in the capital, and requiring Iraqi and Coalition actions in response. Iraqi and Coalition leaders have repeatedly noted their desire that Iran live up to promises made by President Ahmedinajad and other senior Iranian leaders to stop their support for the Special Groups. However, nefarious activities by the Qods Force have continued, and Iraqi leaders now clearly recognize the threat they pose to Iraq. We should all watch Iranian actions closely in the weeks and months ahead, as they will show the kind of relationship Iran wishes to have with its neighbor and the character of future Iranian involvement in Iraq.

Iraqi Security Forces

The Iraqi Security Forces have continued to develop since September, and we have transferred responsibilities to Iraqi Forces as their capabilities and the conditions on the ground have permitted. Currently, as this chart [Slide 9] shows, half of Iraq’s 18 provinces are under provincial Iraqi control. Many of these provinces—not just the successful provinces in the Kurdish Regional Government area, but also a number of southern provinces—have done well. Challenges have emerged in some others, including, of course, Basrah. Nonetheless, this process will continue, and we expect Anbar and Qadisiyah Provinces to transition in the months ahead.

Iraqi Forces have grown significantly since September, and over 540,000 individuals now serve in the Iraqi Security Forces. The number of combat battalions capable of taking the lead in operations, albeit with some Coalition support, has grown to well over 100 [Slide 10]. These units are bearing an increasing share of the burden, as evidenced by the fact that Iraqi Security Force losses have recently been three times our own. We will, of course, conduct careful after action reviews with our Iraqi partners in the wake of recent operations, as there were units and leaders found wanting in some cases, and some of our assessments may be downgraded as a result. Nonetheless, the performance of many units was solid, especially once they got their footing and gained a degree of confidence, and certain Iraqi elements proved quite capable.

Underpinning the advances of the past year have been improvements in Iraq’s security institutions. An increasingly robust Iraqi-run training base enabled the Iraqi Security Forces to grow by over 133,000 soldiers and police over the past 16 months. And the still-expanding training base is expected to generate an additional 50,000 Iraqi soldiers and 16 Army and Special Operations battalions throughout the rest of 2008, along with over 23,000 police and 8 National Police battalions.

Additionally, Iraq's security ministries are steadily improving their ability to execute their budgets. As this chart [Slide 11] shows, in 2007, as in 2006, Iraq's security ministries spent more on their forces than the United States provided through the Iraqi Security Forces Fund (ISFF). We anticipate that Iraq will spend over $8 billion on security this year and $11 billion next year, and this projection enabled us recently to reduce significantly our Iraqi Security Forces Fund request for fiscal year 2009 from $5.1 billion to $2.8 billion.

While improved, Iraqi Security Forces are not yet ready to defend Iraq or maintain security throughout the country on their own. Recent operations in Basrah highlight improvements in the ability of the Iraqi Security Forces to deploy substantial numbers of units, supplies, and replacements on very short notice; they certainly could not have deployed a division’s worth of Army and Police units on such short notice a year ago. On the other hand, the recent operations also underscored the considerable work still to be done in the areas of logistics, force enablers, staff development, and command and control.

We also continue to help Iraq through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales program. As of March 2008, the Iraqi government has purchased over $2 billion worth of equipment and services of American origin through FMS. Since September, and with your encouragement of the organizations in the FMS process, delivery has improved as the FMS system has strived to support urgent wartime requirements. On a related note, I would ask that Congress consider restoring funding for the International Military Education and Training Program, which supports education for mid- and senior-level Iraqi military and civilian leaders and is an important component of the development of the leaders Iraq will need in the future.

Upcoming Challenges

While security has improved in many areas and the Iraqi Security Forces are shouldering more of the load, the situation in Iraq remains exceedingly complex and challenging. Iraq could face a resurgence of AQI or additional Shia groups could violate Moqtada al-Sadr’s cease-fire order and return to violence. External actors, like Iran, could stoke violence within Iraq, and actions by other neighbors could undermine the security situation as well.

Other challenges result, paradoxically, from improved security, which has provided opportunities for political and economic progress and improved services at the local, provincial, and national levels. But the improvements have also created expectations that progress will continue. In the coming months, Iraq’s leaders must strengthen governmental capacity, execute budgets, pass additional legislation, conduct provincial elections, carry out a census, determine the status of disputed territories, and resettle internally displaced persons and refugees. These tasks would challenge any government, much less a still developing government tested by war.

The Commander’s Emergency Response Program, the State Department’s Quick Response Fund, and USAID programs enable us to help Iraq deal with its challenges. To that end, I respectfully ask that you provide us by June the additional CERP funds requested in the Supplemental. These funds have an enormous impact. As I noted earlier, the salaries paid to the Sons of Iraq alone cost far less than the cost savings in vehicles not lost due to the enhanced security in local communities. Encouragingly, the Iraqi government recently allocated $300 million for us to manage as “Iraqi CERP” to perform projects for their people, while building their own capacity to do so. The Iraqi government has also committed $163 million to gradually assume Sons of Iraq contracts, $510 million for small business loans, and $196 million for a 6 Joint Training, Education, and Reintegration Program. The Iraqi government pledges to provide more as they execute the budget passed two months ago. Nonetheless, it is hugely important to have our resources continue, even as Iraqi funding begins to outstrip ours.

Recommendations

Last month I provided my chain of command recommendations for the way ahead in Iraq. During that process, I noted the objective of retaining and building on our hard-fought security gains while we draw down to the pre-surge level of 15 brigade combat teams. I emphasized the need to continue work with our Iraqi partners to secure the population and to transition responsibilities to the Iraqis as quickly as conditions permit, but without jeopardizing the security gains that have been made.

As in September, my recommendations are informed by operational and strategic considerations. The operational considerations include recognition that:
• the military surge has achieved progress, but that the progress is reversible;
• Iraqi Security Forces have strengthened their capabilities but still must grow further;
• the provincial elections in the fall, refugee returns, detainee releases, and efforts to resolve provincial boundary disputes and Article 140 issues will be very challenging;
• the transition of Sons of Iraq into the Iraqi Security Forces or other pursuits will require time and careful monitoring;
• withdrawing too many forces too quickly could jeopardize the progress of the past year; and
• performing the necessary tasks in Iraq will require sizable conventional forces as well as special operations forces and advisor teams.

The strategic considerations include recognition that:
• the strain on the US military, especially on its ground forces, has been considerable;
• a number of the security challenges inside Iraq are also related to significant regional and global threats; and
• a failed state in Iraq would pose serious consequences for the greater fight against Al
Qaeda, for regional stability, for the already existing humanitarian crisis in Iraq, and for the effort to counter malign Iranian influence.

After weighing these factors, I recommended to my chain of command that we continue the drawdown of the surge combat forces and that, upon the withdrawal of the last surge brigade combat team in July, we undertake a 45-day period of consolidation and evaluation. At the end of that period, we will commence a process of assessment to examine the conditions on the ground and, over time, determine when we can make recommendations for further reductions. This process will be continuous, with recommendations for further reductions made as conditions permit. This approach does not allow establishment of a set withdrawal timetable; however, it does provide the flexibility those of us on the ground need to preserve the still fragile security gains our troopers have fought so hard and sacrificed so much to achieve.

With this approach, the security achievements of 2007 and early 2008 can form a foundation for the gradual establishment of sustainable security in Iraq. This is not only important to the 27 million citizens of Iraq; it is also vitally important to those in the Gulf region, to the citizens of the United States, and to the global community. It clearly is in our national interest to help Iraq prevent the resurgence of Al Qaeda in the heart of the Arab world, to help Iraq resist Iranian encroachment on its sovereignty, to avoid renewed ethno-sectarian violence that could spill over Iraq’s borders and make the existing refugee crisis even worse, and to enable Iraq to expand its role in the regional and global economies.

Closing Comments

In closing, I want to comment briefly on those serving our Nation in Iraq. We have asked a great deal of them and of their families, and they have made enormous sacrifices. My keen personal awareness of the strain on them and on the force as a whole has been an important factor in my recommendations.

The Congress, the Executive Branch, and our fellow citizens have done an enormous amount to support our troopers and their loved ones, and all of us are grateful for that. Nothing means more to those in harm’s way than the knowledge that their country appreciates their sacrifices and those of their families.

Indeed, all Americans should take great pride in the men and women serving our Nation in Iraq and in the courage, determination, resilience, and initiative they demonstrate each and every day. It remains the greatest of honors to soldier with them.

Thank you very much.

Among the myriad challenges faced by the Iraqi people, foremost is that they have no historic reference for what they are experiencing – the choices and freedoms and potentialities with which they are experimenting all constitute uncharted waters. Any context for the present-day, painful political evolution in Iraq is purely academic and utterly foreign; the current civil/social engagement is unprecedented here.

For several months, many of us here have predicted that 2008 would be crucial for Iraq in two key areas: first, in logistical and infrastructural development (business generated to meet civil needs); secondly, in the one dominant unresolved sectarian issue - the peaceful participation of the Shia in the political process.

The Kurds in the north, having enjoyed 17+ years of autonomy and attendant economic prosperity, are happy to be left alone. Virtually no Americans have died there, and the community is readying itself for tourism and the world economy. Even the Turkish incursions are largely meaningless.(1)

The key to the future of northern Iraq and Kurdish participation in a Iraqi republic is the city of Kirkuk and who will profit from this economic engine.

The Sunnis, having witnessed the US commitment to preventing sectarian slaughter, are now trying to play catch-up from being left out of the political process through their own miscalculation. When I was in Al Anbar in 2005 (the heart of Sunni land), only 4,000 out of over 1 million potential voters participated. In practical terms, this meant the Sunnis tacitly agreed to stand by as The Occupiers and Shia got their just dessert - or so the Sunnis calculated. Bad call. They never imagined the alternative: two years of de facto Islamist, sharia rule that meant total societal repression and the beheadings of their children. The violence and disruption was so harsh that it spurred a "tipping point" reaction to the (95% foreign) Arab thugs, and Iraqi Sunni tribes were driven to create Al Sawah - The Awakening - to drive out heavy-handed Islamist occupiers.(2)

Of the 3 major population blocs, that left the downtrodden Shia, who were as surprised as anyone when the dominance of their numerical superiority (60+%) was confirmed in the elections of 2005.(3) Bottom rail was on top now...

Please hang with me while I give a short background to last week's initial skirmish:

I teach that being Shia is more than just being born into a religious sect, it is a condition - just as being black in 1955 Birmingham was more than just having a particular skin color. (4)

Shiism was born in Iraq, and its holiest shrines are there. Persia/Iran shares the belief system, but only became its primary champion because the Shia were left voiceless by repression throughout the Arab world. The Ottomans, British, monarchs, and dictators all favored the Sunnis, who are dominant in the rest of Arabia. Over time, this favoritism grew into dependence, as each successive ruling authority turned to the group with the individual and collective education to run the government and institutions. Naturally, Sunni self-interest became tied to the state...and that meant no room for considering Shiite quality of life. The Shia underclass found succor from sources outside the state; namely, religious leaders offering hope and charity. Two brothers named Sadr, both learned, highly-respected imams, answered the despair of their people. Their direct charitable intervention, for example, met the survival needs of the 2+ million Shia trapped in the Baghdad ghetto that became known as Sadr City in their honor. Both paid a price by being executed by Saddam. After the fall of Saddam, as all the competing factions sought leadership, the son/nephew of these great men (to everyone's surprise) arose. Moqtada al-Sadr had none of the gifts, experience, or education of his forbears, but he had the name. "Mookie", as the Marines derisively nicknamed him, has been riding a wave of populism and demagoguery ever since.
In 2003, his followers killed Majid al-Khoie, a moderate Shia cleric that many viewed as the best hope for leadership. Militia groups - primarily known as the Madhi Army - arose and rallied under al-Sadr's call, partly in self-defense, partly out of rage unleashed, but also in an opportunistic grab for self-enrichment. Suddenly, this unschooled, young benefactor of lineage had real power based on the unshackled despair of millions. Inexperienced at running amongst political heavyweights and unused to the high stakes of life-and-death power brokering, he has waffled along the way, squandering his opportunities...sometimes acting boldly, sometimes retreating from the scene to Iran.(5)

Back to the present:

His announcement last year to call a "truce" was, I think, a move of fear - the dirty secret was he couldn't really control the rage and competing interests of those using his name (6), and so chose to "save face" by making a grand gesture of "concern for his people". This was damage control to make the best of an untenable position, not a compassionate, selfless decision. Meanwhile, Iran, criminals, religious zealots, and local petite tyrants continued to recruit from and use his base of desperate people. Out of the sheer numbers of a resistant and restless population, the government in Baghdad became largely irrelevant in southern Iraq, while various opportunists grabbed their (first ever) chance for political power. One avenue to power was to infiltrate all levels of the Ministry of the Interior, which overseas the National Police and Border forces. This allowed all manner of parties to enrich and empower themselves at the national as well as local level. While the Ministry of Defense has made great strides towards becoming a non-sectarian servant of the Iraqi government and people, the Ministry of Interior (MoI) has grown more sectarian and more self-serving of its members and their allies.
All the while, other powerful Shia figures were (and are) still viable - especially Ayatollah al-Sistani (who has assumed a calming, relatively non-political role; in my opinion he deserves a Nobel Peace Prize)(7) and Aziz al-Hakim, also of distinguished lineage and leader of the ISCI political party.(8) Sadr announced earlier this year that he intends to attend seminary (The road to respected religious authority is loooong in Islam - 20 years or more - but it offers eventual, authentic credibility.)...and then last month he extended his "truce". Whatever.
But the imbalance of Shia control within the Interior Ministry has remained. Police fighting against the Iraqi Army is not unusual and control of revenue and power is openly contested. Corruption is rampant in the MoI. Accountability of the leadership has been minimal. And the lesser punks ran the southern provinces and mahallas (neighborhoods) as they wished. Finally - and I assure you, independent of US control(9) - the Iraqi government decided to bust its move to rein in the lawlessness of the south. I only hope that it is a precursor to cleaning out the central government in Baghdad (read MoI). Prime Minister Maliki, in the fashion of Iraqi bravado, flew down to oversee the fight...but many think he is only a spectator to the al-Hakim v Sadr showdown. My main question is: do the Shia need to experience their own Fallujah? The one of 2004 occurred in distant Anbar, and to the Sunnis...do the Shia need to witness for themselves what it is like when Hell comes for breakfast?

I can already hear the nattering commentators over the next two weeks preceding Gen Petraeus' report to Congress: "Nothing has changed!" "The surge has failed!" "This is just more of the same!" ...blah blah blah. Fact is, this is the next logical, necessary step - the elephant in the room, the showdown that has been aching to happen. At least all players are now having to show their hands. Sorta. But certainly more so than before.

For a historical context, please consider...

On the slow process of government building: Re-read the Federalist Papers, and look at the 8-year period between the passage of the Articles of Confederation and the ratification of the Constitution. We had plenty of confrontation, ugly strife, threatened secessions, and outright, armed group violence. Now we are witnessing the same labor pains, except within a perfect storm of societal dysfunction. Late 18th-century America was a raw, untamed land, but it had none of the centuries of resentment, survival only at other’s loss, and legacy of ineffectual and outright failed foreign meddling suffered in Mesopotamia. It is AMAZING that Iraq has come this far so soon.

I just want to cry warning before the storm of BS to which we are all about to be subjected. This is the crucial period, the one where we begin to solidify all for which we have worked and bled.

Geeez - I can't believe I wrote a letter with footnotes, for Pete's sake...

My best to all, and semper fidelis.
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(1) Turkey is the number one investor in Northern Iraq and badly wants to join the EU; it is not in their interest to disrupt Kurdish growth. They are just afraid of Kurds inside Turkey getting ideas. Careful reading of the news reflects mostly symbolic protests by the Kurdish Regional Gov't, since the separatist rebels (PKK) frustrate the Kurds themselves as obstacles to growth and tranquility.

(2) The Anbar-born "Awakening" movement is not to be confused with any other similarly-named groups elsewhere in Iraq!

(3) No reliable census has been taken in decades, so we don't really know the full demographic picture. Even the upcoming census will be a potentially violent fight, since it will influence power. It is estimated that the Iraqi population has grown from approx 16 million to 26 million since only 1992. This same data vacuum applies to petroleum resources - we only think we know how much oil there is, and where.

(4) The example is deliberately narrow. Besides, the demographics are such that southern Iraq more closely resembles apartheid South Africa. Festering resentment from long injustice belongs not to a minority, but to a significant majority, and they have plenty reason to desire a revenge that been due for six centuries or more.

(5) Iran's self-interest in Iraqi affairs is evident, but the REAL story is that Shias in Iraq who may enjoy personal political and economic self-determination is far more threatening to the Iranian ayatollahs than the converse. And never underestimate the Arabic antipathy for all things Persian, regardless of a shared religion.

(6) Very much like Arafat’s tenuous leadership of Hamas in the last years of his life.

(7) Sistani holds all the credible authority Sadr covets – one word from the ayatollah would open floodgates of sectarian violence that would rival that seen in Rwanda…and the potential for catastrophe would be even greater than that undeniable African horror, since it could easily engulf the millions of the entire Middle East, and beyond.

(8) The Hakim v Sadr face-off also carries tones of class conflict, as Hakim’s followers are generally more educated and middle class. It will be interesting to see if this alternative to the underclass gains influence.

(9) This concisely illustrates the U.S. quandary: isn’t Iraqi self-determination what we espouse and hope to encourage, despite our fears of its wisdom?

Thank you Major High for this candid update. We hope to hear from you again soon.

Richard S. Lowry is the author of Marines in the Garden of Eden and The Gulf War Chronicles.