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I Comment on John’s Commenters

By Charlie

That’s right. Do something about it, Weekly Standard! That’s what I thought…


Hi John-
I'm one of those a$$hole battalion commanders mentioned in "The Army's Other Crisis."
Speaking only for myself, from talking to my guys - National Guard cav troopers - it's pretty clear that the main retention issues are that people either are tired of being away from their families and civilian lives or simply want to move on to something else. Being in the Army is, well, hard - it was hard when I was active and it's hard now (Remember the "one weekend a month, two weeks a year" National Guard? None of my guys with under six years does!).
…I'm less convinced that this is a case of a generation of agile, thinkers being repressed by a generation of mindless, nitpicking fossils. As a 20-year LTC, I guess I'm right between those two alleged factions. I don't see it - at least anymore. I mean, when I was a lieutenant, I was certain that only I had the vision, that only I really cared about Soldiers, that my superiors were stodgy, hidebound desk jockies who didn't know anything about the real world. The same was true when I was a captain. About the time I made major, I started to see that perhaps my bosses had concerns that extended a bit farther than the little platoons I led or the companies I commanded.

Sir, I’m with you. Having been through a deployment abroad, I think that officers at the battalion level and below “get it.” Obviously, as officers grow and mature from platoon leaders to company commanders to battalion operations officers to XOs to commanders, they grow and become concerned with things that extend a little farther than the “little platoons and companies.” However, it is also pertinent to note that most O5s and above have not seen counterinsurgency warfare as a company grade officer, and this is especially true in the Reserve Component. This isn’t a knock on colonels, I know a lot of them, but it is a perception among younger officers that must be dealt with –accurate or not. The bottom line for us reservists is that we have to make the best of the situation that we’ve been dealt –imperfect troops, leaders, training –and pair it with our inherent Reserve Component strengths- occupational diversity, civilian skills, creativity, and flexibility. The result of this strange brew has been uniform success in every mission that has been assigned to the Reserve Component, from missions in combat zones to peacekeeping, to support to Noble Eagle and Homeland Security.

The good LTC continues:

That isn't to say there aren't careerist jerks who would shaft their subordinates to get ahead. There are, and they make good people go just like inspirational leaders make people stay. It's just I don't think that's the rule rather than the exception.

Oh, and as for the young officer who was complaining about being chewed out after a patrol for not having his men in their safety glasses - maybe if he did his job and had his guys in their protective gear his battalion commander wouldn't have to. Part of this job is sometimes being a jerk - if you measure success by your popularity, maybe being an Army officer isn't for you. For my part, I'll be the a$$hole squadron commander whose guys can all still see.

Swift and deadly!

Man, I would serve under this officer in a heartbeat. Except that I’m not a huge fan of California’s climate/economic situation. I am sick of hearing about LTs complaining about obvious NCO-Level TTPs being enforced in line units (such as safety glasses and roll-over drills). Those things save lives. The things that can be debated as descent into administrative CYA TTPs, such as reflective safety belts on FOBs, still remain on my lists of reasons to leave the Army ASAP. The bottom line here is that many complaints from junior officers are lingering, and are contributing to the yet-unnoticed mass exodus of mid-level officers and NCOs from the force. These issues are not getting a proper hearing among Army brass, and while the immediate impact cannot be seen, it will soon appear when the Army suddenly finds itself without quality mid-level leadership.

So to conclude, I am with this squadron commander that wrote in to the Weekly Standard, there are no more “weekend warriors,” there are real warriors now. Because of the new threat environment we find ourselves in, there are numerous threats and adversaries that do not easily fit into the current doctrine and training we have received. Change is a part of every organization, but the way that organization manages the change speaks volumes about how the organization will perform in the future.

January 22, 2008 07:18 PM    Strategery

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Comments

hey it was YOUR roommate and YOUR wedding that I got the eye protection comment from!

John   ·  January 23, 2008 05:50 AM

"My lists of reasons to leave the Army ASAP." If you're serious, give me a call. I know an organization you'd probably prefer.

LtCol P   ·  January 23, 2008 06:44 AM

Well, understanding that this is a comment on a comment on a comment... Just thought I might chime in.

First a little background on me. Currently a MAJ in JAG, working on prosecuting war criminals. Two tours in Iraq, one in Afghanistan. Yes, I have been given the combat action badge, for what it is worth. I am also VMI class of '91.

And I think the LTC quoted above is EXACTLY the type of commander driving out young officers and I would stay as far away from him in combat as possible.

Starting with the comment that he, as a commander can talk to troops and actually get a honest response about why they are getting out. Does anyone actually think a troop is going to tell the man that is driving them out, but is going to write their outgoing OER, the truth? That function is actually supposed to be filled by the battalion sergeant major, who can then tell the commander.

Next, he is silly enough to think that he SHOULD be holding an LT accountable for his guys not wearing eye protection. Having participated in ACTUAL patrols as a member, commander, driver, section leader, gunner and cargo, the concept of holding one person accountable for everything is a peacetime fantasy that breaks down in combat. What do you think a patrol leader is going to do when the ride-along (cargo) LTC shows up for a patrol without eye protection? I would give them bonus points if they even notice. Realistically, the senior NCO in the patrol should notice, have some extras stowed and quietly give the LTC a pair with a comment about how good it looks for the rest of the team for him to be wearing them. But if that fails, and the patrol goes out and comes back with no one hurt and the mission otherwise successful, drive on.

An experienced battalion commander would understand that we are all human and can only handle X details at one time. Then when a patrol comes back with people out of uniform, he can talk to the battalion sergeant major, who will chew on the platoon sergeant. The platoon sergeant can then make sure the supplies are present and that the senior NCO of the patrol actually gets everyone in uniform.

See, the problem here is that the Battalion commander who thinks "concerns that extended a bit farther than the little platoons" is a reason to not use the myriad of resources and tools that "extended a bit farther than the little platoons" to solve problems, IS the problem.

What I am getting to is the assumption by the LTC that the problem is simple. His assumption is that the LT is lazy. Maybe the problem is the supply request for eye protection is sitting on the commander's desk. Maybe the problem is the LT is not being supported by the NCOs. Maybe the problem is the analysis by the guys on the ground that "eye protection" keeps them from seeing IED wires and is therefore more dangerous. Maybe the problem is that the eye protection does not fit around the earmuffs (this happened to me) and the choice is between eye protection and hearing protection, with the ability to hear the radio and communicate...

Regardless, the LTC is a problem. Stay away. Find someone who has matured beyond being a company commander, who sees a problem and figures out where the system is broken and fixes that. No one needs a commander who thinks all problems can be solved by yelling at LTs.

I actually thought this was interesting because the guy who was trying to say "this is not me" is actually proving that "this" is him...

JAG

JAG   ·  January 23, 2008 07:39 AM

Seeing that it's all VMI men in this comment thread....

I think the Institute breeds a certain mentality in their officers... the Clint Eastwood/Heartbreak Ridge mindset: improvise, adapt, overcome.

From what I've seen of the Marines, those guys have got it. In the Air Force, it's the opposite: let your checklist do your thinking for you.

Back at Air Force field training, I was the cadet flight commander. One day, a lecture extended past the allotted training block, so when we formed up outside for chow, trainers told me: "You have TWO minutes to get your flight to the mess hall." Okay, that's a 10 minute trip. So I gave them a quick right-face and moved them out double-time.

You'd have thought the world was coming to an end.

"Oh my God! You can't double time your flight while they're in their blues!" Fine.

So I took an "unauthorized" route. Again, the trainers exploded.

I told these idiots (they were ROTC cadets who wore their uniforms twice a week and had just finished their junior year) that if you give someone an impossible task, expect the unexpected.

For that, I had to visit the Director of Operations, a major.

Air Power.

John   ·  January 23, 2008 08:21 AM

Here's my concern with this burgeoning population in the U.S. military (and apparently foreign militaries too, based on the CGSC comments) that feels they need nothing but COIN doctrine and TTPs. While COIN is great, there is only a small piece of COIN that is above and beyond standard military doctrine. COIN does not change the way you kill bad guys - with a bullet, shell or bomb and therefore all that evil, bad 'force on force' training still applies. Sometimes COIN requires you to go toe to toe with the enemy. I partially concur that teaching soviet/Warsaw Pact equipment and doctrine seems old fashioned but a lot of our enemies use that equipment and follow some form of soviet doctrine, still. NK comes to mind, and Iran and China have morphed their doctrine to some extent. Insurgents may not follow doctrine but they use AKs, PPKs, RPGs etc... so it doesn't hurt to know that stuff, and Marines/soldiers need to know the capabilities and limitations of those weapons. Oh, and I got yelled at by my Bn CO for some of my Marines not wearing gloves inside a vehicle - sometimes leaders have to be assholes.

chris   ·  January 25, 2008 03:14 AM

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