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But we WANTED to Fight in the Fulda Gap...
By Charlie
This Canadian colonel comments on the SECDEF's remarks on NATO last week, but struck a chord with me in this graf:
Collateral Damage
By George Petrolekas
Many American officers who passed their military adolescence in training to fight in the Fulda Gap - the strategic area in the Cold War era where the Soviets would theoretically invade West Germany - still believe that the U.S. Army is not meant for protracted low-level conflict or nation-building. The Powell doctrine, so favored by many U.S. officers, of applying overwhelmingly superior force followed by rapid withdrawal from the field, was highly successful in America 's first Gulf war but does not apply to the current situations in Afghanistan and Iraq .The war in Iraq has awakened military soldier-scholars to the fact that America must wage a completely different type of war, fought among the people, generational in scope, where firepower and maneuver must be coupled with the development of civil society and security through close contact with the population.
Petrolekas goes on to chide the SECDEF for his comments about NATO’s reliance on Cold War doctrine and the inability to conduct COIN ops and talk about how great NATO is. What struck me was how true that 1st paragraph rang. Many officers that I have served with, especially the combat arms types, are all about the Powell doctrine and are frustrated with the restricting way the US military chooses to fight its wars. Some majors I have worked with seethe about fighting a “faceless enemy” that does not wear a uniform, others complain about having to waste time on the “other stuff” like IO, PSYOP, Civil Affairs, and coordinating with Host Nation forces, instead of writing a really good “tasks to maneuver units” paragraph in the OPORD. I know that the plural of “anecdote” is not “fact,” but it has been my experience that many leaders in the Army really want to fight another army, not an insurgency. That could be a result –as the colonel above says- of officers who “passed their military adolescence” training to fight the commies in the “big one,” and is leading defense planner to focus on the next “big one,” (China) rather than dealing with what is in front of us now. I always hear from my artillery brethren “you’ll all be sorry you cut the artillery branch when we fight the Chinese/Russians/whoever.”
My take is that the Powell Doctrine is great, when we can use it. The problem is that America rarely gets to choose the conflicts that we engage in. I know Iraq can be debated here as a “war of choice,” but let’s focus on Afghanistan . In 2001, was the Big Army prepared to fight a well-armed terror network and their state-supporters in the middle of Afghanistan in the middle of the winter? Adequately, I suppose, but the Powell doctrine really did not fit into the dynamic of OEF1. So to paraphrase Rumsfeld, you go to war with the doctrine you have. Leaders on the ground made decisions, which became unit SOPs, which were handed off to replacements, which became the "way things were done." FMs have to be re-written occasionally, and organizational knowledge is always better than schoolhouse instruction. We’ll see how the Petraeus doctrine of FM 3-24 (4GW) works out in Iraq, and for all of the Cold Warriors still out there, we’ll keep our older (3GW) regs on the shelf just in case.
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Comments
I know everyone slammed Rumsfeld, but I think he was right ie. asymmetric vs. symmetric warfare.
The days of massed armies or fleets attacking each other are probably a thing of the past.
FYI, Petrolekas is one of THOSE colonels. You know, the type whose unsolicited e-mails get read very carefully by Lieutenant Generals. I can't count the number of times I've heard about an interesting meeting or tasking or even quasi-diplomatic mission, and then heard that he was involved. Bright guy, and well-respected up here.
I think Rumsfeld was half right. Yes, the days of massed fleets and armies attacking each other are over, but you still need a heck of a lot of troops to hold a country or fight an insurgency. Didn't he want to try the Iraq mission with 50k at one point?
Remember, it was Bremmer and the boys at Foggy Bottom that threw the wrench in the gears when they fired every Iraqi who was a Bathist,even though they knew how to make the trains run and keep the lights on. It was no diffrent at the end of WW2 when the Allies kept former NAZI party members in their civil affairs jobs (and with a lot of criticism) but as Patton said "just because they were a nazi party member doesn't mean they cant do a job".
I still think Rumsfeld was a good SecDef. not a great one but good.
Can you blame someone who trained for war riding M1s across the desert at 40+kph for not liking moving down a narrow alley with essentially the same protection and firepower the other guy has only he's got the element of surprise? I think that most of us, of all ranks, that have been on "my beach vacation", understand what is needed to win. What is most heartening to me is the extraordinary response of our junior solders to the tough conditions! Makes me really proud(sniff). I'm rapidly approaching obsolesence but can now do so with the confidence that those soldiers will meet the challenges. These days, I'm more concerned with America getting political leadership with that situational awareness, personal courage and integrity...
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you think it's bad in the Army, try the Air Force. First time I've ever heard folks openly wishing for war against a nation of a billion+ people.