Slab Speaks!

From Anbar. Said via email that he couldn’t log onto our dumb server for whatever reason, so I’m publishing his post for him.

Hello again. I thought now might be a good time for an update on the situation here in Al Anbar, from a firsthand perspective. First things first, however: happy birthday to all of my fellow Marines, and happy Veterans Day to all of the veterans out there, particularly those who went before my generation. I firmly believe that one of the reasons behind the performance of the current generation of service members is our sincere desire to honor the legacy of past generations. Those who went before set a standard of excellence that we have had to strive to emulate. I hope we’ve been successful.

I’m currently living at a small outpost north of Fallujah. My team supports a cavalry troop, Apache Troop of the 5th Squadron, 7th Cavalry. Before I arrived here, this was a pretty dangerous area. Apache Troop had some hard fights in here around late July. However, in August a local civilian watch began assisting with the security situation, which truly turned the corner on security in the Area of Operations.

The civilian watch is really an armed posse, unaffiliated with the Government of Iraq. Some of them are likely former insurgents. In a way, working with these groups is sort of “dealing with the devil”, as not all of them are particularly upstanding members of the community, and when U.S. forces are not present they might give in to the temptation to take advantage of being the “guy with the gun”. However, we’ve seen that, while the local Iraqis are wary of the civilian watch, they’re grateful for the increased security compared to just three or four months ago. In addition, the civilian watch has given Coalition Forces enough security to focus our operations on improving the quality of life in the local area. So if the civilian watch engages in “shady” activity from time to time, ultimately Coalition Forces end up being the good guys, which improves our relationship with the local populace. And eventually the civilian watch will be replaced with or incorporated into an official government security force. In some places that has already happened.

While I’m sure some question the wisdom of cooperating with what amount to Sunni militias, it’s really a matter of being able to exploit “grey areas” in the situation. The U.S. military, in particular, is used to classifying people along binary lines – you are a good guy or a bad guy. One of the biggest strides we have made is in realizing that we can’t continue along those lines – that someone who used to be a bad guy can help us achieve our aims if we find a way to make it an attractive option. This is historically one of the most effective strategies in COIN – co-opting the insurgents. Of course, hard core members of Al Qaeda in Mesopatamia are usually impossible to co-opt, but since we have turned many of the nationalist insurgent groups, Al Qaeda has suffered a huge setback at the hands of our new allies. While dealing with some of these unsavory characters might seem dangerous in the long-term, it gives Coalition Forces the necessary security and freedom to operate that enables us to make quality of life improvements for the local populace, which ultimately sets the conditions for transitioning the area to GoI control.

There are certainly risks to this approach – witness the Colombian right-wing paramilitary organization known as the AUC. Such right-wing groups received tacit approval and support from the Colombian government and military for years, as they were frequently effective at battling left-wing insurgents. However, as their human rights record steadily worsened, and the paramilitaries became increasingly involved in criminal activities – including narco-trafficking – the Colombian government found themselves faced with another enemy that is as much a threat as the left-wing FARC. In some ways, the GoI has flirted with this same danger in its relations with Jaysh al Mahdi, which the U.S. Army continues to struggle with in Baghdad. The important thing is that we need to focus on transitioning control of pacified areas to actual GoI organizations such as the Iraqi Police so that the security forces can be held accountable for their actions. As I mentioned before, I have seen this very transition taking place in nearby areas, so at the moment I am hopeful.

I mentioned this earlier in a comment on Herschel Smith’s Captain’s Journal, but I think it bears repeating – from my experience with Army company grade officers, the United States Army has made a remarkable shift in mindset. Although I am basing my comments on a small sampling, I believe that the Army’s company grade leadership has embraced a counterinsurgency focus. When working with 2-101 BCT at the Army’s Joint Readiness Training Center, I worked with a company commander who spoke the language of COIN fluently. Here in Iraq, Apache Troop is obviously accustomed to intense, kinetic operations, but they have successfully made the transition to more delicate COIN operations in the local villages. The Army has, in my eyes, shown intellectual flexibility beyond what I expected to see. This also gives me hope for the future of this war.

I remain cautiously optimistic – I am hesitant to declare that we have won victory in Al Anbar, because the situation can very easily turn sour on us. Remember, we are facing a thinking enemy, and they will find a way to counter our current tactics. Our erstwhile allies may decide their interests no longer lie in partnership with Coalition Forces, and we may yet again be faced with attacks from these groups. For now, I remain hopeful that we have made the intellectual leap necessary to roll back insurgent activity long enough to establish enduring security under the auspices of the Government of Iraq. Time will tell.