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Recording History Part III - You Can’t Tell the Players without a Program
By Richard S. Lowry
To those of you who have just surfed in, you have arrived nearly at the beginning of a great internet adventure. (Catch up on previous posts here.) I have recently started blogging my way through my newest book project. It will tell the story of the battle for Fallujah. Return frequently and follow along as my work grows into the next military history book to hit the shelves in your local book store. Please contribute suggestions and comments. I am looking forward to your feedback.
For those who have returned – Welcome back!
Richard S. Lowry is the author of The Gulf War Chronicles and Marines in the Garden of Eden.
Now that we have maps and a view of the battlespace, we need to figure out who will be involved in this epic battle. Determining allied units will be easy. Defining the enemy force will be much more difficult, as I don’t have the enemy commanders’ email addresses. So, let’s start with our side.
To the civilian, this chart means very little. But, this is the kind of graphic that makes a military historian salivate. There is more information here than can usually be crammed on a single page. If you really want to get into this military unit shorthand visit globalsecurity.com.
But, if you just want to follow along and not become totally engrossed in these military mahjong pieces, I will provide a brief overview. First, the 1st Marine Division staff used color to point out that this was truly a multi-national, joint effort. The green boxes indicate coalition partners, Iraqi flags designate Iraqi units, purple are Navy SEALS, the black boxes are U. S. Army units while the blue boxes specify Marine Corps units.
The first thing that jumped out at me was that Operation Phantom Fury was the embodiment of Goldwater/Nichols vision of joint operations in our military. I also noticed that there were quite a few Iraqi units involved at every level. During the first fight to take Fallujah, in April of 2004, the supporting Iraqi forces never made it to the battlefield. They broke and ran when they were ambushed in transit. So, to have this many Iraqi units involved was a dramatic improvement from the first time around and was also an indicator of the steady improvement of Iraqi forces in 2004.
Our one-page Task Organization also provides us with some insight to Fallujah – the battlefield. Notice from right to left we have North Babil Province, the Western Area of Operations and Ramadi (we will get to Fallujah and its environs later). The 1st Marine Division had responsibility for a large chunk of Iraq, to include North Babil Province and the entire Anbar Province. In 2004, every turn in the road or stand of palm trees was a potential ambush point. The entire province was dangerous and the cities and towns were downright deadly. General Natonski could not turn his complete attention to clearing Fallujah without providing as much security as possible throughout western Iraq. The battle for Fallujah was not fought in a vacuum, it really required operations throughout Western Iraq.
So, Natonski turned responsibility for the entire area over to his Assistant Division Commander, Brigadier General Joseph Dunford, and assigned the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit to the Western AO and the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit to Babil. The 2nd Brigade Combat Team of the 2nd Infantry Division was assigned to the hotbed town of Ramadi and the remaining forces were shifted around so that they could be part of the actual fight in Fallujah under Natonski’s direct command.
The main attack force would be two Marine Regimental Combat Teams (RCT-1 and RCT-7) and the 1st Cavalry Division’s Black Jack Brigade would surround the city – letting no one in or out. Notice on our chart, both RCTs have an embedded Army mechanized battalion. Spread thin, neither RCT had three full battalions or a heavy armored punch. So, Natonski and his boss the Marine Expeditionary Force commander, Lieutenant General John F. Sattler, asked the Army to pitch in. The commanders in Baghdad gave the Marines everything they needed. Second Battalion of the 7th Cavalry Regiment was “chopped” to RCT-1 and the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Infantry Regiment went to RCT-7. Both of these units were mechanized infantry – heavy with M1 tanks and Bradleys.
I am still absorbing all the information on this chart but it is apparent that the forces amassed for the clearing of Fallujah were enormous, international and joint. This time the coalition had brought all the tools in their toolbox. The second fight for Fallujah would be much different than the first.
In Part IV, I will talk about my first interviews. I try to start at the top to get the big picture. Eventually I will get to the Lance Corporal’s stories, but first I have to understand the strategic and operational stories. Tune in next time for some snippets from my interviews with the division, brigade and regimental commanders.
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Comments
For the non-military type, breaking the image down further and annotating it with your commentary would make it more digestible.
I will be happy to oblige both of your requests in coming posts. I am trying to make my posts, short enough to read in a short period of time. But, if everyone wants longer posts, I will oblige.
My thought on this was that you would all like to see shorter posts - more often.
Richard, you would be correct, short, concise posts....BTW I was in the Blackjack Brigade in my days with the 1st CAV....Hooaaahh!! (M1's of course!)
Doug Santo, do you want the whole book at once or what dude??? ;-)
Old Tanker -
Oops! Sorry for going overboard. Just some ideas.
Doug
Doug,
We know he won't give away too much in his posts.... Then we wouldn't buy the book!!!
Richard,
I have been remiss in my promise made to you while co-hosting with Andrea Shea-King to you about obtaining (of then) LT Neil Prakish's email info so that you might talk about his blog Armorgeddon which is now behind the AKO firewall. His writing has been in the Blog of War edited by Matt Burden of Blackfive.net fame. I'm sure he would be able to put you in touch with the LT.
Happy hunting, and if you still need someone to lug your gear all over Iraq...give me a call.
David - The Thunder Run
Doug,
Actually, I have become increasingly concerned that the Fallujah story is going to be too big for a single book. I am starting to think that I can solve that problem in "Recording History."
By the time we are finished, you all will have read much more than will actually be in the book. I am working on a post right now that will tell an amazing story that will have very little to do with the book's storyline. Stu Segall's contribution will be mentioned in the book, but the detail will be here on OP-FOR.
As I mentioned earlier, my only reason for brevity is to make the experience more enjoyable for you all. Long posts tend to be tiresome.
I'm really enjoying this series and look forward to the next installment. This is important history that needs to be preserved and understood.
What does the box enclosing the III Regiment/Group symbol indicate with respect to the RCT-1 and RCT-7?
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I am interested in the overall strategy beginning with preparatory operations and extending down to company level objectives in certain circumstances.
What was the primary objective of the operation? How were the forces grouped and deployed? What role did air and ground artillery play, if any? What was the strength and disposition of the enemy? How did the battle develop and how did both sides adopt to the changing conditions? What was the final casualty count for both sides? Was the original schedule kept, and if not, why not? Did US media play any role in the battle? What plans were in place, if any, to utilize US and other western media to the advantage of coalition forces? What mistakes were made? What lessons were learned from the action?
Doug Santo
Pasadena, CA