I reached a moment of pure frustration today while typing out a paper for on of my classes. Given a report from the US Coordinator for Counterterrorism in April of 2001, I was assigned to describe what efforts were being made at the time to prevent or slow future acts of terror. Remember, this was April of 2001, five months before September, 2001, when the terrorist equation changed.
This document identified Taliban-controlled Afghanistan as a “primary hub” for international terrorism, and indicated that it was a growing threat for “all countries.” According to this document, sanctions were levied against the Taliban by UNSCR 1333, for harboring Osama Bin Laden and failing to close down training camps. This document hailed the sanctions as a “major victory” in international cooperation against terrorism. Additionally, it highlighted the importance of “isolating” the Taliban.
Additionally, the document points out how sanctions are important to “keep the pressure” on Libya, for its complicity in the Lockerbie bombing. The document mentions Iran, as the top state sponsor of terrorism in the region, and “expects those states in the region that are committed to peace distance themselves from all forms of terrorism.” While questionable as a policy prescription, the document then highlights work within the G-8 to “condemn” terrorism. According to the document, “the foundation of our efforts is diplomacy,” and the report seeks to ensure that terrorists are “brought to justice.”
I am well aware of the current debate of the approaches to dealing with terrorism, and I do understand that diplomacy and multinational cooperation are essential to combating terrorism: terrorists use borders to their advantage, and multinational agreements and cooperation deny this advantage to the terrorists. Got it.
What struck me was how this pre-9/11 law enforcement approach completely failed. It is still a valid argument that terrorism should be handled by law enforcement and not the military, but the debate is on how to practically make that happen in the world today, because the pre-9/11 efforts failed so completely.
What this document I reviewed from the US Coordinator for Counterterrorism (April 2001) told me this:
-If we identify a “primary hub” of international terrorism, destroy it. Don’t sanction it or try to isolate it.
-Diplomatic pressure on Libya did cause Qadaffi to give up his WMD program, only after that diplomatic pressure was backed with a credible threat of military action.
-“Hoping” nations “distance” themselves from regional powerbrokers and state-terror sponsors like Iran is not a credible policy prescription. Syria and even Venezuela have sought to increase their ties with the Islamic Republic since 2000.
-International condemnations are meaningless unless they are backed up by men on the ground with guns fighting for the good guys. Witness Sudan. George Clooney can campaign all he wants for Darfur, nothing will change until a brigade of combat troops from a Western nation shows up to stop the killing.
The law enforcement vs. war debate on terrorism will continue to be a relevant discussion, but the lessons of the past cannot be forgotten on this matter.
**UPDATE: I found the link at the State Dept. website
Is this report available online, or elsewhere within the NMCI establishment?
I predict an “F” and disenrollment… Unless it’s a DoD or maybe a DHS school.
But let’s not forget the failures of military responses to terrorism. Eagle Claw (Iran ’79) and the Marine expedition in Beirut (a much costlier fiasco) are two glaring examples. Granted, they failed for a number of reasons, but they were military responses to terrorism and they did not succeed.
The debate should not be either/or, but rather a “how much of each”…
Just as a narrow-minded focus on a LE response to terrorism was a failure (as you correctly point out), so too would be a purely military response.
It’s gotta be a blend of both… and the discretion to know which to use and when.