Upgraded Warthogs

Doesn't really seem fair to me to single out the A-10 in this instance, as most of the problems with the An Nasiriyah friendly fire incident seem to be C3 related; there was confusion as to where the friendlies were and the A-10s were cleared in on a force in an area thought to contain only hostiles, but in fact tragically contained Marines. The problems don't seem to be endemic to the particular platform used, in fact I suspect that as far as CAS goes the A-10 tends to be much better off than the average fast mover.

That said, I still don't think the A-10 will make an exceptional COIN aircraft, for reasons laid out here.

To summarize, the A-10 might make a good CAS airframe, but that doesn't necessarily make it a good COIN aircraft.

Hello my friend. I hope you are doing well. Generally, I oppose the retirement of the A-10, since the helicopter is considered to be a flying coffin for future dead people. Michael Fumento left a comment that this idea of the A-10 was a good idea for the Air Force to oppose helicopter gunships. True, but then again, the helicopter is no perfect weapon either.

I oppose retirement of helicopter gunships just like I oppose the retirement of A-10s. As to COIN, well, I suppose that they are as well off as any other aircraft, especially since they are low flying, slow and redundant in their pneumatic and electronic controls. Also, they are as good as artillery, which has been used extensively in both Baghdad and Annbar. As to the Shi'a South, we leave them alone, to my dismay.

On the issue of collateral damage due to air power, see:

http://www.captainsjournal.com/2007/08/06/warfare-and-lawfare-an-unstable-alchemy/

Stay in touch.

From my perspective the A-10 mishaps addressed all reflect a break down in communication, command and control. They all reflect novice mistakes.

An A-10 pilot flying low altitude and close range ought to be able to distinguish between friendly vehicles and enemy ones. If he can't, then maybe he shouldn't be a pilot, or maybe his training is inadequate.

On the command side, who identified the targets as viable?

My point is that none of the failures discussed herein reflect the capability of the airframe. They all reflect bad command and control in the targeting process.

So how come it is only A-10 pilots seemingly making these mistakes on such a regular basis? Why not other pilots? Helicopters? Artillery? What are they doing that keeps them from making the same mistakes as the A-10 pilots?

I'm sure there is more to the story.

Defense Industry Daily has a pretty good piece on the A-10C PE upgrade. http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/a-highertech-hog-the-a10c-pe-program-03187/#more A lot of the upgrades sound like they're geared toward addressing the issues that led to the friendly fire incidents by making it easier for the pilot to get information on where the marines and soldiers on the ground are, identify targets, allowing the soldiers on the ground to know where the A-10 is in relation to their position, and making communication between the soldiers on the ground and the pilot easier. Personally, I think it's unfair to single out the A-10 when it comes to friendly fire, especially, when other aircraft like the F-16 have also frequently been involved in such incidents. When you get right down to it, the A-10 has probably been the aircraft involved in the number of friendly fire incidents that it has because it is one of the aircraft most in demand for that mission. I think the real question is how does the A-10 compared to other aircraft in the ratio of friendly fire incidents to close air support missions flown.

I suspect that the A-10 friendly fire incidences are related to the pilots lack of experience with the ground units he is supporting. Do Marine pilots have similar stats for friendly fire in close air support? While the Apaches may have some merit in military operations, their performance in the fight to get to Baghdad suggest that a squadron of A-10's would have been less vulnerable to enemy tactics and more effective at destroying tanks. I think the A-10 pilots need to spend more time with the units they are supporting.

I think blue-on-blue tends to rear its ugly head across community lines.

I believe it was a B-52 or a B-1 that dropped the JDAM that nearly killed Harmid Karzai and wiped out half of CPT Amerine's ODA back in late-2001.

I believe it was a JDAM from a Navy Tomcat that killed several SF soldiers in northern Iraq in 2003.

And let's not forget about the Apache pilot who gunned up a Bradley and its dismounts during Desert Storm.

Most pilots probably don't receive adequate training in vehicle recognition.

Marine pilots are probably more used to operating with ground forces. Hence, they're more likely to know the difference between an LAV and a BTR. They also probably are not so fast on the trigger, conditioned to check things twice before letting steel fly.

Part of the problem with A10s in a joint/comnbined COIN environment is that the A10 was deliberately kept super-simple in the electronics departments, both avionics and communications.
As far as that goes, and as to the Air Force coming late to the COIN party, it would probably be a mistake to ignore the Service Politics angle: The Air Force never really wanted or liked the A10, since it was designed from the start for Close Air Support, which isn't as sexy a mission as Air Superority or Strategic Bombing. Now, OTOH, young lieutenants are clamoring to get into C130s and C17s, which are the stepping stone into Air Force Special Ops, whgich is Where The Action Is. By turning the A10 into a fighter aircraft which can also play that game, they leave room for advancement for fighter jocks.
As a former ground pounder, I am all in favor of any platform which makes that job easier--a platform like the A10 can fill roles that the AC130, for example, cannot.

Speed kills.

Perhaps other alternatives at a much lower cost that meet the needs of private enterprise might also better meet the needs of the Marines in an environment where we have achieved total air supremacy.

Let the Army fly aircraft such as this. In fact, reincorporate the Air Force into the Army to eliminate all the turf carping.

Now, OTOH, young lieutenants are clamoring to get into C130s and C17s, which are the stepping stone into Air Force Special Ops, whgich is Where The Action Is.

Having served on bases with C-130s, A-10s, and F-16s I find this quite interesting, and a little amusing. Back in the late 80s and early 90s, fighter jocks (F-16/F-15) ruled while the poor trash haulers and Warthog drivers were second-class citizens. It's fun to see the shoe on the other foot.

Seriously though . . . seems to me the problem is not the A-10, but the command and control, and training of the pilots who have to be able to recognize friend and foe in a matter of moments. Fixing that should be job number one.

I was a fire support officer in 1/75RGR, 82nd, & 2ID for the majority of ten years in the Army. I worked closely with many CAS platforms during training and combat.

In my opinion it is unfair to judge the A10 based on past CAS mishaps.

The A10, as well as all other CAS platforms, have received numerous upgrades over the last 5 years. I deployed five times and each time the platforms we worked with had new and improved targeting pods. Some of the new sensors on the A10 matched the AC130's sensors (I still prefer the gunship, but that's another discussion).

It has been my experience that a CAS platform is only as good as its crew/pilots. In addition, a CAS mission is only as good as the Controller and the crew/ pilots.

That said, CAS is not easy. Even with the most experienced Operators & aircrews I worked with, there was always great risk involved in every mission.

Every aircraft will reach the end of its life and I'll trust the aviators to make that decision. What is important with regard to CAS is that we have skilled pilots with the most advanced technology available.

I could write for hours about close air support.

Take care and keep up the good work with this forum.

Eli Wahesh (VMI96)

The years that I spent in the AF especially in the 1980's the A-10, A-37, OV-10 and O-2 community was the bastard child of the AF. Even NCO's assigned to places like Hurlbert field was considered a career dead end, boy how times have changed!
The A-10 is not the problem as others have said what is needed is a aircraft designed for the COIN mission. Why not rebuild the AE-1 ? or a upgraded OV-10? The tooling is there and the testing has already been done, we knew what upgrades are needed and with todays avionics you could a lot more bang for the buck.

sweet! Another VMI man!

In the A-10's defense, the electronics were minimal and pilots often had to identify targets via the TV targeting systems in their missiles or via their own eyes.

Now that they are getting upgraded systems it should be easier to identify friendlies and such regrettable instances will become less common.

It wasn't usual for friendlies to be shot up by Huey and Cobra gunships in Vietnam, either. Pilots whizzing by just seem to become disoriented now and then.

Before passing judgment on the A-10 community, I would like to know the ratio between CAS missions flown and CAS missions flown resulting in fratricide. My gut would say that an aircraft tasked with flying more CAS missions than other aircraft would inevitably have more blue on blue incidents than aircraft flying fewer CAS missions. I would suspect that the actual PERCENT of CAS missions resulting in blue on blue is extremely low (.01%?), and probably very similar across all CAS assets.

I do not want, nor am I qualified, to get into the larger discussion of A-10 as a COIN asset. However, I feel it necessary to comment on your Update, in which you list instances of A-10 fratricide.

Two of the DESERT STORM instances were absolutely not the fault of the A-10 pilots: the 7 killed in the LAV and the 9 British soldiers. One of my final assignments on active duty as a Navy Commander (O-5) was in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), where I was involved in review of the various "friendly fire" incidents from Operation DESERT STORM. I cannot go into any sort of details about these two instances, because the Air Force classified the investigative results of their "Friendly Fire" incidents (notably, Army and Navy did not). In these two cases the A-10 pilots were not at fault and, in one case, even took extra precautions to avoid a potential fratricide. (Nor was the behavior of the victims themselves contributory to the incidents).