Got an email from Richard Lowry last night, who is neck deep in the Army’s new field manual on insurgency. Richard sent some choice excerpts, scribed by…who else? LTG Petraeus.
By its nature, insurgency is protracted. The conduct of counterinsurgency always demands considerable expenditures of time and resources. Even if people prefer the host-nation government to the insurgents, they do not actively support that government unless they are convinced the counterinsurgent forces have the means, ability, stamina, and will to win. The insurgent’s primary battle is against the indigenous government, not the United States, but American support can be crucial to building public faith in that government’s viability. Insurgents and local populations often believe that a few casualties or a few years will cause the United States to abandon a COIN effort. Constant reaffirmations of commitment, backed by deeds, can overcome that perception and bolster faith in the steadfastness of American support.
And a second choice cut of the meaty FM goodness:
1-122. American forces committed to COIN are there to assist a host government. The long-term goal is to leave a host that is capable of standing on its own. In the end, the host nation has to win its own war. Achieving this requires the development of viable local leaders and institutions. U.S. forces and agencies can help, but host-nation elements must be able to accept responsibilities to achieve real victory. While it may be easier for American military units to conduct operations themselves, it is better to work to strengthen local forces and then assist them. Host governments have the final responsibility to solve their own problems. Eventually all foreign armies are seen as interlopers or occupiers, and the sooner the main effort can be turned over to host-nation institutions, the better.
I’m guarded, but optimistic about this new phase. Now if only Congress will give Petraeus the tools he needs….
With the Iraqis running this new op, the only tool that Bush can give our military is the go ahead to clean out the city and surrounding cities. Because if we let the Iraqis dictate who and when we fight and how, this will just be a repeat of the last failed op that was supposed to clean out the city and was nothing more than a waste of time.
If Bush is not willing to override the Iraqi government, we might as well not even go to the party.
Papa Ray
West Texas
USA
P.S. “Pardnered” commands never, ever work. The main reason is that there is really no such thing in the military.
I posted something similar to your final thought at SWC a little while ago. My larger concern is that the situation over there is past the point where actual COIN is an option. Even ‘perfectly-applied doctrine’ proponents must see that since “Legitimacy is the main objective”, perhaps we’ve been the boy who cried wolf too many times, for too long. Now, had Petraeus been put in charge and this doctrine applied, say, the day after we secured (largely/relatively) country-wide and pulled the statue down – then I’d be more optimistic than I am now. If anyone can make lemonade out of rotten, soiled lemons Petraeus can…