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Bigger and Badder or Leaner and Meaner?
By Charlie
The whole argument over the Army’s “transformation” can be encapsulated like this: During the Cold War we needed big, heavy, divisions with lots of men, tanks, self-propelled artillery, and armored personnel carriers. We needed this because we faced a similarly equipped enemy. After the Cold War, the unchallengeable American military had nothing to template itself against. For the decade of the 1990’s, the Army downsized, still trying to figure out how to effectively organize itself. Post 9/11, the military has two recent, and different, examples of how to organize itself for war against a medium-sized third world country.
The first is the “lean and mean” force the overthrew the Taliban. This force package revolves around a small, light, maneuverable, dispersed force that is backed up by a lethal reserve force of US airpower and shock troops. The “big and bad” strategy was used in Iraq, and consisted of dual heavy-armored convoys plowing through Iraqi defenses into Baghdad. Both of these strategies worked in the past, and both are used exclusively for “initial entry” into a hostile country and neither addresses the post-conflict stabilization period
A strategy for war brings with it new requirements for manning, equipment, and training –so which one worked out better in the past? Which one will be more prevalent in the future?
Let’s start out with the “Lean and mean” approach. Heavy reliance on already overtaxed SOF assets would require an increase in manning for those units back in the states. Can that be done while retaining the standards these units adhere to? Also, this strategy worked in Afghanistan, where alliances between warlords could be manipulated in order to provide ground forces. Such a strategy might not succeed in a country without active opposition groups to organize, arm, train, and then deploy against their government. Another fault with this strategy is that it tends to rely less on conventional soldering and more on machines to “force multiply” the few forces on the ground.
This approach means:
- More troops trained in UW (Unconventional warfare)
- More money spent per soldier
- More high-tech equipment
- Less reliance on Reserves
The armored fist that broke Iraq in three weeks will go down in history as one of the swiftest military campaigns ever conducted. However, in high country, jungle, mountains, or swamps the advantage of armor drops tremendously. Also, a troop movement as large as OIF one would be vulnerable to massive enemy rear-guard action if it faced any force more organized than the Baathist collective defense. ( we got a taste of this with the Jessica Lynch incident).
This approach means:
-More money spent on conventional armor (tanks, brads, sp arty)
-Larger force requirements
-With that, more reliance on reserves
-Large troops centers become targets
Now that I’ve ripped both of the strategies, lets talk about where we’re going. A large chunk of the Pentagon is leaning toward the FCS (Future Combat Systems) a collection of vehicles that are supposed to “force multiply,” at the expense of, say, more people. However, despite the successes of the past initial-entry ops, current force demands for Stability and Support operations (SOSO) throw both of these for a loop.
In conclusion, we always plan to win the last war, not the next one. If that’s the case, thinking outside the box, which approach is better: bigger, or leaner, or some combination of both?
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Comments
I think a combination is inevitable. The brute strength dominance on land, sea and air have to remain paramount. Because at the end of the day, this shows that the US has the capacity to take or deny (maybe not pacify) any patch of land, sea or sky anywhere on the globe regardless of distance, geography or environment. But the lean and flexible allows us to do it "on the cheap" where possible.
I think the big change is we have to expand the light infantry capacity of the army. It's not sexy like either the heavy army option or the supersoldier ideas, but a large body of essentially garrison or paramilitary grunts would allow the footprint of the large army but at a substantially reduced expense. I know no one really wants to create combat units that would be by design inferior front-line combat troops, but as long as US policy dictates nation building (and both of the last two administrations did) we need affordable/efficient troops to ease the burden on heavy line units. I think dedicated "garrison" units, trained to emphasize paramilitary and support (essentially expanded MP units) supported when necessary by detached elements of "combat" units would bridge the gap between the two
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I'm thinking a combination.
From my little window, I view mobility and flexibility as the key concerns.
Lemme ramble throught some more thoughts:
On a troop level, training in Unconventional warfare and "light fighting" is critical. Along with the best equipment. (not necessarily the most technologically advanced) We do require advanced technology body armor.
On command level, we require dependable communications between our eyes and ears, and our command cells, and strategy cells. (this does require advanced technology.)
On a strategic level, shaping the battlefield is key. Controlling the air and sea is critical. Responsive and mobile heavy units play a significant role at this level.
Also, on a strategic level, we need to get better at dealing with the press and politicians.
Furthermore, we need to stop tying the hands of our chaplains. Chaplains are a critical yet oft maligned force multiplier that we can not afford to be without.
Lastly, I’m all for high tech weapons development. But high-tech is irrelevant if it can’t be properly deployed and used.