The “Regime Stay” Strategy

Has neoconservatism run its course? We once said “you’re either with us or against us,” Now we are making deals with dictators like Libya’s Quaddafi. What happened? Did idealism get mugged by reality, or did spreading democracy suddenly become less important than nuclear proliferation? Perhaps our Post-Bush foreign policy will retain the “Jacksonianism” (or Monroe-ism applied all hemisperes vice one) while dropping the Wilsonianism.

Bottom Line Up Front: Maybe, in some cases, if a tyrant plays ball and gives up his nukes, we should play Monty Hall and make a deal. Call it the strategy of “Regime Stay.”


After 9/11, the school of thought of neoconservatism directed US foreign policy. Steeped in idealism, the neocons sketch the world in the terms of good and evil, and believe that the default setting of human society is peaceful, democratic, capitalistic co-existence. The neocons see before them a world where humanity has been held back from achieving true peace because of tyrants and oppressors –and the way to right past wrongs is to abandon past “realist” policies and draw a hard line with dictators. “You’re either with us or against us,” was a great capsulation of the line of thinking. However, like most policies that look good on paper, after 5 years, 3 wars, and massive international and domestic opposition to US policies, a new line of thinking was bound to emerge.

The problem, as I see it, is that there is just too much world to apply a one-size-fits-all strategy. We had to deal with Uzbekistan to get air basing, a country with a horrible human-rights record. Saudi Arabia and Egypt had to be on our side for our interventions in the region, despite their autocracy, corruption, anti-Americanism, and lack of small “L” liberalism. Neoconservatism provided no easy answers to North Korea, the rising leftist tide in South America, Europe’s broiling Islamist threat, Russian meddling in the CIS, and Africa’s terrorist incubator.

Now, lest all of this policy criticism be mis-interpreted, I think the neocon policy toward OEF, OIF, and the GWOT have been idealistically correct. The problem that has shaken up the chess board is Iran. Following the OEF/OIF model, Iran should be debated at the UNSC, and when everyone disagrees with the American position, we should mount a costly invasion and occupation. However, as we have recently seen with Libya, there is a “third way.” By making a deal, US diplomats allowed a dictator (who had attacked American interests in the past, was pursuing WMD, and supported terrorists) to “walk” as long as he played ball with America, by ditching his WMDs, renouncing terror, and pledging cooperation. Could he be bluffing? Sure –trust but verify. My point is that our objectives (1. disarmament, 2. severing of terror ties, 3. regime change, 4. democracy) were (kind of) met by just fulfilling #1.

So, what if Syria comes to the table wanting to make a deal? Would we blow them off just because Assad is a dictator? What about Iran?

I guess to wrap this post up, I’ll go devil’s advocate: Perhaps the “deal” I’m citing as the first piece of evidence of a pragmatic/realist foreign policy resurgence was only made possible by the neocon-inspired OEF/OIF/GWOT, and the fear it struck into the hearts of tyrants everywhere.

So, has neoconservatism run its course, or is it just getting warmed up?

Comments

  1. Alsadius says:

    I don’t think anyone disagrees that diplomacy, when it works, is the ideal option. Nobody dies, it doesn’t cost a whole lot, and it gives us an excuse to ship a whole lot of nitwits out of the country for the duration of their careers. Libya was willing to play fair and give the US what they wanted(from a practical standpoint, if not an idealistic one), so the US shook hands and went with it. And any other nation would have done the same thing as the US did – when your opponent capitulates in exchange for fairly trivial concessions, you don’t quibble, you smile and play up the photo ops for all they’re worth.

    Where foreign policies differ is in what to do when your adversaries aren’t as accomodating. For example, Saddam talked a great line to the UN about following their rules and opening himself up for inspections, but when it actually came time for him to walk the walk, he didn’t follow through, and he didn’t give us what we wanted. The neocon answer was to yoink his country, the lefty answer was to write an even more strongly-worded letter and hope he caved. But in either case, if Saddam had done what we wanted, we wouldn’t have invaded(whether it was possible for Saddam to do everything the US wanted is another story, of course, but assuming it was possible and he had done it, the US wouldn’t have invaded).

    So basically, if Syria, Iran, North Korea, or any of the other bad guys of the world are willing to accede to US demands and actually follow through, then the US will gladly accept – that’s not neoconservatism, that’s common sense, and nobody in their right mind would blow them off just because they’ve been bad guys in the past.

  2. Andy says:

    For the equivalent to happen in Iran as Libya we’d need a few things:

    1. Iran would have to agree to pay the families of the Marine barracks bombing victims several billion dollars and accept responsibility without admitting direct guilt.

    2. They’d have to cut ties with all terrorists.

    3. They’d have to come out and admit they have clandestine nuclear, chem and bio programs and agree to dismantle them.

    I don’t see Iran doing that. It took two decades of sanctions (even by the Europeans) for the Libyan’s to come around. We need to thank Libya – it’s because of them we found out about the AQ Khan network.

    The deal with Libya is great for them and us. We get guarantees and verification that they’re not pursuing WMD and have ended support for terrorists. They get sanctions lifted, foreign investment and legitimacy in the eyes of the world again.

    Unless everyone, and I mean everyone, including China, etc., are willing to not buy oil from Iran, then they have no real incentive to change.