Iran: Why Diplomacy (alone) Won't Work

Iran’s current situation, stringing out multilateral talks until it can get nukes, seems to be working out wonderfully. Is there any way out of this impending train-wreck of international policy? Multilateralism has worked in the past, but Iran seems to have mastered the game of brinkmanship. Can anything be done? I say no, unless we change some perceptions.

People are beginning to talk about direct negotiations with Iran, but according to Iran, there isn’t much to talk about:

Iran said on Tuesday it wanted to resume nuclear negotiations with the EU and could even talk to Washington if its arch-foe “changed behavior” …. Tehran also said it was willing to negotiate on the number of uranium-enriching centrifuges it uses for research, but stressed it would not stop running the devices entirely as the UN Security Council has called for.

For reference, the UN issued a “presidential statement” that politely asked Iran to stop enriching uranium. Here’s a chunk:

Noting with serious concern Iran’s resumption of uranium enrichment-related activities and its suspension of cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Security Council underlined this afternoon the importance of re-establishing full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development.

Iran gave them the finger. So now the Security Council has to do “something” to make itself seem relevant, since Iran in essence told them to go to hell. Wrangling over language, carrots, sticks, and other such diplo-babble has ensued. The bottom line on all of this is: sanctions won’t work, so the entire diplomatic process that is grinding along is of no consequence. This, dear readers, is multilateralism in its finest. If getting allies is an end in itself, not a means by which to accomplish a goal, you get outcomes like the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 which “outlawed” war as a means of settling international disputes. How’d that work out?

Back to my point, looking elsewhere in the Middle East, Libya seems to be a case where diplomacy succeeded. The dictator saved his skin, dropped his WMDs and renounced terrorism. But was it diplomacy alone that did this, or was it the fact that a credible threat had been established by the invasion of Iraq, Quadaffi thought he was next, and a deal was struck? I think it was a mix of both. We didn’t have Marine landing teams stationed off of Libya ready to storm the beaches at a moments notice, and we also didn’t have a grand alliance of Earth-members striking a deal under Kofi Annan’s fatherly gaze. Libya worked because of force and diplomacy, not force alone, and not diplomacy alone.

So can we expect the same thing with Iran? Not at all. The problem with Iran is one of perceptions and realities. In order to understand this better, behold this Download file“>PowerPoint slide:

(yeah, the pic is grainy -download the slide and look at it if your eyes hurt…)

This depicts, more or less, the current perceptions that red and blue have of each other, and themselves. Now, if you look closely, there are “+’s” and “-‘s” by each point. A plus means it is a net benefit to America, a minus means it is a net loss. To come to a solution with Iran, our diplomacy must be backed up with the threat of credible retaliation (economic, social, cultural, or military) if it decides not to play by the rules. For the situation to be resolved, only the red views (at a minimum) must be changed from “-“ to “+”. However, if considerable effort is needed to resolve them, blue views must change as well.

So to start off the analysis: We (blue, unless you are an Iranian agent reading the blog) must present ourselves as unified, strong, focused, and resolved. Remember, this just has to be a projected image, but it becomes difficult to do so, particularly with Iraq in the foreground of American debate. Iran has successfully inserted itself inside our decision making process, and the more trouble they stir up in Iraq, the less we will focus on them.

However, we could also play to our strengths. We can do this by building up our technology R&D, and scaring mullahs with our ability to hit them anytime, anywhere in their own country if we choose to. Also, we have more money, and thus, more influence. Information operations, cross border PSYOPS, and funding and incitements of anti-regime forces in Iran could all keep the mullahs off-kilter.

Now, you might be asking yourself: how much do we have a say in how red views red? Well, we probably can’t convince them to drop the quest for hegemony –its too late in the game, and Iran is an honor/shame culture. Nukes are their destiny, or they will lose face. We probably can’t blunt their religious themes, especially not with the current regime in place. We can target their unity, however. The recent Azeri protests show that ethnicity, the double-edged sword currently bleeding us in Iraq, can also bleed others. What triggered it? CSMonitor:

The protests were triggered by the official government newspaper – the Islamic Republic News Agency’s Iran – publishing a cartoon which depicts a boy repeating “cockroach” in Persian before a giant bug in front of him asks “What?” in Azeri.

Azeri-Iranians – who make up approximately one-quarter of the country’s population – were particularly offended by the cartoon. These disturbances come at a bad time for the Iranian government, which is stressing national unity in the face of international concern over its nuclear program.

Cartoons seem to be a touchy subject. BUT the bottom line on all of this is that currently, multilateralism is the name of the game. It won’t work, and Iran keeps the advantage, and the initiative.