What Iran Could Learn from Israel’s Nuclear Weapons Program?

I’ve been reading Israel and the Bomb by Avner Cohen, a fairly dense history of the Israeli nuclear program. What initially jumped out at me was the luck, circumstances, coincidences, and political tactics that led Israel to acquire nuclear weapons. Cohen describes the Israeli nuclear program as “opaque,” because its existence and capability has never been directly stated or addressed. Iran, if it truly wants to acquire nuclear weaponry, would do well to emulate Israel’s pursuit of nuclear weaponry instead of the blustering path it is taking now.


Before I dive into the argument, I would like issue a preemptive caveat: most states that obtain nuclear weapons do so secretly, as the acquisition of a nuclear weapon usually changes a state’s standing on the world stage dramatically. Therefore, Israel’s nuclear program can’t be singled out as the only clandestine pursuit of strategic weaponry development in the world. That being said, Israel’s nuclear program is a case study on how to get strategic weapons, and how to deploy them around the classical views of nuclear tactics and deterrence strategy. Iran is doing things precisely the wrong way, and if they wanted actual weapons (and the benefits they bring) instead of an overt program (and the sanctions/ military actions it may incur), they would do well to sit and listen to how Israel got the bomb.

Now I had a general idea on how Israel acquired its unstated nuclear arsenal, but Cohen breaks it down very well. Israel’s pursuit of nukes started after the first war it fought with its Arab neighbors in 1948. After fighting off the Arabs and winning a fairly decisive victory, the Israeli government reasoned (correctly) that the Arabs would view the conflict as a temporary setback, not a final defeat, and re-group for another attack on the Jewish state. Because of Israel’s size, population, and relative power, the very survival of the state was at stake, and the government deemed it necessary to acquire some sort of assurance against annihilation – nuclear weapons seemed to be the best route to accomplish this.

The program started by educating a cadre of scientists that were well versed in nuclear technology. This took several years, and culminated with the establishment of Israel’s nuclear reactor: Dimona. Dimona was established for the express purpose of acquiring nuclear weapon technology. Now, here’s where it gets interesting.

In 1958, according to Cohen, Israel had 13 infantry brigades, compared to the Arab’s 45-48. Tensions began to rise, especially after the establishment of the UAR (United Arab Republic, Nasser’s grand design of pan-Arabism that resulted in a military alliance between Syria and Egypt) and the nationalization of the Suez Canal. This led Israel to an unlikely alliance with France. France, who saw Algeria’s intransigence as Nasser’s fault, saw a strong Israel as a benefit to France, drawing attention away from Algeria. So France, which was already pursuing a nuclear program for itself, aided Israel in its Dimona project. So France (yes, France) provided Israel with the real know-how to get their nuclear program on track.

Norway provided Israel with the necessary heavy water, and the program began in earnest. Now, the necessary elements for a nuclear weapon are the tech know-how, the delivery method, and the infrastructure to produce a warhead and field it –Israel was rapidly requiring all 3, but it wasn’t publicizing it. Israel believed that while nuclear weapons would ensure its national survival, admitting they had the weapons may be a casus belli for the Arab nations, who outnumbered the Israelis. So it had to balance its growing ability with the necessity to keep the program secret. Israel ran into serious problems, however, when the Kennedy became the president in America.

Kennedy’s foreign policy had a heavy emphasis on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This led to America taking a very tough line with Israeli and its research at the Dimona plant. American policy restricted and prevented Israel from developing the necessary components for their weapon, but Kennedy’s tough policy ended with his assassination. Johnson took a warmer approach to the Israelis, and his administration green-lit significant arms-deals with the Israelis in return for nebulous guarantees of “not developing the bomb.” The reasoning for this was simple: a conventionally weak Israel would be more inclined to produce nukes, a conventionally strong Israel would be less inclined to rely on nukes if it had a significant modern air forces and armored maneuver forces. Israel used this opening to purchase 30 ballistic missile delivery systems from France, cementing their unstated nuclear ability.

Now, very importantly, Israel’s nuclear program was not a reason for the 1967 “Six Day” war, but it was a point of contention among the Arab nations during a lead-up to the conflict. America’s apparent policy toward Israel was one of acceptance of its nuclear policy as long as it did not directly admit it had such a program. Cohen calls this “Opaqueness”. In 1970, the New York Times declared Israel a nuclear power (and hey- that’s the final word). Thus, despite the Yom Kippur war, the Infitada (I and II), and many other regional conflicts, Israel has remained a regional nuclear power in almost every sense.

So why is Iran pursuing the exactly opposite path that Israel took to successfully establish its power? There are several reasons, but let’s focus on “What” the Iranians are doing wrong, rather than “why”. First Iran is being very, very vocal about their program, their intentions, and this is raising the hackles of its enemies, and the international community at large. When you say “I’m enriching uranium, Israel must be destroyed, and you better not stop us”, it makes people nervous. Israel said precisely nothing, and deflected as much inquiry as possible, as it developed its program.

Next, Iran isn’t leveraging its outside help as effectively as Israel did. France was the key to getting Israeli nukes off of the ground, Russia is the key for Iran. The problem is that coinciding national interests permitted the technology exchange between France and Israel –does Iran possess the same national interests as Russia does to necessitate its nuclear tech exchange? -We’ll see as the sanction talk increases.

Finally, Israel’s acquisition of nuclear weapons grew out of a desire for self-preservation, not a quest for regional hegemony. Therefore, Israel benefited from the region suspecting, but not sure of, its nuclear capabilities. Iran is developing its nuke program for the express purpose of regional hegemony, and it suits them to inform as many people as possible (as loudly as possible) of their abilities to establish fear. This can backfire on them if they push too hard.

No two circumstances can be exactly compared. Israel developed its program with the backdrop of the Cold War, Iran is developing its nukes in a post 9/11 world. The lesson of Israel’s nuclear program still endures today: if you really want nukes, shut up and develop them!

Comments

  1. Harland says:

    I’d like to add another possible thought. Perhaps the way Iran approaches this work has more to do with the Arab – Islamist mentality than any political saavy. That is the biggest bully on the block wins – to put it bluntly. A lot of the Arab community values power and the ability to be tough, talk tough. It’s an argument used in the lack of Arab response to US actions in the region. If Iran appears to be able to bully around the world and get its way by talking tough and giving the standard anti-US, Israel dribble – then they gain value in the region. It’s the taunting that gains esteem, not just the actual item.

    Additionally they through in the China card – not a bad tactic – to stem interference from the UN and general community. And thus force Israel and the US (since most in the EU have ruled out violence – for now) to look like the evil empire again.

    Of course it’s a bluff if you look at if from the bully stand point. B/C if the US acts tough in response and serves a big slice of humble pie ala USAF, then they loose all ground and the Arab community shrinks back (Hamas gets quieter and more submissive as do other groups.)

    Just a thought or two.

  2. Harland says:

    I’d like to add another possible thought. Perhaps the way Iran approaches this work has more to do with the Arab – Islamist mentality than any political saavy. That is the biggest bully on the block wins – to put it bluntly. A lot of the Arab community values power and the ability to be tough, talk tough. It’s an argument used in the lack of Arab response to US actions in the region. If Iran appears to be able to bully around the world and get its way by talking tough and giving the standard anti-US, Israel dribble – then they gain value in the region. It’s the taunting that gains esteem, not just the actual item.

    Additionally they through in the China card – not a bad tactic – to stem interference from the UN and general community. And thus force Israel and the US (since most in the EU have ruled out violence – for now) to look like the evil empire again.

    Of course it’s a bluff if you look at if from the bully stand point. B/C if the US acts tough in response and serves a big slice of humble pie ala USAF, then they loose all ground and the Arab community shrinks back (Hamas gets quieter and more submissive as do other groups.)

    Just a thought or two.

  3. Eric Blair says:

    Harland brings up a good point, and combined with the notion that Israel’s nukes are for self defense, suggests a rather disturbing future possibility: That is, the Iranians are not only bent on developing nukes, they’re also going to use the existence them to bully their neighbors and perhaps just use them. (On Israel, to start with).

  4. Maggie says:

    I am struck by the incredible irony. The best example for Iran to follow is the last one they will consider.

  5. igout says:

    There’s another possibility. Iran already has some, perhaps from North K, perhaps from the old USSR. How imaginative to hide your nukes under a program to acquire them. Also, this lets you strut and quietly possess at the same time.

    As to what they want them for, some people say they’re hot-crazy, and seek the end of the world beause the 12th imman likes that. Others think they’re cold-crazy, like Stalin say, and want to take the world over intact. In the first case, they’ll probably launch their nukes; in the 2nd, they probably won’t.

    Either way, they should be whacked soon.

  6. Andy says:

    If Iran could go the Israel route they would have. The simple fact is they have always lacked the technical and engineering expertise to do things on their own. They can’t even refine enough gasoline in their own country to meet their needs. Many of the country’s brain-trust left after the revolution, and Iranian students don’t have as much access to the world-class engineering schools. If Iran hadn’t been given designs and actual working centrifuges from the AQ Khan network, along with other help from China, their program would still be in stagnation.

    The Iranian program was covert until the AQ Khan network was busted. Once the evidence was there for everyone to see, Iran could no longer claim they didn’t have a nuclear program, so it suddenly became their “civilian power” program.

    And Harland makes a classic mistake – the Iranians are not Arabs, they are Persians. And although they are radical Islamists, they do not subscribe to the Sunni Wahhabi radicalism that characterizes Al Qaeda and most of the active and most dangerous terrorists today. Even though they are radicals, the Iranians are less radical than the Wahhabi’s. Even the Iranians thought the Taliban were barbarians after all.

  7. Andy says:

    If Iran could go the Israel route they would have. The simple fact is they have always lacked the technical and engineering expertise to do things on their own. They can’t even refine enough gasoline in their own country to meet their needs. Many of the country’s brain-trust left after the revolution, and Iranian students don’t have as much access to the world-class engineering schools. If Iran hadn’t been given designs and actual working centrifuges from the AQ Khan network, along with other help from China, their program would still be in stagnation.

    The Iranian program was covert until the AQ Khan network was busted. Once the evidence was there for everyone to see, Iran could no longer claim they didn’t have a nuclear program, so it suddenly became their “civilian power” program.

    And Harland makes a classic mistake – the Iranians are not Arabs, they are Persians. And although they are radical Islamists, they do not subscribe to the Sunni Wahhabi radicalism that characterizes Al Qaeda and most of the active and most dangerous terrorists today. Even though they are radicals, the Iranians are less radical than the Wahhabi’s. Even the Iranians thought the Taliban were barbarians after all.

  8. Andy says:

    If Iran could go the Israel route they would have. The simple fact is they have always lacked the technical and engineering expertise to do things on their own. They can’t even refine enough gasoline in their own country to meet their needs. Many of the country’s brain-trust left after the revolution, and Iranian students don’t have as much access to the world-class engineering schools. If Iran hadn’t been given designs and actual working centrifuges from the AQ Khan network, along with other help from China, their program would still be in stagnation.

    The Iranian program was covert until the AQ Khan network was busted. Once the evidence was there for everyone to see, Iran could no longer claim they didn’t have a nuclear program, so it suddenly became their “civilian power” program.

    And Harland makes a classic mistake – the Iranians are not Arabs, they are Persians. And although they are radical Islamists, they do not subscribe to the Sunni Wahhabi radicalism that characterizes Al Qaeda and most of the active and most dangerous terrorists today. Even though they are radicals, the Iranians are less radical than the Wahhabi’s. Even the Iranians thought the Taliban were barbarians after all.

  9. Andy says:

    If Iran could go the Israel route they would have. The simple fact is they have always lacked the technical and engineering expertise to do things on their own. They can’t even refine enough gasoline in their own country to meet their needs. Many of the country’s brain-trust left after the revolution, and Iranian students don’t have as much access to the world-class engineering schools. If Iran hadn’t been given designs and actual working centrifuges from the AQ Khan network, along with other help from China, their program would still be in stagnation.

    The Iranian program was covert until the AQ Khan network was busted. Once the evidence was there for everyone to see, Iran could no longer claim they didn’t have a nuclear program, so it suddenly became their “civilian power” program.

    And Harland makes a classic mistake – the Iranians are not Arabs, they are Persians. And although they are radical Islamists, they do not subscribe to the Sunni Wahhabi radicalism that characterizes Al Qaeda and most of the active and most dangerous terrorists today. Even though they are radicals, the Iranians are less radical than the Wahhabi’s. Even the Iranians thought the Taliban were barbarians after all.

  10. Andy says:

    Man, sorry about the spam, my comments kept timing out from my end. Please delete this post and my extra copies.

    Again, my apologies.

  11. Harland says:

    Andy brings up a valid point, although I still think the idea holds validity. Persians are different from their Arab neighbors, and don’t subscribe per se to the Wahhabi’s. But that doesn’t change the fact that they at least understand the Arab mentality of power (or projected power) wins the ‘who’s bigger’ game. Although I think they still (even as Persians) fundementally believe it (at least those in power). Take the whole US embassy take-over. It nicely won them respect on the Arab stage…exactly their design.

    Harland

  12. Pat West says:

    Why yes, how the State of Israel ever acquired the atomic bomb is certainly a mystery. It is truly amazing, considering that all of the leading nuclear scientists of the time were Chinese, including Doctors Oppenheimer, Fermi, Einstein, Szilard, Teller, Wigner, Serber, Frankel, Konopinski, Bethe, Marvin, Simon, Kurti, Fuchs, and Rosenburg. Naturally, all of the above were very discrete, and above suspicion. Oh, did I mention that Dr. Oppenheimer lost his security clearance, that Dr. Rosenberg was executed for treason, and that Dr. Fuchs was jailed for treason? Well, these things happen, even to the best Chinese scientists!

    Cohen’s book on Israel and the Bomb, claiming that France essentially gave Israel the technology for the Bomb, is a complete, totally fantasy. Absolutely preposterous! This massive piece of dis-information was obviously engineered, from start to finish, by the Mossad. Perhaps to make it more credible the Mossad should suggest that Israel start calling it the Force du Frappe, in honor of the ridiculous frogs. What does Cohen have for us next? An expose that it was actually French immigrants to Australia that attacked Pearl Harbor? It is, of course, entirely possible that Cohen is not merely a dupe, but actually works for the Mossad.

    I don’t think, for a moment, that the Mossad initiated this farce to impress Americans. Most fair minded Americans would agree that the Jewish State deserves to have the Bomb, for without immigrant Jewish scientists, we would not have the Bomb. So, good for Israel! But Americans, certainly our young military officers, should not take this absurd book seriously.